


RS-TAC-90-010
APRIL 1990



**FOREIGN
BROADCAST
INFORMATION
SERVICE**

JPRS Report

Arms Control

Arms Control

JPRS-TAC-90-010

CONTENTS

18 April 1990

CHINA

Article Views Bush Arms Cut Proposal [SHIJIE ZHISHI 1 Mar]	1
Article Discusses New U.S. Military Strategy [JIEFANGJUN BAO 12 Mar]	2
U.S. Disarmament, Arms Sale Position Criticized [RENMIN RIBAO 1 Apr]	4
Zhou Peiyuan Meets Disarmament Seminar Members [XINHUA 6 Apr]	4

EAST EUROPE

BULGARIA

Deputy Defense Minister on Army Budget [K. Dobrev; NARODNA ARMIYA 23 Mar]	5
Soviet Says No Nuclear Weapons in Bulgaria [BTA 30 Mar]	6

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Shortage of Civil Defense Shelters in Slovakia [H. Kardosova; ROLNICKE NOVINY 21 Mar]	6
Dobrovsky on Presence of 'Less Than 10' SS-23's [CTK 28 Mar]	7
Tanks in Nitra Dismantled for Metal [Prague Radio 29 Mar]	7

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Plans for Army Reduction, Disarmament Outlined [H.-J. Nagel; DER MORGEN 22 Mar]	7
---	---

HUNGARY

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Proceeds on Schedule [MTI 29 Mar]	8
Railway, Defense Ministry on Soviet Withdrawal [Budapest Radio 30 Mar]	8
Soviet Officer on Withdrawal of Troops [M. Burlakov; MAGYAR HIRLAP 4 Apr]	8
Organization Formed To Monitor Soviet Withdrawal [MTI 5 Apr]	9

POLAND

Arms Manufacturers 'To Obtain Export Licenses' [GAZETA WYBORCZA 21 Mar]	9
Public Opinion Poll on Soviet Withdrawal [PAP 29 Mar]	10
Military Daily on Future European Developments [W. Stepak; ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI 29 Mar]	10

YUGOSLAVIA

Army on Danger of Military Industry Insolvency [TANJUG 28 Mar]	11
--	----

NEAR EAST & SOUTH ASIA

PAKISTAN

Aims of Indigenous Arms Production Detailed [THE NATION 2 Apr]	12
--	----

SOVIET UNION

Security of Asian Pacific Region Examined [V. Vorontsov, A. Muradyan; FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS No 1, Jan]	13
List of U.S., Soviet 'Operational Missile Bases' [L. Kolpakov; VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA 31 Jan]	21

Iceland's Hermannsson Voices Support for Naval Arms Cuts [S. Hermannsson; ZA RUBEZHOM No 6, 2-6 Feb]	21
U.S. ALCM Test Over Canada Noted [A. Kamenskiy; KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Feb]	23
Meeting on Questions of Economy, Ecology of Disarmament Proposed [O. Mamalyga; MOSCOW NEWS No 6, 18-25 Feb]	24
Military People's Deputy Questions Wisdom of INF Treaty [E. Gams; MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 3, Mar]	24
Realities of 'Third Zero' Option Discussed [P. Bayev, et al; MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN No 3, Mar]	28
Austrian Choice Of Bofors Missile Noted [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Mar]	36
M60A1 Armor Upgrade Noted [KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 7 Mar]	36
Major General Kuklev Comments on 'Open Skies' Talks [V. Kuklev; TRUD 27 Mar]	36
Total Ban on Nuclear Testing Examined	38
French Official Comments [J. Bouchron; TRUD 3 Apr]	38
British View Given [W. Churchill; TRUD 3 Apr]	39
Soviet's Kiselev Counters [S. Kiselev; TRUD 3 Apr]	39

WEST EUROPE

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO's Woerner on Need for Nuclear Arms [M. Woerner; Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG 25 Mar]	41
Belgium Urges 'Massive Reduction' in SNF [Paris AFP 6 Apr]	41

AUSTRIA

Investigation Continues on Illegal Arms Exports [H. Czernin; PROFIL 26 Mar]	42
Former Envoy to U.S. Testifies on Arms Exports [WIENER ZEITUNG 27 Mar]	44

BELGIUM

Defense Minister Coeme on European Strategy [Brussels Radio 6 Apr]	44
--	----

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Post-CFE Forces Planning Guidelines Emerging [H. Bruemmer; WEHRTECHNIK Feb]	44
Defense Minister on Possible Cuts in Bundeswehr [DPA 29 Mar]	48
Hesse Government Wants U.S. Troop Reduction [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 4 Apr]	48
Dregger Urges Eliminating Short-Range Weapons [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 4 Apr]	49
Defense Spokesman Confirms Missile Withdrawal [Cologne Radio 4 Apr]	49
No Evidence of RSA Submarines Found [FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE 7 Apr]	49

FINLAND

Interceptor Acquisition Choices Seen Narrowed [M. Klemola, J. Raivio; HELSINGIN SANOMAT 11 Feb]	50
USSR Questioned About Possible Nuclear Tests [Helsinki Radio 28 Mar]	53

FRANCE

Controversy on Hades Missile Deployment Viewed [F. Fillon; LIBERATION 6 Feb]	53
Disarmament Plans Trouble Army Leadership [J. Guisel; LIBERATION 6 Feb]	54
Defense Official Questions Equipment Production [LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS 6 Mar]	55
Defense Minister on German Unity, Europe [Mar] [LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS 6 Mar]	55

NETHERLANDS

First CFE Monitor Recruits Begin Training [NRC HANDELSBLAD 24 Feb]	58
--	----

NORWAY

Debate on Local U.S. Force Strength Viewed	[A.O. Brundtland; AFTENPOSTEN 6 Mar]	59
--	--------------------------------------	----

TURKEY

Ministry Sees No Hostile Iraqi Missile Intent	[ANATOLIA 5 Apr]	60
---	------------------	----

UNITED KINGDOM

Nuclear Triggers Intercepted en Route to Iraq	[P. Archer; PRESS ASSOCIATION 28 Mar]	60
Defense Secretary Foresees Military Cuts	[PRESS ASSOCIATION 28 Mar]	61
Kohl Wants 'Full NATO Protection' for Germany		
	[T. McMullan; PRESS ASSOCIATION 30 Mar]	61
Company Denies Illegal Dealings with Iraq	[PRESS ASSOCIATION 30 Mar]	62
Hurd Stresses 'Essential Role' of NATO	[PRESS ASSOCIATION 31 Mar]	62
Defense White Paper Outlines Future of Forces	[C. Miller; PRESS ASSOCIATION 2 Apr]	63

Article Views Bush Arms Cut Proposal

HK2903010390 Beijing SHIJIE ZHISHI
No 5 in Chinese 1 Mar 90 pp 2-3

[Article by Sa Benwang (5646 2609 2598) and Xin Peihe (2946 3099 0678): "A New Card From the United States—Bush's New Proposal on Europe's Conventional Arms Cut"]

[Text] Bush's new proposal indicates that the initiative of arms control and arms cut talks is now in the hands of the United States. It answers U.S. domestic interests, and is designed to help Gorbachev. What is worth pondering is that both want a part of their armies to remain in Europe, just to guard against any unexpected developments in East Germany and German unification.

At his first "State of the Union" address to Congress on 31 January, President Bush announced an important arms cut proposal: "further reducing U.S. and Soviet troops in Central Europe to 195,000 for each side." Before the official announcement Bush had talked specially with NATO ally leaders and called the Soviet leader on the telephone concerning the issue.

Bush's proposal was an important revision to the European conventional arms reduction proposal made by him at the Brussel NATO head meeting on 29 last May. Originally Bush proposed both the United States and the Soviet Union reduce the troops stationed in other European countries to 275,000. Under this proposal, the United States would have to cut its Europe-stationed army by 45,000 troops, that is 14 percent of its 320,000 stationed in Europe; and the Soviet Union—600,000 troops in Eastern Europe at the time—would need to cut 325,000, 54 percent of the Soviet troops based in East Europe. According to Bush's new proposal, both U.S. and Soviet forces were to be reduced to 195,000, in which case the United States would cut 55,000 troops, 22 percent of its 250,000 troops based in Central Europe (all in West Germany); the Soviet Union currently has 520,000 troops in Eastern Europe (380,000 of which in East Germany), and needs to cut 325,000 troops, 63 percent of its forces in Eastern Europe. Reductions by the Soviet would be more. More importantly, the 195,000 U.S. troops based in Central Europe after the reduction, plus its troops stationed in Britain, Greece and Turkey, would add up to 225,000 U.S. Europe-based troops; whereas the Soviet Union would only have 195,000 troops in all of Europe following reductions, since it has troops only in East Germany. Of course, the United States argues that its home army is far away from Europe, while the Soviet troops are much closer.

The raising of Bush's new proposal indicates that the initiative of armament control and arms cut talks is now in U.S. hands. Several years ago Gorbachev repeatedly initiated drives to cut arms, with which Reagan could only deal passively. Now Bush has reversed the situation. His new arms cut proposal has put Gorbachev in a passive and defensive position. Bush declared confidently in his State of Union address: "Before us now lies

a world full of challenges and opportunities. Now there is a need for a kind of leadership for which only the United States is qualified." Some people see this as a necessary reflection of U.S.-Soviet relations and strategic situation, in which the United States is on the offense and advancing, while the Soviet Union is defensive and retreating.

Bush's new proposal responds to the trend of easing up in U.S.-Soviet and East-West relations, and to a trend of weakening military tension between the United States and Soviet Union and NATO and Warsaw. The United States judged that, owing to rapid changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, its and Warsaw's military threats against America and NATO had dropped to "the lowest since the close of the Second World War." Changes in situations offered the United States a chance to seize the initiatives in arms control and arms cut talks. The United States considered that, provided that its relatively superior military power was preserved, its military expenditure and troop strength could be properly reduced, parts of military bases closed, and overseas stationed army withdrawn. According to an announcement by the U.S. Defense Department, U.S. military expenditure in 1991 fiscal year was estimated to be \$303.3 billion, a two percent drop from 1990 fiscal year after deducting the inflation factor. In the coming five years, U.S. military expenditure will be reduced by an annual average of two percent. In 1991 fiscal year, the total forces of U.S. three armed services will drop from 2,077,000 to 2,040,000, a net decrease of 37,000; among which the most affected is the Army, where divisions on active duty will be cut to 16 from 18. In the coming five years, U.S. total troop strength will be reduced by 200,000. Following the closure or adjustment of 145 (86 closed) military bases in 1989, the United States is planning to shut or scale down the operations of 69 military bases in 1990, 14 of which are overseas. It is expected that, in the 1990-1995 fiscal years the reduction of military bases will save \$1.2 billion. Apart from this, 20 weapons development projects will be stopped, which will save \$2.9 billion; the reduction of troops in central Europe to 195,000 will annually save \$8 billion. Cutting military expenditure is an important part in Bush Administration's efforts to reduce government financial deficits. Bush has announced that the government budget deficit in 1991 fiscal year will decrease from four digits to \$63.1 billion, and great efforts will be made to achieve budget balance and eliminate deficit in 1993 fiscal year.

Bush raising his new proposal at this time is intended to respond to Soviet need and help Gorbachev rid present difficulties. Bush has recently praised Gorbachev for his "work to realize openness and reform," and stated "his hope that Gorbachev can have the situation firmly under his grasp." At present the Soviet Union desperately needs arms cut and, through it, to reduce military expenditure and divert the expenditure to civilian and

economic areas. As early as December 1988 Gorbachev had announced an unilateral troop reduction of 500,000 soldiers, and begun reducing troops in Eastern Europe. Eastern European countries following the drastic changes have also begun asking the Soviet Union to pull out its army. At the end of last year, Czechoslovakia and Hungary respectively demanded that the Soviet Union withdraw this year the 75,000 and 52,000 troops stationed in their land. They have held several talks with the Soviet Union concerning the pullout. The trend is bound to affect Poland (40,000 Soviet troops are stationed there) and the German Democratic Republic (350,000 to 380,000 Soviet troops there). The Soviet Union has stated that it will pull out its troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary as early as possible and will talk with Poland over the military pullout issue. It seems that Soviet military pullout from Eastern Europe is an established trend. Bush's new proposal conforms to the trend, and in a certain way has helped prevent Soviet withdrawal from being viewed as unilateral. This obviously will put Soviet highranking officers at ease and help strengthen Gorbachev's domestic position.

Bush's new proposal has been generally welcomed by European allies such as West Germany, is viewed as an important step in further easing military tension in Europe, and will help realize a low-level security situation in Europe; particularly in central Europe. In fact, before Bush made his proposal Belgium had expressed its intention to withdraw all of its 25,000 troops from West Germany, and Holland had also said it would call back part of its army stationed in West Germany. The U.S. example may set off a upsurge among NATO countries of cutting military expenditure and troops. At present, NATO countries have accepted Bush's new proposal as a formal motion in talks with Warsaw Pact. On the other hand NATO's military strategy will undergo new impacts. Despite Bush's statement that "United States' military presence in Europe is necessary," NATO countries' confidence in U.S. determination to defend Europe will suffer. The future direction of NATO's long observed flexible response strategy will become an important topic of discussion for NATO countries.

The Soviet Union basically agrees with Bush's new proposal. What it disagrees with is U.S. non-equivalence policy, namely, the real number of U.S. troops in Europe will be 225,000, while there will be 195,000 Soviet Union's troops in Eastern Europe. This was the reason Gorbachev told U.S. Secretary of State Baker at when they met on 8 February, that either U.S. troops really amount to 195,000, or the Soviet troops will be adjusted to 225,000 soldiers. What is worth pondering here is the Soviets could have made a more radical counter-proposed: Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasimov explicitly stated on 1 February that "Bush's proposal has not gone far enough," "we must continue to work vigorously to achieve our target: no armies are stationed on foreign land." In reality Gorbachev did not immediately make such a counter-proposal, but

announced on 11 February that it would withdraw all of its troops in Eastern Europe before 1995-1996, and dismantle all military bases in foreign territories before 2000. Some people have commented that the statement was made following the change of events. The media had also noticed that the second half of Gerasimov's statement: "People would perceive from Bush's speech that he needs U.S. army to be stationed permanently in Europe... This is not a good sign." Some comments consider this as an indication that both the United States and Soviet Union need to have part of their armies stationed in Europe for any contingencies in Eastern Europe; in particular, the process of German unification is speeding up and nobody can it stop now, and the United States and Soviet Union must now guard against and restrain a unified, economically powerful and populous Germany. Obviously, **maintaining a certain number of armies in Europe serves better the interests of the two superpowers.**

At present President Bush has expressed that he would stick to the levels made in his new proposal. Public opinion thinks that both countries have the need to cut armies stationed in foreign territories, and it seems likely that within a short time important developments can be seen in Europe's conventional arm reduction talks.

Article Discusses New U.S. Military Strategy

HK2803014690 Beijing JIEFANGJUN BAO
in Chinese 12 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by Li Qinggong (2621 1987 0501): "U.S. Military Strategy in New Situation"]

[Text] In late January, when submitting the national defense budget of the 1991 fiscal year to Congress, the Bush administration also expounded the U.S. military strategy under the new situation. The Bush administration held that "there are tremendous opportunities as well as tremendous uncertain factors and risks in the current rapidly changing world." According to this basic assessment of the current situation, it affirmed that "the Soviet Union will remain the main rival of the United States in the global sphere," but the United States will also face actual and latent challenges from "the serious threats which are increasing in other aspects." Therefore, the Bush administration laid more stress on the flexibility of its military strategy of "flexible reactions," and also adjusted various sub-strategies.

Nuclear strategy: The Bush administration held that "nuclear deterrence will remain the core of the U.S. defense strategy" and that "increasing the comprehensive deterrent power of the nuclear force remains the pressing task of the times in U.S. nuclear strategy." The Bush administration is making some major adjustments in its nuclear strategy, and the adjustments are mainly concentrated on two aspects.

First, priority is given to the surviving capacity of the nuclear force. In its plan for modernizing the nuclear force, the Bush administration gave priority to the

development of such projects as the B-2A "stealth" bombers, the mobile MX missiles, the "Midgetman" missiles, and the "Trident II" submarine-launched missiles which will increase the surviving capacity of the nuclear force. A total amount of \$11.773 billion was allocated to these projects. Second, the strike targets of the nuclear force were also adjusted. In order to raise the credibility of its nuclear deterrence, the Bush administration not only takes the land-based heavy transcontinental ballistic missiles of the Soviet Union as its main strike targets, but also the strategic defense systems. A noticeable fact was that the headquarters of the U.S. strategic air force was formulating a new "combat program based on strategic integration." The U.S. nuclear force also plans to carry out nuclear strikes against the location of the Soviet leading group in the initial stage of the war, and is prepared to organize a "crack nuclear force" to carry out special tasks and to be commanded by the president to tackle emergencies.

Strategic defense: In recent years, due to various obstructive factors in the strategic environment, in the political situation, and in technological development, the "Strategic Defense Initiative" that Reagan launched in March 1983 was bogged down for a time. According to its strategic needs and the new technological developments, the Bush administration again attached importance to the "Strategic Defense Initiative" and worked out three objectives for this program: 1) "containing the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear offensive;" 2) "containing the offensive staged by countries which possess and are developing missiles for carrying nuclear and chemical warheads;" and 3) "coping with incident-caused or accidental nuclear raids."

In order to achieve these strategic objectives, the Bush administration accelerated the research and development process concerning the "Strategic Defense Initiative." In order to ensure the effectiveness of this program, the Bush administration still planned to allocate \$4.471 billion, which marks an increase of 25 percent, to the research and development projects for strategic defense in the coming fiscal year even though the total military expenditure is to be reduced. The Bush administration expected that "by the end of this century or in the early 21st century, the United States will enter the initial deployment stage of the new strategic defense system," then the deployment plan of "the multi-tiered strategic defense system which includes the land-based and space-based weapons" will be fulfilled step by step. Then, the strategic strength of the United States will serve both offensive and defensive purposes.

Conventional strategy: When facing the changes in the international security environment, especially the developments in Europe's political and military situation, and when facing the "challenges" against the United States posed by some "regional powers" in the military field, the Bush administration has begun to partly adjust its traditional conventional military strategy. On the one hand, it stressed the need "to maintain strong conventional armaments and reduce the dependence on the means of nuclear

reprisal;" on the other hand, it attached greater importance to "the building of a conventional deterrent force that can perform combat duties when deterrence becomes ineffective."

It relied mainly on deterrence when tackling the military threats from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, but it resorted more to the use of military force against the low-intensity regional conflicts in the Third World. In order to guarantee the implementation of this strategy, the Bush administration will continue to carry out the structural adjustment of the conventional military forces in the new fiscal year by strengthening the construction of light-equipped units and special combat units and raising their comprehensive combat capability in coping with the eventualities. In addition, the Bush administration will also revise the campaign and tactical principles according to the experience in the fighting of invading Panama.

Competition strategy: The Bush administration now pays attention to the development of armaments in the next 10 years or a longer period, and has once again stressed the importance of the competition strategy. In order to "carry out protracted competition with the Soviet Union," the Bush administration has planned to make full use of the United States' high-technology advantages and develop the previous competition strategy which was rather effective. It will put more resources into the three major fields of developing "crucial technologies, weaponry and equipment, and tactics" in order to ensure the United States' superior position in these aspects.

Disarmament strategy: In the recent period, according to the development of the Soviet and East European situation and the changes in the international security environment, the Bush administration has made some substantial adjustments in its disarmament strategy and has fixed new strategic objectives in five aspects.

Through carrying out negotiations, concluding treaties, and implementing treaties, the United States is trying to achieve the following purposes: Forcing the Soviet Union to substantially reduce its armaments, thus reducing its military threats against the U.S. security interests; resolving the tough problem of the insufficiency of military expenses caused by the development of armaments, while maintaining the crucial strategic deterrent force and the main research and development projects; prompting the allies to shoulder more commitments for "common defense" and consolidating the "collective security" system in the West; helping Gorbachev tide over his difficulties with a hope that "Gorbachev will tightly control the situation;" and shake off the plaguing influence of the arms race on the building of "new strategic relations" with the Soviet Union. In order to achieve these five disarmament strategic objectives, the Bush administration will adopt more flexible and positive approaches and steps in the field of disarmament.

Alliance strategy: The United States has formed "alliance structures" with 26 countries according to seven major treaties to "guarantee their common political,

economic, and security interests." This play a major role in propping up the U.S. military strategy as a whole. When drastic changes have occurred in the current international situation and when the United States has found it harder and harder to pay the military bills, the Bush government will need to "place more stress on its alliance policy" and to strive to maintain the United States' leading position. At the same time, it "will rely more on the crucial commitments of the allies for common defense."

The Bush administration stressed that "the forefront defense" is the foundation for the U.S. alliance strategy, while the troops stationed in overseas areas and the overseas bases constitute two major pillars. Although the Bush administration planned to reduce the number of troops stationed in overseas areas and reduce the number of overseas bases in order to meet the need of cutting down on the military expenditure in the new fiscal year, its military presence in the key strategic points will still be upgraded in quality and the posture of "forefront defense" will not be weakened. In addition, in order to bring "forefront defense" into better play and strengthen allied relations, the Bush administration planned to provide \$8.8 billion of security assistance to various allies in the new fiscal year, marking an increase of about 20 percent.

In short, although the Bush administration has adjusted the above-mentioned sub-strategies to different degrees, it still stressed that the United States will continue to pursue the "flexible reaction" strategy. This indicated that according to the Bush administration, although there were the tremendous changes in the current international political situation, no corresponding improvement had occurred in the international security environment and threats still existed to a serious degree. Therefore, "the 'flexible reaction' strategy that was successfully pursued for more than 20 years" will continue to be applicable in the present stage. This also indicated that when facing the rapid and tremendous changes in the present international situation, the Bush administration could not make a conclusive assessment of the security environment and it was hard for it to put forward a brand-new military strategy. Reportedly, the strategists and military experts in the Bush administration are intensely working in order to formulate the country's military strategy in the 1990's.

U.S. Disarmament, Arms Sale Position Criticized

HK0204131090 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
1 Apr 90 p 6

["International Jottings" by Zhu Ji (4376 1015):
"Reduction of Arms or Resale of Weapons?"]

[Text] As revealed by THE NEW YORK TIMES, the U.S. Government recently submitted a secret report to Congress, listing weapons with a total value of \$30

billion that could be sold to some Third World countries. Part of these weapons, with a value of \$9.8 billion, may be sold in 56 transactions.

As is known to all, the United States is a large seller in the arms trade, and makes good money through such transactions. However, according to THE NEW YORK TIMES, the weapons that the United States plans to sell are "the weapons that would have to be destroyed once the agreement on reducing conventional arms in Europe is concluded." This is an issue worth considering. Weapons are used in wars; in order to prevent wars, arms must be reduced. Therefore, disarmament has also been the strong demand of the peace-loving people of the world. In the past, when the superpowers were contending for world hegemony, they spared no effort to expand arms, and the shadow of war hung critically over the earth like the sword of Damocles. Today, they are complying with the detente trend of the times in the world and beginning to reduce their arms. This is naturally a good thing. However, if the weapons being removed from Europe are not destroyed but sold to other countries, especially to some hot spots in the Third World, then this is no different from kindling the flames of war in those areas. This will just create new regions with latent tension and go against the original purpose of disarmament and the wishes of the world's people. U.S. Government officials tried to justify this practice with this argument: The production lines in the defense industry must continue to maintain normal operation when the Pentagon is to reduce its budget. How much iron has been wasted in order to cast the present heavy sword? Although the United States has great national strength, it now also finds it hard to shoulder the burden of too heavy military expenses. Reducing military expenses will certainly be favorable to its efforts to lower its budgetary deficit and to develop the economy. However, if it continues to maintain large-scale production in the defense industry while carrying out disarmament, people cannot but question what benefit such disarmament will bring to world peace. Only when the production of weapons is also reduced along with a reduction in the existing arms will disarmament be really beneficial to the maintenance of world peace.

Zhou Peiyuan Meets Disarmament Seminar Members

OW0604124690 Beijing XINHUA in English
1205 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Beijing, April 6 (XINHUA)—Zhou Peiyuan, vice-chairman of the National Committee of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference and president of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and Disarmament, met here today with participants in the second Isodarco (International School of Disarmament and Cooperation) Beijing arms control seminar.

BULGARIA

Deputy Defense Minister on Army Budget

AU2903133990 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 23 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, first deputy minister of national defense, by unidentified representative of NARODNA ARMIYA Editorial Board; place and date not given: "Are the Funds for the Country's Military Defense Large or Small?"]

[Text] As is known, at the 15th session of the National Assembly, the people's deputies approved by a vote the defense expenditures for 1990. The subject of the military budget has recently given rise to many discussions and varying opinions among different circles of our public opinion. In order to shed some light on this very important problem, to avoid certain contradictions in the interpretation of the specific figures, and to enable them to be compared with both Bulgarian defense expenditures in recent years and the expenditures of some of our neighbors and of other countries in Europe, a representative of the Editorial Board interviewed Colonel General Khristo Dobrev, first deputy minister of national defense and chief of the Bulgarian People's Army [BPA] General Staff.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Comrade colonel general, during its 15th session, the National Assembly approved a defense expenditure for 1990 of 1,656.6 million leva. Do you consider that these funds will ensure the successful defense of the country?

[Dobrev] The National Assembly approved the 1990 defense expenditure after they had first been discussed in the Defense and Internal Affairs Commission, where we put forward our arguments in defense of the amount you have quoted. The 1990 defense budget is in conformity with three main realities.

The first of these realities is our country's defensive military doctrine, which leaves its stamp not only upon the development of the Armed Forces, but also on the military budget. The present budget takes into account the cuts in the strength of the Army, armaments, and combat equipment made last year. The new deliveries planned in the budget are mainly directed toward the purchase of equipment for conducting defensive operations.

The second reality is the present model for our Army's development, in conformity with our national interests and commitments to our allies. This model is reflected in the Law on General Military Service, under which the BPA is kept up to strength. This is a model in the course of development, which increasingly combines national security interests with reasonable sufficiency and our country's resource capabilities.

The third reality is the country's serious economic situation, chiefly the budget deficit and our state debts. In

this situation only such means are allocated for defense as to guarantee the maintenance of the Army and the most pressing deliveries of arms and equipment.

Accordingly, in 1990 we will not, so to speak, live off the fat of the land, but the budget adopted by the National Assembly does guarantee the country's defense interests.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] A budget of 1,605.1 million leva was announced for 1989, yet for 1990 it has been fixed at 1,656.6 million leva. How would you comment on these figures?

[Dobrev] First of all, I would like to draw a distinction between the budget of the Ministry of National Defense and the defense expenditures. The figure of 1,605.1 million leva for 1989 represents the budget of the Ministry of National Defense, whereas the amount of 1,656.6 million leva covers the expenditure on defense, of which 1,615.0 million leva relates to the Defense Ministry budget.

As can be seen, compared with 1989 a growth of 10 million leva is envisioned.

In the preliminary draft, we stated a figure of 1,640 million leva for the Defense Ministry budget (35 million leva more than in 1989). The reasons for this increase was the rise in the prices of a number of types of material equipment and the change in the foreign currency coefficient. This figure was checked with the Ministry of Planning and Economy, and formed the basis upon which we made our calculations up to 25 December 1989.

Following this date, because of the state's serious financial situation, the issue was raised of further reductions in the budget. In consultation with the Ministry of Finance, we agreed on the figure of 1,615.0 million leva.

How does this figure look against the background of the expenditure during the last four years?

Year	Defense Ministry Budget (million leva)	Percentage of State Budget
1986	1,713.0	8.78
1987	1,728.0	8.38
1988	1,751.6	7.62
1989	1,605.1	6.37
1990	1,615.0	6.24

It becomes clear from the dynamics of the expenditures that the proportion of financial means allocated from the state budget for defense shows a steady fall.

The difference of 41.6 million leva between the figures of 1,615.0 and 1,656.6 million leva does not represent direct expenditure by the Ministry of National Defense, but is connected with the country's defense. Of this amount, 22.1 million leva is for construction of defense installations for civil departments, and 19.5 million leva is circulating capital. The latter amount is to be handed

over to the "Navy Arsenal" Shipyard for the repair of ships, but at the end of the year, after the sums for the completed repairs have been received, it will be remitted back into the state budget.

[NARODNA ARMIYA] The figure of 1,615.0 million leva is a very general one. Would you explain how it is allocated?

[Dobrev] The Defense Ministry budget for 1990 is allocated as follows, in millions of leva:

- For maintaining the BPA (wages fund, communal and everyday personnel services, logistic support, machines and installations, spares, etc.): 986.8
- Scientific research and experimental-design work: 7.7
- Purchase of arms, equipment, and property (home production and imports): 566.0
- Military construction: 54.5

[NARODNA ARMIYA] Comrade colonel general, how would you assess the size of our military expenditure, bearing in mind our country's geostrategic situation and the military efforts being made by our neighbors?

[Dobrev] The People's Republic of Bulgaria is situated at the most important crossroads between Europe, Asia, and Africa, and is in direct contact with NATO countries, which possess great combat potential and have powerful troop formations located close to our borders. Our government is making efforts to improve our mutual relations with these countries. Last year we made unilateral cuts in the BPA, but our example was not followed. It is no secret that our mutual relations with Turkey are burdened with certain problems. In this situation, we are obliged to allocate the necessary funds for defense and maintaining the country's military potential at a level that guarantees our sovereignty and security. Neither as an absolute value nor as a proportion of the state budget are these funds any greater than those that other countries with a similar military strategic situation allocate for military purposes.

In order not to talk vaguely, I will provide the following data: In 1988 the Republic of Turkey allocated 11.6 percent of its budget for military purposes; for 1989 the figure was 11.9 percent, and the figure planned for 1990 is 12.4 percent. In 1989 the Hellenic Republic spent 9 percent of its state budget on defense. In addition, these two countries received considerable military aid without payment from the United States and the FRG.

What is the picture regarding the military expenditures of countries outside our region? Let us take as an example neutral Switzerland, which has not waged a war for centuries. In 1990 Switzerland plans to spend 19 percent of its state budget on national defense.

Here is another example. Belgium is a member of NATO. It shares no borders with any of the Warsaw Pact countries, but nonetheless allocates 5 percent of its state budget to military needs.

Any unprejudiced person may reach his own conclusion on whether the funds that our country spends on defense are large or small.

Soviet Says No Nuclear Weapons in Bulgaria

*AU3003193390 Sofia BTA in English
1816 GMT 30 Mar 90*

["No Nuclear Weapons in Bulgaria"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, March 30 (BTA)—In connection with the information that Soviet missiles of the type OTR-23 (SS-23) are deployed in the GDR and Czechoslovakia, on March 27 this year a spokesman of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR stated that before the signature of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles Treaty, in fulfillment of its obligations as an ally, the Soviet Union had delivered to these countries and to Bulgaria missiles of type OTR-23.

In reply to an enquiry made by the Embassy of the United States in Sofia, a representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria gave the following explanation:

According to the data about the Armed Forces of the country officially announced on January 31, 1989, the Bulgarian People's Army has in its possession 72 operational tactical missiles, including eight OTR-23 missiles with a maximum range of 500 km. The eight missiles were bought and received in 1986, they are Bulgaria's property and are under exclusive Bulgarian control.

There have never been and there are not at the moment any missiles in Bulgaria which should be declared and destroyed on the strength of the IMF Treaty signed between the USSR and the United States in 1987.

The OTR-23 missiles bought from the USSR have never had nor has there been any intention to supply them with nuclear heads.

The Bulgarian Government has always backed up the proposal to include in the negotiations on disarmament in Europe the so-called double-function weapons to which the Bulgarian OTR-23 missiles are related.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Shortage of Civil Defense Shelters in Slovakia

*AU2803125590 Bratislava ROLNICKE NOVINY
in Slovak 21 Mar 90 p 3*

[Hana Kardosova report: "Do We Still Need Civil Defense Shelters?"]

[Excerpts] He who believes that, in view of the favorable international political situation, we do not need civil defense is mistaken. We still need it, of course, but without ideological ballast and with a maximum orientation of the forces and means of the CSSR civil defense

toward the protection of the health, lives, and valuables of our citizens. [passage omitted]

Because of the blind and buck-passing policy of our former statesmen, we lag behind the advanced world in many respects. At a news conference with representatives of the Civil Defense staffs of the Slovak Republic and Bratislava, some facts came to light that had been kept secret for a long time and that show a shortage of suitable shelters for citizens on Slovak territory. Well, there was something to hide!

For example, in Petržalka, which has more than 130,000 inhabitants, there are about 10 minimum-capacity shelters. Safe antiradiation or antichemical shelters are missing here. This catastrophic situation is to be partially compensated for by the rapid transit system, to be built underground, which would give shelter to approximately 35,000 people. [passage omitted]

At present, Bratislava's shelter capacity can absorb 12 to 13 percent of the population, thus lagging far behind our other cities. Prague, for example, with its subway, covers 50 percent of the requirements. A similar situation obtains throughout Slovakia, which has 25-percent shelter capacity. This is very little and there is a lot to catch up with in this area.

Dobrovsky on Presence of 'Less Than 10' SS-23's

LD2803164890 Prague CTK in English
1500 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Prague, March 28 (CTK)—Only several SS-23 missiles—less than 10—equipped with conventional warheads and with a 400-km range are deployed on Czechoslovak territory. Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry Spokesman Lubos Dobrovsky told CTK today.

Referring to yesterday's information of U.S. State Department Press Spokeswoman Margaret Tutwiler on medium-range missiles, he said that these missiles were deployed in Czechoslovakia in 1985, i.e. prior to the signing of the Soviet-U.S. agreement on the liquidation of medium- and shorter-range missiles. Moreover, they are not comparable to Pershing 1A missiles, he added.

The Czechoslovak Army has no other similar or longer-range missiles than the SS-23 ones.

Lubos Dobrovsky stated that the Czechoslovak Foreign Ministry provided this information despite the fact that these missiles are Czechoslovak's property, and are not included in the above mentioned Soviet-U.S. agreement. The foreign Ministry expressed astonishment at inaccuracies in Mrs Tutwiler's statement.

Tanks in Nitra Dismantled for Metal

LD2903215490 Prague Domestic Service
in Czech 1630 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] Kovosrot enterprise employees in Nitra dismantle and tanks discarded from our Army and supply the metal

to the ironworks in Podbrezova and ZTS (heavy engineering works) in Dubnica, and agricultural, wood-processing, and other enterprises interested in using the engines. According to preliminary information, the Nitra employees are to dismantle about 800 tanks and even a higher number of armored personnel carriers before the end of this year.

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Plans for Army Reduction, Disarmament Outlined

AU2903131990 East Berlin DER MORGEN
in German 22 Mar 90 p 1

[Dr Hans-Juergen Nagel report: "Generals Give Green Light for Disarmament"]

[Text] Berlin—If the new People's Chamber and the future government were to quickly give the go-ahead, disarmament and the conversion of economic capacities that have so far been used for military purposes would be initiated in a way that could really be regarded as an example in the German unification process. Depending on the results of international negotiations, considerations and concepts developed in the Ministry for National Defense might be translated into concrete programs and stages by such a far-reaching political decision.

For example, it has to be decided whether the National People's Army [NVA] is to be further reduced and changed into a regular Army or whether it will be completely disarmed by the year 2000.

In their considerations, military experts, such as Colonel General Goldbach and Lieutenant General Seifert, proceed on the second variant which, according to their estimations, will take approximately 10 years. Adequate prerequisites will be created by an Office for Technical Disarmament in the Defense Ministry and by a similar institution responsible for qualifying, retraining, and employing regular soldiers and civilian employees for activities outside the Armed Forces.

By 1995 socially secured opportunities regulated by law for the changeover to civilian professions would have to be created for 7,000 regular soldiers and 3,000 civilian employees every year. The NVA would also hand over barracks and facilities to municipal authorities, private businesses, and enterprises. It is also conceivable that former regular soldiers could start businesses of their own. In more far-reaching considerations, the NVA expresses interest in direct cooperation with employers' associations and craftsmen's organizations.

As demonstrated by the GDR's first experiences with the scrapping of 600 tanks and 50 fighter planes, disarmament, conversion, and retraining are not possible free of charge. However, at present this is more economically implemented in the NVA and by military experts than in the industrial sector. Increasing know-how will change

the ratios and the speed. More than 3,000 pieces of equipment, 2,600 tanks, 450 planes, 180 helicopters, and 2,500 artillery pieces that have to be sorted out, scrapped, or destroyed are mentioned, among other things, in variant two. All this is to take place in an orderly, controllable, and very safe way, while strictly heeding ecological requirements.

The new defense minister (Rainer Eppelmann is mentioned as a possible candidate) can proceed on the solid preparatory work of his predecessor, Admiral Theodor Hoffmann.

HUNGARY

Soviet Troop Withdrawal Proceeds on Schedule

LD2903160390 Budapest MTI in English 1447 GMT
29 Mar 90

[Text] Budapest, March 29 (MTI)—The 10th train with outgoing Soviet soldiers crossed the border to the Soviet Union at Zahony on Thursday.

The local railway directorate said to MTI's correspondent that the Soviets were observing the fixed timetable.

Reloading because of different track widths is expediently carried out by Soviet soldiers.

Railway, Defense Ministry on Soviet Withdrawal

LD3003175190 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Text] MAV [Hungarian State Railways] and the Ministry of Defense held a joint news conference.

Andras Meszaros, deputy chairman of MAV, stated that MAV would be able to complete the transportation of soldiers and their equipment even before the final deadline. He also stated that the withdrawal is progressing without any problems. To ensure the continuity, however, it would be necessary to speed up the reception on the Soviet side from the summer onwards, when the transporting of officers and their families will begin.

So far, 31 military transport trains have left the country, half of them carrying Army units, and half of them carrying their equipment.

Soviet Officer on Withdrawal of Troops

AU0504125590 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP
in Hungarian 4 Apr 90 pp 1,3

[Report on interview with Colonel General Matvey Burlakov, commander of the Soviet Southern Army Group, by Csaba Poor on 3 April; place not given: "The Generals Did Not Oppose It"]

[Excerpts] Some 166 tanks, 212 trucks and mortars, a total of 1,354 people, 123 officers, 53 ensigns, 936 conscripts, two civilian employees, and some 250 family

members left Hungary on 16 military trains on 3 April [figures as published]. The withdrawal of Soviet troops is going according to schedule —Matvey Burlakov, the government commissioner in charge of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary, said in an interview granted to MAGYAR HIRLAP on the eve of 4 April.

[Poor] Not so long ago, hardly one and a half years ago, during an interview with MAGYAR HIRLAP, a high-ranking Soviet general firmly rejected even the idea of Soviet troops withdrawing from Hungary, and said that the Warsaw Pact had already made enough unilateral concessions to NATO. Now, after a few months of negotiations, the final withdrawal of Soviet troops has begun. One can easily have the impression that the decision has been made exclusively by the politicians, and, had it been for the generals, the Soviet troops would continue to be deployed in Hungary.

[Burlakov] No, this is not so. Before making such a decision, the political leaders naturally consult the Army, and the soldiers expressed their opinions in this case too.

As for the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of the Hungarian Republic, we discussed this matter even before 1989. As early as in 1985, the Soviet Union proposed withdrawing foreign troops from Europe by 1995-96, and eliminating every foreign military base by the turn of the century. The partial troop withdrawal carried out in several East European countries in 1989 served this goal. [passage omitted]

[Poor] Does that mean that you no longer fear upsetting the balance of forces in Europe?

[Burlakov] The troops to be withdrawn from Hungary represent a considerable army group trained for action under modern conditions. This army group consists of almost 50,000 soldiers, some 27,000 units of combat technology, including more than 800 tanks, 1,200 armored vehicles, more than 250 airplanes and helicopters, and also 560,000 tonnes of various military and equipment and fuel.

From a purely military point of view, the withdrawal of such an army group naturally upsets the balance of forces, all the more so because NATO had an advantage in southern Europe even before the withdrawal. However, we take it into consideration that, nowadays, the security of a country can be guaranteed today not only by military means, but also by political ones. The Soviet Union does not intend to solve international problems by military means today or in the future. In this area, we count on positive steps in response from NATO. [passage omitted]

[Poor] Thus, the staff of generals did not come up with any opposition to this withdrawal?

[Burlakov] No, and they will not oppose it in the future either. [passage omitted]

[Poor] Do you think your relations with the population in Hungary have always been good?

[Burlakov] As a whole, our relations with the population have been good. Naturally, there are always problems where there are young people together. For instance, we had cases of traffic accidents that threw a bad light on us at one time. However, I think we have no reasons to doubt our friendship. [passage omitted]

[Poor] How much does this withdrawal cost, and who will cover the expenses?

[Burlakov] The expenses incurred in maintaining our troops are entirely covered by the Soviet Government. We allocate 300 million transferable rubles for this annually, which is more than 6.5 billion forints. We spent close to 2 billion forints annually only to maintain and renew the assets of the Southern Army Group, and the various services cost us more than 1 billion forints annually, and the railway transportation cost us 234 million forints. I could continue the list of expenses. For transportation, we pay from the Soviet Defense Ministry budget and through foreign trade.

We have set up various installations on our own. Their value stands at several tens of billions of forints. Thus, we built 370 blocks of flats with 14,500 apartments, more than 100 military barracks with 17,000 places, 70 canteens for 24,000 people, and many other installations. Many organizations, cooperatives, and firms are interested in these installations. We have also received offers to buy part of our technical installations, various installations, hospitals, and schools. Naturally, we will hand over everything we have been renting from the Hungarian Government, in accordance with the existing agreements. [passage omitted]

Organization Formed To Monitor Soviet Withdrawal

LD0504201590 Budapest MTI in English
1918 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, April 5 (MTI)—The Council of Ministers recently discussed and approved the tasks related to the withdrawal of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Hungary. As part of this, it has appointed Brigadier General Antal Annus, general deputy of the chief of staff of the Hungarian Army, as government commissioner, and Imre Karacsony, chief of division at the National Planning Office, as deputy of the government commissioner.

Although most of the tasks related to the Soviet troops withdrawal are of a military-technical nature, these affect almost all ministries and many national authorities, said Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, spokesman of the Ministry of Defence, in an interview with MTI.

Mr Keleti said an inter-ministerial committee was set up on Thursday in the Ministry of Defence under the

leadership of the government commissioner. The members of the committee include representatives of the various ministries and several national authorities. The basic task of the committee is to far-reachingly enforce the interests of the Republic of Hungary in the various partial issues and regarding the entire troops withdrawal. The government commissioner said that 43 Soviet military trains had left Hungary by Thursday morning.

POLAND

Arms Manufacturers 'To Obtain Export Licenses'

AU2303134590 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA
in Polish 21 Mar 90 p 1

['ek'-signed report: "The Arms Business"]

[Text] The Polish arms industry specializes in tanks, ships, radar stations, and munitions. Its capacity significantly exceeds current military needs. In extreme cases we do not use as much as 85 percent of what arms factories are capable of producing. The options are: Close the factories or export weapons.

If we want to be a sovereign country, we cannot stop producing weapons. Many enterprises are seeking to enter other markets and obtain permits to export weapons, but the issue is delicate, politically and often ethically.

At a news conference given on Tuesday [20 March], Marcin Swiecicki, minister of foreign economic relations, said: "The immediate reason for putting the arms trade in order was the attack on a Polish ship carrying arms in the Red Sea."

At a 20 March interdepartmental conference, called by Minister Swiecicki, it was decided to end the Central Board of Engineering's monopoly. Arms manufacturers will be able to obtain export licenses. The Central Board of Engineering will become a normal trade enterprise.

The control of exports will become formalized, because until now it has been conducted "over the phone." Every transaction will be licensed.

Political control will now be exercised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which will draw up a list stating the countries to which arms may be exported, and what may not be exported. Every contract involving the list will have to receive the approval of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Other contracts will have to be approved by the Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

Exports of military hardware are worth several hundred million dollars a year and mean several dozen factories and thousands of jobs. The main recipients were Warsaw Pact allies and some Third World countries. So far NATO has not expressed any interest in our products.

Poland occupies a place somewhere between the thirtieth and fortieth entries in the list of arms exporting countries worldwide.

The government will issue an appropriate directive within a month.

Public Opinion Poll on Soviet Withdrawal

LD2903175790 Warsaw PAP in English
1445 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Text] Warsaw, March 29—Yes, the Soviet troops should be withdrawn from Poland, but the date of their pullout should depend on the developments in Germany, said 47 percent of those asked in a poll carried out by the OBOP TV center for public opinion research on this March 4 and 5. According to 23 percent of those asked, the Soviet troops should go home as soon as possible regardless of the situation in Germany. Another 23 per cent said that the troops should stay in Poland.

The views of the troops' pullout are closely connected with the assessment of the possible united Germany's threat to the Polish borders. Among those not being afraid of Germany 35 per cent were for withdrawing the Soviet troops as soon as possible.

Military Daily on Future European Developments

AU0204213090 Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI
in Polish 29 Mar 90 pp 1, 3

[Major Wojciech Stepek commentary: "Really On All Fronts?"]

[Text] Recently, the press has carried many articles whose authors present their own opinions on the shape of the future (united, confederated, divided, or dismembered) Europe, wondering what place Poland will have in it and how to establish security for Europe and Poland during a changing balance of forces. Thanks to these generally valuable analyses, Polish public opinion is able to acquaint itself with a broad spectrum of opinions, and formulate its own views.

However, humility tells one not to ignore the fact that sometimes, tense authors give reign to their fantasies. On the basis of assumptions about what may but need not occur, they express extreme views not only about tomorrow, but also about today. Surely it would be better to carefully consider ways of building a united Europe that take into account the vital interests of the Polish people. That is the vision toward which Polish foreign policy is aimed, and that is the direction of Polish defense doctrine.

It is commendable that politicians in the Warsaw Pact countries underline the need to preserve and maintain the two opposing alliances until further notice (mentioned at the Prague foreign ministers' conference). NATO politicians and military men are saying the same thing at a time when momentous changes are occurring

in central and East Europe. One should assume this attitude has been brought on by at least three factors:

- An eagerness to preserve the balance that has prevented conflicts quite effectively;
- Most of the disarmament talks are between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The standpoints reached therein are so advanced that any violation of the mandate of the talks would cause great losses, delaying or destroying the possibility of accords;
- The West is interested in the success of "perestroika" and, as illustrated in the speeches of some Western representatives, it maintains a cautious approach toward the Soviet military presence in Europe. Although during Premier Mazowiecki's Washington visit President Bush did say that the sooner Soviet forces pull out of East Europe, the better, some Western politicians are not quite so sure. By the way, the Polish premier, referring to the U.S. President's statement, said that Soviet forces should remain in Poland until the German question is resolved.

Assuming that these are just forecasts, the following are the most likely prerequisites in the coming years for Poland's security:

- The philosophy of new thinking will strengthen, and its results will be visible in the political, economic, environmental, and military spheres;
- The present opposing alliances, NATO and the Warsaw Pact, will not disappear from the map of Europe. Instead, they will evolve into political, not military, pacts (as far as the Warsaw Pact is concerned, this is already happening);
- Poland will belong to the Warsaw Pact on a partner-like basis, guided by properly conceived national interests;
- A treaty on conventional armed forces and arms reductions will be concluded in Vienna, which will set upper limits on the size of national armed forces, including Poland's;
- Poland will share its western border with a united Germany;
- The Baltic republics of the Soviet Union will strive for independence, though this will be a rather longer process than is currently believed.

Of course, these events may take a different direction, accelerate, or slow down. Other prerequisites might also appear. But assuming that the above-listed prerequisites do prevail, what kind of Army should we have?

Its size and shape will be based on Poland's defense doctrine and international agreements, most of all those reached in Vienna, plus the country's economic capability. It seems that in fact, the situation will encourage a reduction, not an increase, in military capability, which does not mean that a total end to this capability is necessary. There will be a clear change in the orientation of armed forces, away from defense and counterattack, toward defense on its own. Concrete plans have already been publicized, so I will not discuss them. Anyone

interested can read articles in, among other things, ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSC'I, POLITYKA, and specialist publications.

What I think is most important is a clear tendency to make Polish military undertakings clearly defensive ones, including such undertakings that possess a social dimension. The state's defense system consists of many components. The Armed Forces are a major component, but not the only one. It would be a fatal error to abandon the solving of defense problems on a nationwide basis. A power group, with sole responsibility for safeguarding security, is an anachronism. Without comprehensive and coordinated political, diplomatic, economic, social, military, and other tasks, safeguarding the country's security is impossible.

During the further debate on the future shape of Poland's security, I would advise against the formulation of conclusions whereby our Army should be immediately prepared to act on all fronts. This is not at all because I think there is a greater danger from one direction than from the other, or because our neighbors might be alarmed and feel threatened. I do not deny the existence of dangerous desires. But what I would suggest is the establishment of the kind of European and national security that does not presuppose the existence of one, two, or more enemies, but instead treats all neighbors at least as solid partners, if not yet friends. It would be disastrous to pursue a policy which, instead of destroying existing divisions, gives rise to new ones, builds up animosity, creates real or imagined threats, and surrounds one with enemies. In such a situation, it is difficult to imagine the country's defense capability, including the size of the Armed Forces. Regardless of how events develop, let us preserve moderation and remain realists.

YUGOSLAVIA

Army on Danger of Military Industry Insolvency

LD2803201890 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1905 GMT 28 Mar 90

["Pool" item]

[Text] Belgrade, March 28 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav military industry is faced with insolvency because of late payments by Yugoslav and foreign ordering parties, official spokesman for the Yugoslav People's Army, Colonel Dr Vuk Obradovic said here today.

He pointed out that the Federal Directorate for Trade With and Reserves of Products for Special Purposes, which covers trade in weapons and army equipment, has unsettled claims to the amount of one billion 309.2 million dollars from Iraq, Angola, Peru, Libya, Syria, Cuba, Sudan and others, with payment due for only 436 million dollars. The collection of due payments is being realized with great difficulties, Obradovic underscored.

Obradovic also specified that the financing of a new Yugoslav supersonic jet would be covered by funds from the regular army budget and will not increase the budget for the army. Obradovic pointed out that no-one from the Yugoslav Army had ever said that a decision had been made about the production of the new plane, nor was any foreign country ever mentioned as a chosen or possible partner in this project. He also said that the introduction of new transport helicopters in the Yugoslav Air Force is planned for the period from the year 1995 to 2000, and that the army will only then consider offers from Yugoslav and foreign firms and decide about ordering the aircraft which will be the best and least expensive.

PAKISTAN

Aims of Indigenous Arms Production Detailed

BK0204092690 Lahore *THE NATION* in English
2 Apr 90 p 8

[Text] Karachi—The direction of Pakistan's future defence production is towards high technology products like electronic proximity fuzes, TOW [tube-launched, optically-tracked, wire-guided]-guided missiles, cluster bombs, and even something on the Surface-to-Surface Missiles like warheads [as published], it is learnt.

The new products were well under way and are bound to catapult Pakistan to the state-of-art ammunitioners. All the products are to be produced at the Pakistan Ordnance Factories [POF] near Rawalpindi.

Under its modernisation programme the POF has signed a contract for proximity fuzes, a memorandum of understanding has also been signed with the United States for the TOW-guided missile series.

A contract has been signed with another US firm for 155 mm artillery gun which would be hopefully delivered to the Pakistan Army by 1991.

Some other contracts have also been signed by the POF. The cluster bomb is under production and the first few pieces have been delivered to the Pakistan Air Force.

POF which produces everything aimed at indigenous production has been supplying weapons to the countries in the East and the West. The range of products almost covers the entire spectrum of production.

Its arms and ammunition have been supplied to 40 countries and at present it is working on contracts with nine countries in the past two to three years [sentence as published]. POF has tried to concentrate on the European and the American market supplying submachine guns and spares.

Now they are trying to focus attention on NATO—POF would like to be one of the contractors for the supply of spares to various NATO countries for their G-3 rifles and other popular weapons.

Exports of POF have increased over the years especially during 1988-89 when it earned half a billion rupees in terms of value they were 25-30 percent of the total production.

It also has collaboration with a number of countries and organisations as until recently POF was dependent on import of technology which could only be done in collaboration with the original manufacturer.

Now POF has started its own research and development efforts and consequently there are some products which are uniquely its own—not designed or based on somebody else's licence.

Security of Asian Pacific Region Examined

90WC0057A Moscow FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS
in English No 1, Jan 90 pp 19-36

[Article by V. Vorontsov and A. Muradyan: "APR Security: Concepts and Reality"]

[Text] Problems of security in the Asian Pacific region, on the solution of which the world's future largely depends, are becoming ever more pressing. They are attracting priority attention at various debates. Last year the FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS published a number of articles on vital topics of world politics by Soviet authors. Among them was Doctor of History Arthur Muradyan.¹ Below we present Muradyan's views on the problems which he discusses with Vladilen Vorontsov, Editor-in-Chief, FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS.

[Vorontsov] Your book "Bourgeois Theories of International Politics. Critical Analysis" came off the press last year. Presently being prepared for publication is your work on the main categories of foreign policy theory. Sinologists with such a broad range of academic interests are quite few. This is why we wish to discuss with you the problems of security, primarily in the APR [Asian Pacific Region]. But, first, it would be pertinent to touch on the current definitions of security. How do you understand the concept of security?

On Definitions Or Meanings Of Words

[Muradyan] In both Soviet and foreign theoretical works national security is usually defined as a state's ability to "protect itself from external sources of threat to its existence". National security, according to the "Encyclopaedia Britannica," means the "security of a nation from the danger of subjugation by external power" and international security is defined as "the common objective of states cooperating for the maintenance of their national security". Consolidation of national armed forces, the creation of military alignments ensuring power equilibrium ("balance for force"), and maintenance of collective security were traditionally regarded as the principal types of security policy. Collective security was interpreted as a system guaranteeing protection by a group of states to a victim of aggression.

[Vorontsov] Such definitions, it appears were historically warranted, since the might-is-right principle prevailed in international relations during the times of classical colonialism. The principal purpose of diplomacy as an instrument of international politics was to prepare the most favourable external conditions for a new war to recarve the spheres of influence. Since you are inclined to view the "international politics" concept as a fundamental category of the foreign policy theory, then diplomacy, security, war, propaganda abroad, etc., are bound to be instruments of this policy. The content and forms of international politics are now obviously changing. What, in your opinion, are these changes? Is there still an inertia of positions-of-strength thinking in foreign policy theory?

[Muradyan] The view that security means, above all, security from war and that the main function of diplomacy and security policy is to prevent an armed conflict has become increasingly policy in international political science during the past few decades. War, as one of the principal forms of foreign policy, has practically ceased to be a rational instrument. Foreign propaganda has turned from an instrument intended to misinform the adversary, or to "fool" him, into just the opposite—as means of objective confidence. Also changing is the essence of the security policy which is now losing its military "power" nature.

At all stages of historical development people used military strength to ensure security. Hence, the idea current both among the public and scientists that "force" is an independent agent in international relations, a sort of "military-power fetishism". The inertia of the "positions-of-strength" thinking persists of this day although the world's social climate has changed substantially. We are witnessing the shift of accent in maintaining and safeguarding the social interests, and hence every form of security, from the purely military sphere to technology, science and economics. Consequently, the concepts of security—national, regional and global—are also changing, that of the Asian Pacific region being no exception.

[Vorontsov] Well, let us then get down to problems of the APR security. What are the boundaries of this region? We can hardly regard them as fixed since the Asian Pacific region's geographical boundaries vary in official documents and in academic papers. R. Sh. A. Aliev, who also contributed to our journal, believes that the APR cannot be viewed as an integral whole, because it is wrong to define its boundaries using the geographical principle alone. Some experts use such criteria as the extent of economic integration and common political problems.

[Muradyan] Yes, there is now a spate of different views on this point both in Soviet and foreign writings.

[Vorontsov] It would then be expedient to acknowledge that the term "APR" is somewhat conditional. Moreover, hardly can this question be crucial for our conversation. It may not be actually worthwhile subdividing the principle of international security into European, Asian, Pacific, etc. Nevertheless, what criteria of defining the APR's boundaries do you think to be preferable from the point of view of international politics?

[Muradyan] Some people suggest, for instance, that it would be expedient to delimit the region by the countries of the Far East and Southeast Asia in the west; by Australia, New Zealand and South Pacific insular states in the south leaving out the Pacific coast of North and South America, and the countries of South Asia, including India. Others believe that the APR embraces such countries as India, Pakistan and Afghanistan and extends to the Pacific coast of both Americas in the east. Its pivotal nations, forming the Pacific Ring, are Japan,

South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hongkong, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and China. There is yet a "narrower" interpretation of the Pacific Ring: Japan, the "Four Dragons", and ASEAN. It is more frequently referred to as the "East-Asian Ring".

I believe it is expedient, politically, to have a broader definition of the Asian Pacific region so that it would include the biggest states, both in terms of area and population, such as the Soviet Union, China, the USA, India, Japan, Indonesia, and others. In this case the region will include almost half of the globe with the greater part of world's population.

Such an approach is not very handy from the point of view of economic analysis.

It is common knowledge that the capitalist world now has three major integrational centres: the West European, North American and East Asian. The West European centre, including 12 states (the total population—332 million, the GDP of \$3,400 billion, the share in the world's exports and import in 40.9 percent and 39.6 percent respectively), is ready to further strengthen its unity in 1992 by creating a single internal market of commodities, capital and manpower. The North American centre (the population—267 million, the GDP—\$4,500 billion, and 14.9 and 21.4 percent of the world's export and import trade respectively) was formally created after January 1, 1989, following the signing of a free trade agreement between the United States and Canada. Actually, however, it came into being some years earlier. The possibility is that Mexico and the Caribbean nations will eventually join it. According to the agreement, tariffs will be abolished in three stages and trade between the two countries will become duty free as of January 1998. Furthermore, restrictions on the movement of manpower and capital between them will also be lifted.

The East Asian centre (the population—481 million, the GDP—\$2,400 billion and the share of the world's export and import trade being 19.6 and 14.6² percent respectively) is an informal economic group of states comprising Japan, the ASEAN nations and the "Little Dragons" (South Korea, Taiwan, and Hongkong). As distinct from the first two centres, these states are not bound by any official integration agreements. They are united by large-scale mutual trade, reciprocal investments, and are influenced by the yen and the Japanese market. China's deeper involvement in the East Asian centre's activity is not unlikely.

The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is the fourth integrational group. It is comparable to the three aforementioned centres of the non-socialist world in terms of population, the GDP and volume of trade. But not all is well with CMEA's internal integrational relations. Still worse is the socialist nations' cooperation with other integrational centres. We are now witnessing processes which help to expend and deepen relations between the centres, for instance, between the North American and East Asian. A vast Asian Pacific economic

integration zone is now taking shape. For instance, in the late 1980s U.S. trade with APR nations reached \$271 billion (\$170 billion with Europe). Forecasts have it that by year 2000 trans-Pacific trade will exceed twofold that of Atlantic. It is pertinent to note that APR nations are increasingly being drawn into mutual economic activities, in particular, trade. For example, they account for more than 50 percent of U.S. foreign trade, in Japan—for 60 percent, and in China—more than 60 percent. By comparison, those nations account for less than 10 percent of the Soviet Union's foreign trade. Still meager is our share in Japan's foreign trade—1.3 percent. Very low, too, is Japan's share in Soviet foreign trade—only 2 percent. All this is due to the unsatisfactory situation in our national economy. The decisions taken under the Long-Term State Programme for the Comprehensive Development of Productive Forces in the Far Eastern Economic Region up to the Year 2000 remain unfulfilled. The extent of Soviet economy's participation in the APR international division of labour and the USSR's participation in regional integrational processes are unsatisfactory and alarming. The reasons for this situation and recommendations for its rectification were discussed in your journal.¹

[Vorontsov] Your arguments confirm once again the conditional character of the APR boundaries. In his report to a meeting of the Asian Society (June 1989) on new Pacific partnership as a programme for the future, the U.S. Secretary of state James Baker spoke, for instance, of the East Asian area, the Pacific region, intra-Asian trade, the Pacific basin, etc. However, Western writings present the APR chiefly as a region which includes Japan, the "Four Dragons", the ASEAN nations, and China. Emphasis is laid on its growing role in the world economy and intensified interaction with the North American economic region. Thus, a survey by US congressional research establishments concludes that if the current tendencies continue, 25 percent of the world's total production will fall on the Asian Pacific nations by the year 2000, and the share of North American countries will be roughly 30 percent. By coordinating their efforts these two regions which account for more than half of the world's output will become a decisive force in world commerce and capital movement. Although relations between North America and Europe will remain close, radical changes in the Asian Pacific region will prepare the ground for a new era of international economic rivalry.⁴ It is noteworthy that the region's future role in world development is viewed, in this and other studies, against the background of the APR's growing economic rivalry with other regions and integrational centres. Such an approach is by no means fortuitous. It stems logically for the general concept of world politics and international security underlying the official course of the United States and other Western powers.

American analysts, while recognizing the conditionality of the APR geographical boundaries, attach special importance to the development and implementation of

their own regional security concepts there. This was again noted in James Baker's report. The objectives and essence of the U.S. Pacific security concept remain basically the same—to safeguard and consolidate its economic and political interests in the region. In the meantime, the changing correlation of forces within the framework of American's alliance with its Pacific partners is bound to make the U.S. adjust its doctrines. As Japan's economic potential and influence were gaining in strength, the U.S. Asian Pacific security concept assigned Japan an ever bigger role. In 1950 Japan's GNP was a mere 3.8 percent of the American. By 1987, it had already reached 60 percent (in U.S. dollars). Japan's per capita GNP has exceeded America's. Doesn't the growth of Japan's and now South Korea's economic potentials indicate the mounting role of economic factors in the formation of both national and regional security concepts?

New Yardstick Of Security

[Muradyan] It is pertinent to recall in this context the Japanese politologist T. Yano who said that the main-spring in the development of Japanese civilization is no longer military strength, typical of a static civilization, but economic power. The achievements of civilisation which Japan can impart to other countries through intercourse with them are illustrated by the goods it exports.⁵

Thus, the striking progress made by Japan is science-intensive and high-tech production, as well as international investment policy has placed the country among the world's leading powers and enabled it to pose an obvious challenge to America. This influence is not commensurate with its relatively modest armed forces, which shows convincingly that the balance-of-forces formula is increasingly losing its significance as the only basis of international politics, and of the security policy, in particular.

[Vorontsov] Japan's growing commercial and economic pressure on the U.S. compels Washington to take countermeasures. The latter sees American-Japanese relations in the light of "global" partnership (see James Baker's report) and presses for Japan's greater involvement in U.S. military and political plans.

Japan bears 40 percent of the expenditures on the maintenance of U.S. armed forces on its territory. Tokyo cooperates with Washington in the development of new military technologies and has assumed a considerable burden of implementing the West's social strategy in the developing world. Such partnership, as conceived by U.S. architects of the Pacific security system, is bound to take up a substantial share of Japan's material and technological resources, thereby making up, to some extent, for America's weakened position in economic competition with its Far Eastern ally. In this case American strategists combine the military and the socio-economic aspects of U.S. security within the framework of alliance with Japan. This also points to the fact that

the purely military factor has ceased to place the decisive role in safeguarding social interests. Moreover, the social and political interests are changing in the process.

The increasing role of economic factors, their closer interaction at national and global levels, the growing awareness of the fatal consequences of a nuclear conflict for humankind—all this leads to a re-examination of the contemporary world's security concepts. The "balance-of-forces" thesis has been replaced in the Soviet Union's foreign policy doctrine by the term "balance of interests" in contemporary international politics. It is common knowledge that "balance of forces", i. e. equilibrium of the military potentials of states and their coalitions, constituted the basis of international security for centuries. Any increase in the potential of one side led to the boosting of the potential of its neighbours or rivals, and that was the only yardstick to gauge a country's security. Nuclear weapons have radically modified the "balance-of-forces" formula as the basis of national and international security.

A new security concept—nuclear "containment"—had appeared in the post-war period. This concept actually upsets the formula of comprehensive "balance" of armed forces because it is no longer necessary to match every element of the adversary's potential to maintain reliable security. It suffices now to have a definite nuclear potential capable of inflicting unacceptable losses upon the adversary, in order to prevent ("contain") a war. The same premise provided the basis for the "reasonable sufficiency" principle, which has, in fact, become the pith of the current approach to national security problems. The accumulated disarmament experience confirms the viability of this principle. Let us take the INF treaty. It has contributed to the consolidation, not weakening of security at all levels—national, regional and global. And one more example: China has reduced its armed forces by one million men, lowered military expenditure from 17 to 10 percent of the national budget. But did this endanger its security?

Hence, we are witnessing a logical process of replacing one security formula by another: the "balance of forces" by the "balance of interests". And this is, apparently, an indication that the sides concerned are prepared to embark upon the road of political cooperation for the sake of common goals.

Political Contradictions: Myth Or Reality

[Muradyan] I willingly accept the logics of these arguments but with two reservations. First, neither in the recent nor distant past has the "balance of forces" concept constituted the bedrock of international politics. It was "balance of interests", of the social interests of states involved in international relations or, to be more exact, of their ruling classes, that lay at its core. "Military force" is an instrument and not the basis of politics. Neither is it an end in itself. But the functional role of force was exceptionally big in the past and consequently, the correlation of national military potentials was the

immediate, though not fundamental, basis for foreign policy, of regional and international political situations.

The point is, primarily, that in the past "interests were balanced" by a direct infringement on the interests of weaker nations, which led to "imbalances" in favour of the military-strong countries.

The second point is that political interests and their clashing in the world scene are a reality of present-day life. The thesis that there are no grounds for political interests of the Soviet Union to clash with those of the United States and other Western powers now occasionally appears in Soviet writings. We sometimes encounter allegations that there is no political rivalry between them, since there are no political contradictions to provoke it. Some Soviet experts in international affairs call for "an end to the most defiant, most expensive stupidity of our epoch—Soviet-American rivalry".

The emotionally and political meaning of such an approach bring to memory immortal literary allegories. For instance, Saltykov-Shchedrin's idealistically-minded carp believes that proper order could be enforced in the river to suit, in today's parlance, the "common interests" if the pike was told the "whole truth." The way this carp understands historical of the triumph of good over evil, common sense over folly."

[Vorontsov] In other words, you believer that an approach to international politics from "overoptimistic" positions has a history of its own?

[Muradyan] That is exactly what I mean. The point is that the thesis "let's understand, let's explain" has not only its own satirists, but its own theoreticians as well. This tradition can be traced down to Antiquity. It began to assume more streamlined forms in the Middle Ages and in Modern Times. Sebastian Brant's poem, *The Ship of Fools* appeared in 1494. It said that all social "absurdities" and "ridicules" were due to innate human stupidity. In our days such ideas have become part and parcel of the ideology of irrationalism which is rather widespread in Western social science, including international political science.

[Vorontsov] Of course, even the most skillful negotiations, consultations and "explanations" of good intentions cannot guarantee security in conditions of irrational foreign policy in the nuclear age. However, an international political mechanism, like the Helsinki mechanism in Europe (to be operating, possibly, within the United Nations) and, in perspective, in the Asian Pacific region, will positively influence the political climate in the world. It is bound to reduce the risk of armed conflicts, help to create favourable conditions for cutting down the nuclear potential to the level dictated by the "minimum containment" strategy. In this respect there is a rational kernel in the call to understand the motivations of the opposite side.

[Muradyan] Of course, there is. It is important, however, to determine the direction in which it can be found. I

believe it is necessary to understand another thing: the contradiction between American and Soviet political interests in the world arena is an objective reality. Practically any regional conflict of our days is fraught with elements of our political differences with the United States. It is particularly important to convince one's counterparts that it is expedient and possible to settle our political contradictions by political, diplomatic means, through negotiations—in a word, to rule out "arm twisting" for the purpose of proving one's right.

[Vorontsov] But isn't this a case of Shchedrin's carp idealism, if we are to accept your logic?

[Muradyan] Not at all. This is rather a reflection of the difficulties with which the extremely complicated dialectics of international relations is apprehended. It is particularly important today to expand areas of between states and cooperation thus narrow the spheres of "power rivalry, extensive as they are today. [Sentence as published.]

Let's take, for instance, such a global problem as the Strategic Defence Initiative. How should this programme be assessed from the standpoint of political theory? Isn't it a case of a materialized power politics? It is an expression of U.S. political differences not only with the Soviet Union, but also with the developing world. The United States seeks qualitatively superior weapons systems.

[Vorontsov] I agree that the SDI is aimed not only at states with a different social system. One of the programme's goals is to make a break through in science and technology by mustering the country's huge financial and material resources. It is expected that in the process of the large-scale research and experiments new important laws of nature and new ways of using them for civil and military purposes will be discovered, thereby strengthening America's positions at the expense of its Western partners as well as rivals. The SDI also reflects Washington's desire to rally the country's intellectual resources in competition with its adversaries and partners—a competition which in conditions of peace is likely to serve as a catalyst of world scientific and technological progress. And herein lies the opposite side of the dialectics of interaction between different poles of the contemporary world.

But, still, and if I got you right, you stand for a more sober evaluation of the situation which can spare us groundless euphoria without subtracting from our "historic optimism"?

[Muradyan] Right. Such an approach is acceptable to the western public, too, for which competition is a natural element of society's life, eliminating the ideas, institutions, and political and economic patterns which don't pay.

[Vorontsov] Could you elaborate on this last point?

[Muradyan] Readily. I shall refer to the view of the U.S. foreign policy expert Robert Murphy, who believes that competition in international life is a justified and positive factor, though it causes political tension. Robert Murphy wrote that tension, like competition, was a sound and constructive aspect of present-day life, if it did not lead to catastrophic clashes. Tension is to a certain extent a synonym of democracy, he says. What a conclusion! An important reservation is warranted here: acknowledgement of political rivalry by no means denies, but necessarily implies that the USSR and the United States are ceasing to be mere rivals and are becoming partners, competing partners. This is the tendency of international development at present. Making use of their intellectual potential both states contribute to social progress. The circumstances "compel" them, as it were, to become trailblazers in social, technological and economic spheres, and this is a necessary condition for their survival and advancement.

[Vorontsov] How does this general theoretical proposition apply to the international relations in the Asian Pacific region? I think that everything you said about the United States is also true of Japan.

[Muradyan] Certainly. It is absurd to deny that we have no political differences with Japan. What is the "northern territories problem" in terms of the political interests of the two countries? Before, when military power was the supreme argument in similar disputes, the essence of foreign policy, diplomacy, military posture, and propaganda of both nations would have boiled down to preparation for an armed conflict. But today the public is impressed by the sides' diplomatic efforts aimed at solving this problem through negotiations without even attempting to stake on military force.

It is characteristic of contemporary Japanese foreign-policy ideology to accentuate the importance of non-military means in international politics.

[Vorontsov] If I understood you correctly, your words can be summed up as follows: first, the world development today is changing the very concept of international security. The economic and technological development of a country is becoming a key factor of its security, while the significance of the military factor diminishes. Second, there is a changing approach to the most acute inter-state issues, including such formerly "hopeless" cases as territorial claims; it is becoming possible to settle them through negotiations. Third, openness of economics to progressive external influences, their constructive involvement in the international division of labour and in regional and global integrational processes are becoming a factor of national and international security. The first point is more or less clear. Could you specify the other two citing some developments in the region?

[Muradyan] A book by the prominent American journalist Harrison Salisbury, an editor of The New York Times, on the causes, character and prospects of the

Sino-Soviet conflict⁶ was published in the United States in 1973. The author included it among the "bloody hostilities" dominating relations between great powers and bound to dominate relations between China and Russia for a long time to come. In a nutshell, Salisbury ruled out completely the possibility of Soviet-Chinese rapprochement even in the distant future.⁽⁷⁾ As a matter of fact, many of us thought then that the conflict with China was quite serious and would continue for a long time. These forecasts did not reckon with the rates and scope of basic internationalization processes in the economy and social development of the region and the world during the last decades of the 20th century. The imaginary barriers of "bloody hostilities" collapsed under the pressure of integrational processes reflecting the regional and world wide economic interdependence. The imperatives of modern society's economic and technological development have compelled politicians to leave disputed Sino-Japanese territorial issues, including that of the Senkaku islands, for future generations to settle; to make a new departure in the Soviet-Chinese relations and raise them to a new constructive level following Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to the PRC in May 1989.

There is a clear understanding in Chinese scientific and political literature that the technological revolution's new phase will, in the long run, "alter the status of the biggest world powers". It is noted, specifically, that the "race to achieve impressive national power will replace the arms race as the principal form of international confrontation. This rivalry will focus chiefly on economy and technology, but will also include military, political and cultural factors". Chinese experts in international affairs note that this process has already started and that "all countries are adapting their economic structures to it, replacing their obsolete elements and mapping out new ways of economic development". The development of new major processes can no longer be overlooked today and all international problems appear in a different light against their background. National leaders are beginning to view them from a new angle: to what an extent will their resolution (or persistence) contribute to the country's advancement to a higher level corresponding to the key tendencies of world development?

[Vorontsov] It is worth adding, apparently, that prolonged inter-state bilateral and even more so multilateral conflicts impede the domestic socio-economic development of states; they have a negative impact not only on the nations involved in these conflicts but also on these indirectly drawn into them, and affect the political climate in the given region and the entire world. I think we now have to get back to the essence of the APR security concept.

The Concept Of Pacific Security

[Muradyan] It is hardly necessary to list here the numerous initiatives of the USSR, PRC, Vietnam, Mongolia and the DPRK, aimed at establishing a reliable security system in the Asian Pacific region.

I believe that the crux of the concept of APR security is inadmissibility of military force as an instrument of international policy in the region. Neither nuclear, nor conventional weapons should be used for political purposes, the question of establishing non-violent, non-forceful international relations has been raised. This general theoretical concept has been advanced at different forums and in various documents. Suffice it to recall in this connection the Soviet Union's Krasnoyarsk Programme and Mongolia's proposals. In practical terms this idea was to be promoted by proposals not to increase the nuclear arsenals in that region, not to build up naval forces there, and to reduce, on a multilateral basis, the military confrontation in the areas where the coastlines of USSR, China, Japan, DPRK, South Korea and other countries converge. The same purpose is pursued by joint efforts to demilitarize the Soviet-Chinese border. As agreed by the USSR and the United States, 436 middle- and shorter-range missiles are being scrapped in the eastern part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet forces deployed there will be reduced by 200,000 effectives, including 120,000 in the Far East, in 1989-1990. The ground forces will be cut down by 12 divisions, eleven air-force regiments will be disbanded and 16 warships decommissioned from the Pacific Fleet. Three divisions will be withdrawn from the Mongolian People's Republic in the same period, including two armoured divisions and the entire air-force contingent. In a word, restructuring in keeping with the defence sufficiency principle has commenced in the Soviet armed forces deployed along with Soviet-Chinese frontier. This sets an example for the entire region.

The next important component of the Asian-Pacific security concept is the idea of internationalizing the negotiations. The initiatives, formulated in Mikhail Gorbachev's Krasnoyarsk statement, contain a proposal to discuss problems pertaining to the "creation of a negotiation mechanism".

[Vorontsov] The need to set up a new mechanism for multilateral cooperation among the Pacific nations was also noted in James Baker's report. The principal purpose of such a mechanism, according to the Secretary of State, is to promote the development and integration of market economies within the framework of an international system.

In 1989, Australia made tireless diplomatic efforts to rally its Pacific neighbours for the formation of a free association of states united by common goals, the most important of which are further expansion of industrial cooperation, intensification of capital investment, and relaxation of customs regulations. According to Australian officials, the masterminds of such an association have no ideological objections of Soviet participation in it. The problem lies in the Soviet side's insufficient business ties with APR nations. During our visit to Seoul last April and May we, representatives of the Far Eastern Affairs, asked some local officials why the blueprints of the association made no mention of the possibility of the

Soviet Union's participation? The answer was that the association would rally only countries with a "market economy".

It appears that there is an inertia of old thinking in this case, although the importance of political and economic levers in the present-day international relations tends to grow while the role of "military factors" diminishes in world politics. The new mechanisms of regional cooperation will hardly be conducive to a healthier international climate since they have the purpose of isolating countries with "non-market economies", and an element of rivalry with "alien" societies, ruling out cooperation with them, is inherent in them. It is doubtful whether a regional mechanism, aimed at isolating even some of the APR nations, will help reshape relations among the states of the region in the spirit of the new thinking. In this sense the question of improving and expanding economic and scientific-technological cooperation among all APR states holds one of the key places in the concept of regional security.

And today, we see ever more clearly the interdependence of perestroika processes in the Soviet Union (primarily economic reform and restructuring of economic ties) and implementation of regional security concepts. The process of actively drawing several Far Eastern nations into the international division of labour has shown, for instance, that Japan and the newly-industrialized countries of the Far East consolidated their financial positions by expanding the start of labour- and material-consuming goods, which enabled them to start restructuring their economies. This was followed, as a rule, by modernization of more up-to-date, export sectors of the economy with the help of foreign capital and technologies, and relatively modest outlays.

Doesn't the USSR's national security directly depend today on the development of the country's economy, and on economic, scientific and technological ties with other states?

[Muradyan] Indeed, our lagging behind in APR international economic cooperation has not only economic but also political implications and is related to our national security. We have advanced a new, constructive concept of APR security. Admittedly, however, that for it to be feasible all its components—military, political, technological and economic—have to harmoniously combine, be mutually supplementary, and attain proper level. These prerequisites are lacking so far. I would put it in the following way: from the structural point of view the concept appears to be somewhat "unbalanced".

Particularly important, against the background of APR's further economic and technological progress, are long-term political and economic measures aimed at drawing Soviet Far Eastern regions into the integrational processes in the East Asian zone and the APR as a whole. The Soviet Far East and the Asian socialist nations will hardly be able to carry out in the foreseeable future a

structural reorganization and technological modernisation of their economies if they remain divorced from these centres of regional technological and economic progress. It is exceptionally important to bolster up positive political processes in the Asian Pacific region by full-blooded and large-scale economic cooperation. If this problem is not settled constructively and quickly, all diplomatic initiatives will be of no use.

[Vorontsov] Can we claim today that the elaboration of the APR security concept has yielded tangible results? How are its principles implemented?

'We Are Not In Danger Of Euphoria'

[Muradyan] The concept has already become, to a considerable extent, part and parcel of foreign policy practice. It ought to be borne in mind, however, that this concept rests not only on the existing, but also on latent, though potentially rather powerful, laws of development. And this means that opposite trends are conspicuous in the region's international relations. Their stability and influence should not be ignored. This is why "we are not in danger of euphoria". This is how Eduard Shevardnadze put it speaking about the results of his official visit to Japan at the Japanese Institute of International Studies in December 1988. So far as the international situation in the APR as a whole is concerned, I think this idea is correct. Although the predominant trend of development there is unquestionably positive, we should not close our eyes to disturbing tendencies.

In this light it is pertinent to mention the still existing general tendency to perpetuate and reinforce the "power" style of international behaviour in the region, and to intensify the arms race. This is primarily true of Washington's present foreign-policy ideology which proceeds from the idea that in the foreseeable future there will be no alternative to the containment strategy, relying as before on nuclear weapons. I cannot go into detail here but it is a fact that nuclear war scenarios are being discussed both in specialized publications and reports to U.S. government institutions. They are written by the Pentagon and State Department advisers and experts on military and strategic matters. Plans are being prepared for "local" and "surgical" nuclear blows at Soviet territory, in retaliation of "Soviet aggression", of course.

Military spendings still cut deep into the budgets of the United States, Japan, South Korea and some other countries. American military presence in the region is not diminishing. This would not give rise to anxiety, however, if the U.S. leadership accepted the idea of freezing the armed forces and armaments there, with their subsequent reciprocal reduction. But so far there is no progress in this direction.

This warrants the question: what are we to do, given the temporizing, not to stay indifferent, attitude of the United States and its allies to our disarmament initiatives? There are views in our political publications that it is advisable to continue disarming unilaterally, to reduce the Soviet strategic nuclear forces by as much as 95

percent, and to adopt the so-called "minimal deterrence" strategy. It is claimed, specifically, that this would deal a blow at the American SDI programme.

[Vorontsov] Many people cannot make out today why, in the light of the Soviet Union's unequivocal policy of disarmament, the pragmatic Americans spend huge sums of questionable futuristic problems, though confronted with many really urgent everyday problems. It is worth noting in this connection that the SDI programme and other expensive military projects are running up against growing opposition in the U.S. Congress.

[Muradyan] I wouldn't exaggerate this opposition, in spite of the new, unique disarmament situation; the U.S. Congress has not blackballed a single major military programme. It has only "trimmed" some of the requested allocations. The U.S. ruling circles are looking into the future and preparing for it "in their own way", and not "in the way we are going it". America is getting ready for future competition not only with the USSR and maybe not so much with it as with global tendencies and challenges of primarily technological and production character rather than military.

At the same time, influential U.S. circles often regard international relations in the foreseeable future as a "positions-of-strength" period, with the military power factor continuing to play a substantial role as a foreign policy lever. It is obvious to them that the political outcome of the in-depth integrational processes going on in the Asian Pacific region will depend largely on a technological and economic course charted by the U.S. Otherwise America will have to put up with the role of a "policeman" or "bouncer" serving the rich Japanese customer. Various options are being considered to solve the problem. One such option is to set up a huge economic and political complex—Pax-Japonica or Pax-Ameriponica", i.e., a union of Japan and the United States. [Quotation marks as printed.] The two partners' role in it will depend on the economic and technological potential to each. These are nothing but abstract plans so far. However, they show that various U.S. circles are now concerned with the tangible social processes under way in the Asian Pacific region. I merely want to point how American political thought is inclined to resolve the growing regional economic and political contradictions, and to illustrate the difficulties which our concept of regional security will encounter in the near future.

[Vorontsov] You seem to question the concept of "minimal deterrence", and I wish to stress its soundness. Only two years ago, when speaking with some disarmament experts, I tried to prove the expedience of keeping our military potential within reasonable limits and asked: hasn't China ensured its security with the help of a rich arsenal of political means and a nuclear-missile potential of only ten strategic missiles? The answer I got was that our great nation could not follow this example. It took our people and leaders, particularly the military, some

time to see the formidable gap between the great-power ambitions cherished by some quarters and the actual state of affairs.

Can the strategy of "minimal deterrence" contribute to our security? I believe it can, if it is backed by a whole spate of measures in the spheres of foreign policy and economy. The implementation of "reasonable sufficiency" principles has already raised the prestige of our country, multiplied the ranks of those who stand for the promotion of comprehensive cooperation with the Soviet Union, and weakened the urge to strengthen various coalitions on the anti-Soviet basis. This phenomenon can apparently be regarded today as an inalienable feature of the international situation which, in turn, directly influences the political climate in various countries, including the APR nations. The political situation in Japan also seems to evolve in the spirit of new international trends: the position of the Socialist Party of Japan, which advocates greater independence in foreign policy is being consolidated. On the whole, I understand your doubts. The political effect of our course, including in the military sphere, based on the new thinking, has obviously considerably impressed the public abroad. This is what we, representatives of the Far Eastern Affairs, saw during our trip to South Korea last spring. Not military efforts to preserve the image of a "super-power", but purposeful efforts to revitalize our economy and to draw on the creative potential of partners with a higher level of industrial development, now contribute, as never before, to all-embracing security.

And I think that in this sense the example of the European security process is becoming ever more important, despite its unique character. It goes without saying that efforts to guarantee European and Asian security are now at different stages. It will be right to say that the foundation of security has been laid in Europe and the walls of an "All-European Home" are now being put up. A site is yet being cleared for such an edifice in the Asian Pacific region. Only the first piles have been sunk there by the restoration and complete normalization of relations between the USSR and China, China and Japan, etc. However, some problems both between individual countries and regional still remain unresolved. Attempts to "whip up history", to apply mechanically the experience of a more advanced diplomatic process of security building in Europe to the initial phases of the nascent Asian Pacific security concept can hardly yield good results.

One The Eve Of The 'European' Or 'Pacific' Era

[Muradyan] Since you have already raised the question of interaction between processes of building security in Europe and Asia, it is relevant to note the steadily growing importance of such interaction for stabilising the international situation as a whole. The European security process can, in fact, be regarded as an unprecedentedly huge socio-political experiment to implement principles of the new political thinking in international politics. For several reasons this experiment has made

greater progress on the European continent than in the APR. But the principles and goals of a security system are the same both in Europe and Asia.

[Vorontsov] We shouldn't overlook the APR specifics—political, social and cultural. The European region, including the territory of our country up to the Urals, is in many ways a single cultural and historical complex despite all national distinctions, the age-old traditions of economic, spiritual and intellectual exchanges in Europe are incomparably deeper and more comprehensive. The Asian Pacific region is quite another thing. Just consider the inimitable civilizations of Japan, China and India, with their centuries-old cultural and religious traditions, including long periods of self-imposed isolation from the rest of the world. The population density of Asian countries is also quite impressive. If we add to this international political collisions of the recent and more distant past, we will get a clearer picture of the general situation in the region as compared to Europe. In this context Europe seems to have better integrational potentialities.

[Muradyan] The paradox of the situation is that in the foreseeable future Europe will undoubtedly lead in developing comprehensive cooperation. But in the long-term perspective, the APR has a more powerful potential for ushering in a "Pacific era". This forecast is corroborated by the factors which are now viewed as "negative", for instance, the huge population of such countries as China and India. If the term "human factor" is not a mere metaphor, the abovementioned states are potential sources of tremendous intellectual and labour reserves, the positive value of which can hardly be assessed rightly today. As a matter of fact, some analysts have already delved into this problem. The aforementioned book by Harrison Salisbury suggests that pooling of China's huge population with Japanese technology, of a billion Chinese with the world's biggest GNP, would create an unlimited potential. If Japan and China were able to work together, if Japan's technological know-how and production potential were linked up with China's tremendous reserves of human talent and energy, could there be any unattainable goals for such a community? It is clear that in the early 1970s, when the book was written, the author viewed such a prospect largely from confrontational positions. But it can be approached also from the angle of constructive regional cooperation involving, among others, the Soviet Union, the North American integrational axis and other Pacific sub-regions, the cooperation divorced from the "power" system of coordinates. In this light the creative and economic potential of the Pacific integrational cluster appears to be really inexhaustible.

[Vorontsov] I'd like to add that the diversity and uniqueness of the historical legacies and civilisations of APR nations can be a positive factor in cementing this huge seat of world culture. Hasn't Singapore, where you have worked, become an island where distinctive offshoots of different civilisations have merged fantastically, mutually enriching each other?

[Muradyan] It certainly has, and I have in mind not only the huge economic potential of the North American and East Asian integrational centres. Mutually enriching poles, attracting different economic, political and cultural patterns, are bound to emerge in this unique Pacific "crucible".

In the middle of the past century Karl Marx and Frederick Engels predicted that "the Pacific Ocean will have the same role as the Atlantic has now and the Mediterranean had in the Antiquity and the Middle Ages, the role of the great water highway of world commerce". The experience gained in modern international relations clearly shows that the Pacific is not only a great sea route linking nations. "World commerce" is gaining roots on its banks and stands the chance of being raised to a qualitatively new stage leading to a deeper "socialisation of mankind".

[Vorontsov] There is no doubt that the question is how, at what pace and in what forms this will take place depends largely on the solution of the problem of regional security in the near future. I believe it is high time Soviet and foreign experts intensified the search for unconventional and radical ways of strengthening international security in the Asian Pacific region. Our dialogue suggests this unequivocal conclusion.

Footnotes

1. "Morals and Politics. Marking the Second Anniversary of the Delhi Declaration", Far Eastern Affairs (FEA) No. 1, 1989; idem., "Priority Attention to the Universal Values of Humanity. Pancha Shila—35 Years", No. 3, 1989.

2. Statistical data for 1986.

3. Far Eastern Affairs, No. 4, 1989.

4. Economic Changes in the Asian Pacific Rim, Wash., 1986, p. 2.

5. Quoted from B. Pospelov's article published in FEA, 1988, No. 6. Denying the possibility of a Japanese-American nuclear conflict, many Japanese politologists predict growing economic and technological tensions and rivalry in the foreseeable future: "Japan and the United States will be drawn increasingly into a deadly struggle for survival".

6. H. E. Salisbury, To Peking and Beyond, N.Y., 1973.

COPYRIGHT: Translation into English, Progress Publishers, 1989.

List of U.S., Soviet 'Operational Missile Bases'

90UM0300A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 31 Jan 90 p 2

[Report by L. Kolpakov under the rubric "Glasnost-90":
"The Secret Costs a Ruble"]

[Text] This information was until recently kept in strictest secrecy, and probably none of our readers would

have believed that VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA could precisely name the **operational missile bases of the USSR**. But now, here they are: Postavy, Vetrino, Polotsk, Smorgon, Lida, Gezgaly, Slonim, Ruzhany, Zasimovich, Mozyr, Petrikov, Zhitkovichi, Rechitsa, Slutsk, Lutsk, Brody, Chervonograd, Slavuta, Belokorovich, Lipniki, Vysokaya Pech, Korosten, Lebedin, Glukhov, Akhtyrka, Sovetsk, Gusev, Malorita, Pinsk, Vyru, Aluksne, Ostrov, Karmelava, Ukmerge, Taurage, Kilomya, Stry, Skala-Podolskaya, Lapichi, Katakurgan, Stankovo, Tsel, Slobudka, Bayram-Ali.

We direct your attention to the fact that VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA is the first to publish this information in the open press. And if you are interested in auxiliary missile installations in the USA, we can name those too: Martin Marietta at Middle River, Maryland; Redstone Arsenal at Huntsville, Alabama; Fort Sill at Fort Sill, Oklahoma; Complex 16 at Cape Canaveral, Florida; the Longhorn Munitions Plant for the U.S. ground forces at Marshall, Texas.

We hope that you, dear readers, are significantly intrigued about where VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA obtained these top secret items. We shall reveal an editorial secret and report the source of our information.

If you carefully read the evening issue of our newspaper, you noticed the article "The Ministry of Foreign Affairs Reveals Secrets." V. Milyayev, its author and chief editor of the magazine VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL SSSR, told how glasnost is becoming the law also for diplomats.

And yesterday Vitaliy Leonidovich sent us an advance copy of the magazine for this year, which will go on sale tomorrow. All of the information cited at the beginning of this article was derived from it.

Believe me, the official material, boring at first glance, sometimes reads like a detective novel. And these secrets and sensations cost only a ruble. Look for them at VESTNIK MINISTERSTVA INOSTRANNYKH DEL newsstands.

Iceland's Hermannsson Voices Support for Naval Arms Cuts

90UI0366A Moscow ZA RUBEZHOM
in Russian No 6, 2-6 Feb 90 pp 2-3

[Interview with Iceland Prime Minister Steingrímur Hermannsson by Vladimir Verbenko, director of the Novosti Press Agency in Iceland: "Our Accent on Disarmament on the Sea Is Enjoying Increasingly Greater Support"]

[Text] The leadership of Iceland does not share the apprehensions of a number of its NATO allies in relation to reducing naval arms, and it is the first member of the alliance to demand with increasing insistence that this

highly important problem be included in the present disarmament process. Iceland's prime minister expresses his point of view on this account in an interview for ZARUBEZHOM.

[Verbenko] Three years ago M. S. Gorbachev introduced a new political phenomenon into international practice, proposing to President Reagan that they meet in Iceland's capital without a lot of annoying protocol to discuss the widest range of issues, including the principal one—disarmament in all spheres. As I now have the honor of interviewing one of the organizers of this historical meeting, I would like to hear your opinion concerning a sort of "Reykjavik-2"—the unofficial meeting between the leaders of the USSR and the USA by the coast of Malta.

[Hermannsson] The Malta meeting was very important. And here is what is interesting: Three years ago there were people who spoke in negative tones about the meeting in Reykjavik as well. Some were anxious about Malta—would any mistakes be made? From my point of view this is an extremely strange approach to history. Because it is obvious that the "snowball of trust" that came into being and began its fortunate road here in Reykjavik is gathering increasingly larger mass and speed as it swiftly moves forward.

It was in Reykjavik on Mikhail Gorbachev's initiative that the practice of informal summit talks was started. In that instance as well, there was no preapproved agenda or agreement concerning the signing of any sort of treaties. And yet everything was done to welcome an exchange of any ideas, which is probably no less important today. The desire of the sides to meet once again 3 years later without formalities in order to discuss and evaluate everything that has occurred seems supremely justified to me. And the changes that have occurred are so grandiose that there is no need to enumerate them—they are on everyone's lips.

Therefore I deliberately repeat that the meeting on Malta was extremely useful: The leaders of the two great powers meticulously examined political and economic development, including in Europe—our native continent. I have always asserted, and continue to assert, that trust is at the basis of everything, it is the strongest foundation. In this respect I think that the recent meeting between G. Bush and M. S. Gorbachev is noteworthy precisely because it continued, on a qualitatively new level, the process of growing trust begun in Reykjavik 3 years ago.

[Verbenko] On several occasions M. S. Gorbachev has emphasized the urgent need for negotiations and practical measures with the purpose of starting reductions of naval arms, including in Reykjavik, in Murmansk, in Vladivostok, in Yugoslavia and in Finland. During his meeting with U.S. President G. Bush on Malta, M. S. Gorbachev once again emphasized that the time had come to begin discussion on naval forces. As we know, the reaction of the American side was negative.

May I ask you, the prime minister of a country in the center of the North Atlantic, to comment on the present state of affairs in this regard?

[Hermannsson] Yes, of course. As everyone knows, Iceland depends wholly and completely on the sea. It would not be an exaggeration in the least to say that our life depends on it literally. We are in the center of the North Atlantic, and this says everything from any point of view, including the military. It is precisely here that intensive growth of arms, especially nuclear, has been occurring in recent years. Considering this growing threat, back in May 1985 Iceland's Althing (parliament) adopted a resolution unanimously (which is extremely indicative) calling for nuclear disarmament in the territory of the entire region—from Greenland to the Urals—that is, in all of the North Atlantic as well. Therefore, being prime minister at that time, and minister of foreign affairs after that, and having served once again as prime minister for over a year now, I am fulfilling my duty—that of acting in behalf of this resolution's execution in every way possible at all levels, including the United Nations and NATO.

Thus in a recent meeting of the leaders of the NATO countries in Brussels I felt it necessary to express our disappointment with President G. Bush's negative reaction to M. Gorbachev's proposal on reducing naval arms. I feel that there are very substantial reasons for addressing it without delay. And it is incomprehensible to me why such reduction and establishment of a balance between the great powers at a certain level might appear dangerous to marine lines of communication. As a member of NATO, Iceland understands the need for ensuring the security of these lines of communication—this is just as natural as preserving the land routes between the USSR and Eastern European countries within the framework of the Warsaw Pact. But I am firmly certain that dependable security of marine lines of communication may be ensured in due fashion precisely under the conditions of a reduction in naval arms coupled with the strictest control over this process. That is what all of us need! We are deeply persuaded that without this, there cannot be real and complete disarmament.

We understand of course that the agreement that has been reached on medium and shorter-range missiles and the Soviet-American SNV [not further identified] treaty are influencing naval arms to a certain degree. But this is not enough: Reduction and subsequent elimination of sea-based cruise missiles and many types of tactical weapons used on the seas must be included in the overall process if we wish to protect mankind from nuclear destruction.

In this connection it is pleasant to see that a unique sort of active opposition is gradually forming, one that is fighting for disarmament on the seas and in the oceans, and for effective control over it. Of course other countries have not yet declared their support officially in NATO. But the positive trend established by a number

of countries—for example Norway, Denmark, Canada, Belgium and Turkey—in the aspect of increasingly more resolute support to the idea of including this highly important problem in the general disarmament process, is clearly discernible.

As far as Iceland is concerned, we will act increasingly more aggressively within the NATO framework, avoiding a position in which we spend too much time listening to others and having others making decisions for us. Luckily this situation has changed. I would like to emphasize that when we speak like this, we have no intention of violating our obligations as allies, and we are not "stabbing NATO in the back," as some suggest. On the contrary it is our duty to support, with all of our strength, universal disarmament between the great powers, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, which is so vitally important to all.

[Verbenko] As you know, recently USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs E. A. Shevardnadze called Iceland's idea to conduct an international conference on disarmament issues in the North Atlantic an extremely attractive idea. This was Moscow's first reaction at such a high level. What do you have to say in this connection?

[Hermannsson] We in Iceland are examining the idea of conducting such a conference in relation to the entire complex of reduction of naval arms and control over them. We have not yet resolved everything, but this issue is in the center of our attention, since from our point of view it is more than urgent.

[Verbenko] What kind of step (or steps) and from what side (or sides) do you feel would be the most useful and necessary for a real breakthrough in disarmament?

[Hermannsson] From my point of view there are several important steps that are realistically possible in the immediate future. Thus we hope very much that the SNV treaty will be signed at the next Soviet-American meeting in Washington. In the general context of an all-embracing process of disarmament, it would be very useful to draft a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. We are also waiting for drafting of a treaty reducing conventional arms to be completed in Vienna.

There can be no doubt that our focus on disarmament at sea is also enjoying increasingly greater support. Primarily of course from the Soviet Union. As I mentioned earlier, positive shifts have also occurred in the NATO framework, in which we are constantly dealing with this issue—such is one other direction of our efforts. I am certain that this vitally important problem will be raised anew during the Washington meeting between President G. Bush and M. Gorbachev. And I believe very strongly that the sides will reach agreement on the need for placing it on the agenda of the disarmament talks.

U.S. ALCM Test Over Canada Noted

90UM0285A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Feb 90 First Edition p 5

[Article by A. Kamenskiy: "Comments on Words and Deeds"]

[Text] The American Department of the Air Force has started to carry out in the air space of Canada (with the consent of the government of this country) the next phase of flight testing of its new air-launched cruise missile (ALCM), which is designed to destroy ground targets located deep in the territory of a potential enemy.

The ALCMs are usually launched by B-52 strategic bombers flying over the waters of the Beaufort Sea, in the neighborhood of the Primrose Proving Ground, which is located approximately 250 kilometers northeast of the city of Edmonton. The missile, under complete automatic control, flies at minimum altitude to afford the greatest avoidance of detection by air defense systems during its entire flight of more than 2,500 kilometers.

The long range makes the use of cruise missiles possible for virtually the entire depth of the Soviet Union's territory, thus obviating the need for bombers to enter the effective engagement zone of Soviet air defense systems and rendering the missiles an effective weapon for modern warfare. Testing involves monitoring the efficiency and reliability of missile systems, flight accuracy and approach to the target, and missile intercept actions executed by American and Canadian fighter aircraft.

Neither Washington nor Ottawa makes a secret of the fact that American experts selected the Canadian air spaces for a good reason. The relief of the terrain and abundant snow cover are similar to that of the northern regions of the Soviet Union. It is from the north that American strategists plan mass employment of cruise missiles against the USSR in the event of unleashing of conventional and nuclear war.

The tests of the American ALCMs over Canadian territory are being carried out under the terms of a five-year agreement signed by both sides in 1983 and extended, over the protests of the Canadian public, to 1993. The Pentagon made plans to carry out from 1 January to 31 March of this year the next series of tests in the air space of its northern neighbor; two of them have already been accomplished: on 23 and 29 January.

The Canadian government in the last few years has stated on a number of occasions that arms and disarmament control will remain as its "constant, continuing, and dominant priority of foreign policy." The invariability of this course was recently reaffirmed by General John de Chastlain, chief of the Canadian Defence Staff, at a military doctrine seminar held in Vienna.

However, actual deeds are obviously contradicting the above words. The present tests of the American ALCMs in Canada constitute convincing evidence of this.

Meeting on Questions of Economy, Ecology of Disarmament Proposed

90WC0062A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS
in English No 6, 18-25 Feb 90 p 12

[Article by Oleg Mamalyga, USSR State Prize winner, designer: "Price of Arms Conversion"]

[Text] More than 80 per cent of the missiles to be liquidated under the INF Treaty have been destroyed. But how can we best recycle the weapons we have so as not to repeat our old mistakes.

After my article on the conversion of military equipment and production technologies (MN, No 40, 1989), the dialogue was joined by G. Khromov, of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers; his views appeared in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. Khromov considers that the best way to destroy missiles in the USSR is to blast them—just what is being done and thus preventing us from learning any lessons for the future.

Khromov suggests that we should be satisfied by these "real savings" at the expense of "reducing the armed forces and stopping the costly exploitation of arms and military equipment."

But the USSR's non-economic method of destroying missiles by blasting them (instead of burning through the stages of the missiles, as they do in the U.S.) will cost our economy, according to my estimate, up to 3 billion roubles' worth of high-grade steel, titanium, tungsten and other materials that are expensive and scarce, plus the steering gears from the missile stages, worth some 10 million roubles for engineering purposes.

True, Khromov considers that steering gears cannot technically be recycled. But experts from the Chief Specialized Designing Bureau in Ryazan have already put parts of steering gears from the SRM-23 on a new potato-harvesting combine now being tested.

The constructors lost millions of roubles' worth of high-grade glass-reinforced plastic tubes 2 metres in diameter, which could have been made from the IRM-10 transport-launching containers by cutting them up approximately in half, which is permitted by the INF Treaty. These losses are irreplaceable. But we should learn from this negative experience, because the main work is yet to come. If the USSR's proposals on reducing conventional arms in Europe go through, then the WTO countries will have to get rid of 40,000 tanks, 42,000 armoured personnel carriers, 46,000 artillery pieces, mortars and systems of salvo-fire, 1,000 helicopters, etc.

Thousands of ICBMs and hundreds of planes are to be destroyed according to the 50 per cent reduction of strategic weapons. And these are all items of the highest quality.

If we reinvest these materials in the economy, the return will be worth about 2-5 per cent of the cost; if we reuse the engines, the return will be worth about 8-10 per cent

of the cost; and if everything is used—movers, carriers, etc.—then we can expect a 20 per cent or more return on the original cost.

The retrieving of precious metals from steering missiles' instruments is impossibly ineffective. The total worth of precious metals extracted from the steering instruments of all the SRM-23 adds up to a little over 250,000 roubles, whereas the use of these instruments for geophysical rockets would save tens of millions of roubles.

The shift from a long-standing state of superarmaments to minimum deterrence with minimum economic and ecological losses calls for well-thought-out and lengthy efforts coordinated with the world disarmament process. In this connection, I propose that the Commission of the Soviet of the Union on developing industry, power engineering, techniques and technology and the Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on defence and state security take responsibility for questions of control and the most economic method of disarmament. The most expedient solution would be to set up a special Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on Conversion and Economy of Disarmament.

We could convene an international, practical conference for defence and civil-industry experts to exchange know-how, ideas and proposals for economic and clean technologies for the utilization of weapons on the list to be liquidated.

The process of perestroika, glasnost and birth of "new thinking" in the USSR has arrived at the moment when a meeting is becoming real between Soviet and U.S. arms specialists, for discussing a broad spectrum of questions of optimum economy and ecology of disarmament, including also the problems dealt with in this article.

Military People's Deputy Questions Wisdom of INF Treaty

90WC0061A Moscow MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN
in Russian No 3, Mar 90 pp 82-87

[Letter to the editors of MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN by Captain E. Gams, USSR people's deputy: "Doubts About the INF Treaty"]

[Text] In the past year, various newspapers have published a number of explanations in answer to the concern expressed by a portion of the readers (and judging by everything, a rather significant portion) in connection with the conditions under which the Soviet-American INF Treaty was signed.

We believe we will have to return more than once to this topic, because the set of standard arguments presented each time is rather unconvincing and, as such, not only does not reassure the people, but sows even greater doubts.

Everything is by far not so simple and synonymous as it may seem. For practically any argument, we may (and

evidently must) present a sufficient number of substantial counter-arguments, which taken together are capable of fairly well ruining the sweet picture painted by various observers.

Let us take even the question of the inconsistency in numbers of missiles to be destroyed (1752 for the USSR and 859 for the USA). We might add that if we take into account the warheads of these missiles, which are often not mentioned at all, then the ratio becomes even more discouraging for us.

Yes, it turns out that we have more medium- and shorter-range missiles than the Americans. But so what? We should have more of them, since we have to take into account the nuclear forces of France and Great Britain. We might add that for a number of years the Soviet side viewed the accounting of West European nuclear forces as a necessary condition for reaching any agreement on medium-range nuclear weapons. Was it wise to reject this principle for the sake of concluding the present agreement? In his time, A. A. Gromyko said that the Soviet people do not care what nationality's missiles will fall on their cities. He spoke wisely! Perhaps since that time something which might instill optimism has appeared in the military plans of Paris and London? Certainly not.

Here, for example, is what the newspaper HUMANITE writes about French nuclear ambitions: "In 1985 France's nuclear forces were capable of destroying 25-34 million Soviet citizens and from 16 to 25 percent of the Soviet industrial potential. By 1990 the human losses in the USSR as a result of a French nuclear strike may increase to 48-55 million people, with the destruction of 25-40 percent of the industrial potential. By 1995, Paris's plans envision having nuclear forces capable of killing 81 million Soviet people and wiping $\frac{3}{4}$ of the Soviet Union's industrial capacities off the face of the earth".

And under these conditions we are agreeing to Reagan's "zero" in Europe? Is this not a bit too brave? If this really is the new thinking with which they put off all doubters today, then I, quite frankly, prefer the old. Before we could at least depend on missiles. But what now? To hope that the Americans and the French are people too, as they say; that Armand Hammer is our great friend, and that M. Thatcher, although imposing in appearance, is nevertheless still a woman? We get the impression that some of our leaders have taken the political philosophy of Leopold the Cat as their weapon, a philosophy whose entire "wisdom" does not go beyond the well-known formula: "Fellows! Let's live as friends".

One cannot help but recall what we read about the first days of the Great Patriotic War, when many of our soldiers and commanders, lulled by stupid propaganda, seriously expected that the sense of proletarian solidarity would awaken in the German soldiers, and that the war would immediately end because of this. Unfortunately, the elements of such a "world outlook" are being

affirmed also in the consciousness of many of our contemporaries, and not without help, we might add, from the means of mass information.

Of course, we can console ourselves with the fact that somewhere beyond the Urals we will find a hundred or two intercontinental missiles to compensate for the European strategic systems which are "deducted as expenditures". We will be able to find them, but these ICBM's are a component part of the formula for strategic parity between the USSR and USA, and their practical re-orientation would in essence be tantamount to our loss of this parity. We believe that this is not only a purely speculative, but also an entirely "physical" possibility whose negative effect we would soon feel on the political, diplomatic, and ultimately on the military level. This question will arise most acutely if a Soviet-American agreement is reached on the 50 percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons, when the "ponderability" of each remaining missile will increase at least by two times.

Another argument against unequal responsibilities under the INF Treaty bears perhaps an even more principle character.

The oldest political wisdom says: "Do not set a precedent". By consenting (if even with the very best intentions) to an agreement which imposes greater responsibilities upon us than upon the counteragents, we have set an extremely undesirable precedent for ourselves.

They write today that in past years Soviet diplomacy has achieved poor world notoriety as "Mr. No", due to its absolute obstinacy even in those questions on which a compromise was possible. We must be careful not to fall into the opposite extreme today, and not to gain the reputation of being the kindly "Mr. Yes", ready not only for mutual compromises, but for something even greater... It seems that our agreement to Reagan's formula for eliminating missiles in Europe has been interpreted abroad in a context which is unfavorable for us. A real threat is being created for a significant hardening of the positions of our opponents at future talks on political and military questions and their presentation of additional demands which under different circumstances would be unthinkable. The specific indicators of such an evolution are already apparent. After the signing of the INF Treaty, in Japan there was an apparent revitalization of the campaign for "return of the northern territories", as the Kuril Islands are called in Tokyo. It appears that the Japanese side seriously hopes that the Soviet leadership will exhibit new thinking on this question as well.

Discussions about the fact that the unequal reductions are supposedly programmed by the initial missile imbalance between the USSR and USA also do not withstand criticism. So what if by the rules of arithmetic we should destroy two times as many missiles as the Americans? There is also higher mathematics! Who says that politics must fall within the four arithmetic functions?

In any case, one thing is clear: Under any circumstance, our diplomats in Geneva must seek such a formula for agreement which would impose entirely equal (in totality) responsibilities upon both sides, and which would consequently not be detrimental to our international authority. If the framework of the Geneva talks on the INF has proven to be too narrow to seek out such a formula, then it is evidently time to expand it, to transfer the negotiations to new spheres, to change over to the practice of "package" agreements, and in general to do everything for the sake of final equality in the responsibilities of the parties.

There have been possibilities for this. Let us take at least the great lack of correspondence between the might of the USSR and USA naval fleets. Why not place this problem on the agenda of the negotiations in order to cover the question of our supremacy in terms of missiles in Europe? Of course, such an approach would hardly be to Washington's liking. But what do we care about that? We must defend our own interests. As it is, it turns out that we are sending our missiles off to be dismantled, while their aircraft carriers continue to hang around all the seas as they had before! Could it be that we are being led by "good Uncle Sam" in our choice of spheres and frameworks of negotiations? If they do not want to discuss something, that is it—the negotiations have the red light in that direction. Let us take this very same question of the fleet or the infamous SDI. It turns out that we are discussing only that which they agree to, and in that framework which is acceptable to them. Yet the West determines the parameters of talks with the East not without its own ulterior motive.

Who, for example, stands to gain from the fact that the negotiations on military questions are conducted primarily not on a block, but on a bilateral Soviet-American basis? One does not have to be a genius to guess the answer—the West. That is because under this variant, the military might of the other great powers of the imperialistic camp—Great Britain, France, the FRG, Japan, etc.—remain outside the framework of the negotiations. Nevertheless, they remain members of the unified anti-Soviet, anti-socialist club. It is understandable that for the Soviet Union, who has no such strong allies, it would be more expedient to conduct negotiations at the level of military coalitions, which would make it possible to strive toward real (we might say absolute) military parity instead of one which is artificially computed from the overall sum of Soviet-American equality.

So what if we have military parity with the USA, if right next to this parity there is a totally uncontrolled supremacy over us by the sum of imperialistic armaments? The West, nevertheless, conducts the matter as if such a position is the only one possible. At the same time, it blocks all our efforts to place military dialogue on an inter-coalition footing. This is the reason for the 15-years of beating the air at the Vienna talks on reduction of armed forces and weapons in Central Europe, and this too is the reason for the more than cool attitude initially expressed toward the initiative of the

Warsaw Pact Organization resounding from Warsaw about conducting an all-European forum on questions of relaxation of military tensions. Judging by all this, our opponents do not intend to reject the bilateral Soviet-American dialogue which they have come to like, and which leads, in the course of its successful progress, toward a continued relative weakening in the military coalition of the socialist states in the face of the unified military alliance of the West. Having agreed to this bilateral formula in the days when the relation of powers was reduced to Soviet-American military force, or more precisely to the missile balance, today, and to an even greater measure tomorrow, we run the risk of encountering very serious difficulties. This is why we must urgently change our priorities before it is too late, and lay down a new algorithm for the program of military dialogue with the West. This would be truly be a new way of thinking, unlike the apparent one created by the INF Treaty.

As concerns this agreement, it, being the typical child of the political conditions, in essence is tantamount to our major diplomatic defeat, fraught with dangerous foreign political consequences. By violating the principle of equal rights of the parties, it darkens the prospects of conducting further negotiations on disarmament and works objectively against the policy of reducing the levels of military opposition and providing for greater security in the world.

The conclusions on certain specifics also do not evoke trust. We believe many Soviet people do not understand the reasons for the haste with which our side, practically in unilateral order, began fulfillment of the INF Treaty conditions. The document had not yet been ratified, i.e., had not yet gone into effect, and we already began the withdrawal of our missiles from the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The Americans began eliminating their missiles on 8 September 1988, while we had already blown up 70 of ours by 26 August. In August we began the elimination of our "SS-20" medium-range missiles, while in the FRG at the same time the 56th Field Artillery Command was conducting training operations with the participation of the Pershing-2 medium-range strategic missile.

What is our hurry? Can it be that even in this case the desire to make a propagandist coup—there, we might say, in this matter too "we are ahead of the entire planet!"—has proven stronger than the elementary sense of our own dignity? What kind of an irrepressible urge toward triumphant reports is this?

I am convinced that the times for eliminating the first missiles must be synchronized for both powers. I cannot think of a better symbol to emphasize the equality of the agreeing parties and their mutual respect for each other. It is of no importance that on the whole we had more of these missiles. What is stopping us from blowing them up later, even at the rate of a hundred a day?

As for the inspections, this question too is not as synonymous as the observers interpret it. It is no accident that the problem of control almost became a stumbling block at the very last moment—during the reading of the agreement in the course of its ratification in the American Senate. The newspaper *ZA RUBEZHOM* published a curious report by the American journalist P. Grayer on the visit by Soviet inspectors to American missile bases in a number of states. This small material draws attention to itself by its absence of euphoria, rare for today's times, in interpreting the questions associated with adherence to the INF Treaty. The author notes that even at the inspected installation, far from all facilities are subject to the inspector's control, and that only 18 storehouses are open for access to inspectors, while 18 others of the same type are closed. The report presents the words of an American colonel responsible for matters of security: "We...do not allow objects to get into the field of view which should not be there".

We can, of course, contemptuously shrug off these evaluations of the bourgeois journalist which resound in dissonance to the general chorus of toasts.

However, if we judge matters soberly, then we must admit that the absence of deceit regarding the fulfillment of the agreement conditions may be guaranteed not by inspections (if need be, they will fool any inspection, because there will always be "18 closed storehouses"), but only by mutual good will. We may affirm with a high degree of assurance that today this good will abounds. But what about tomorrow? Who can give the guarantee? Understandably, no one will give such guarantees. Who knows how things will turn out?

Might it not happen that in the near future we will have to hastily restore the missile stock which we are currently throwing to the wind? That too, by the way, is an interesting question! Especially since the precedent is already present in our recent history. The only difference is that at that time Nikita Sergeyevich put under the press everything but missiles, while today it is specifically missiles which have turned out to be "objectionable". It is frightening to think what would happen if at the next turn of history (and how many more of them there are yet to be) we find ourselves faced with the need for a new arms buildup! We must understand that such turns are more ruinous for us than they are for the West. America will hardly suffer from a new upsurge in the arms race, while its military business will even be elated. Even the possibilities of division of military power between the partners in the West are utilized to 100 percent capacity. However, for our overtaxed economy, for a state which is bound hand and foot by unsolved social problems, the prospect of a new arms buildup necessary to keep us from becoming powerless in the face of mighty enemies might prove catastrophic. Especially after the "brilliant" disarmament currently being conducted. In essence, the West is playing a hand which it cannot lose. While partially disarming on conditions which are beneficial to it (let us remember: the bilateral rather than coalitional character of the negotiations is

beneficial to the West!), it at the same time retains the capacity for a new upsurge in military competition. We, however, in destroying that which we already have in our defense sphere, risk being left to play the fool, since we do not have comparable potential at our disposal to compensate for a new Western upsurge, if one should ensue. Our capacities in the military sphere are even more narrowed in connection with the course set by the state toward a changeover of the economy to intensive methods of management and limitation of the command-administrative forms of management.

I would like to deal in greater detail with the matter of the "SS-23" missile. Today E. A. Shevardnadze states that we have demonstrated our good will by agreeing to destroy the "SS-23" missiles under the INF Treaty, despite the fact that they are not covered under this treaty. The Americans, however, despite our noble gesture, are meanwhile making the decision to expand in Europe the placement of missiles analogous to those which we are destroying under the treaty.

We might ask: If things are really as Shevardnadze says, then how can we allow such a thing—to include in the agreement a missile which does not fall under it? What kind of "good will" is this? It is doubtful whether anyone other than the USSR would demonstrate their good will in this manner. The Americans evidently will not reject their plans of developing a new system with radius of up to 500 kilometers. There is no law which keeps them from doing this. But what about us? We too will have to develop something along these lines, but not the "SS-23". All the hints at the possible departure from the INF Treaty in connection with these systems have no serious foundation. After all, as we know, the Soviet Union never violates agreements.

However, the version of the "good will" of the USSR, which prompted it toward voluntary elimination of the "SS-23" is not especially credible. According to certain data, the matter is much more prosaic. It is simply that at the time when the INF Treaty was being discussed, the Americans demanded that the "SS-23" be included in it on the grounds that the computed range of this missile reached 500 kilometers and more. We, most likely, tried to convince them otherwise, but did not succeed. The new missile complex intended to replace the long outdated mobile systems with range of up to 300 kilometers was included in the reduction, while the old missiles successfully remained to finish off their lifetimes, decaying in their positions. Moreover, we may be assured that the lower limit of the range of missiles included in the INF Treaty was also not selected randomly, but specifically with consideration for the capacities of Soviet missiles, and primarily the "SS-23". We need hardly doubt that if this missile had an estimated range of not 500, but let us say, 450 kilometers, then the lower limit of the INF range would have to be reduced to this level.

All this indicates that the problem of the "SS-23" should have been resolved at the time when the conditions of

the INF Treaty were being worked out. Evidently, during that period the line of the Soviet side was largely, if not primarily, determined by the desire at any cost to sign the agreement, which was a rather important political victory for our new leadership. As a result, the Soviet Union was inclined toward a certain flexibility in resolving controversial questions, even at the cost of curtailing some of its legal interests. Today, when the treaty has already gone into effect, some people are evidently experiencing delayed regrets in connection with the "good will" which we displayed at that time. The train, however, has pulled out.

And here is the last point. As substantiation for the "extreme necessity" of this agreement for the USSR, justifying even our series of unilateral conciliations, it is customary to refer to the extraordinary character of the threat to our security which arose after the placement of the "Pershing-2" missiles in the FRG, 10 minutes flight time from Moscow. This, they say, sharply increased the risk of a military confrontation (including an unsanctioned one) and has catastrophically reduced the time for making any political decisions. Yes, this is really so. The "Pershing-2" flies to us from the FRG three times faster than the "Minuteman" does from North Dakota. There is a corresponding increase also in the danger of the automatic escalation of any conflict into an all-out one. Yet this danger increases equally for both sides! After all, our missiles are also 5-10 minutes flight time from most NATO capitals. The approach time of Soviet missiles to American territory proper was also reduced to comparability due to movement of part of the Soviet submarine missile carriers to forward areas. All this ensured the maintenance of an approximate "balance of fear" at the new level of military balance which emerged after the placement of missiles in Europe.

Thus, the measure of our apprehensions could not be in any way significantly higher than that of the West. Consequently, there was also no reason for accepting conditions which provided for greater sacrifices on our side. All that we have said is certainly not a discussion "after the fact". Today, when the prospect of new and much broader agreements on disarmament is the order of the day, we must once again weigh all the arguments "pro" and "con" and subject our disarmament strategy to comprehensive public discussion.

Unfortunately, under the conditions of one-sided glasnost which reign among us at the present time, and which, according to the precise definition given by M. S. Gorbachev at the 19th Party Conference, is turning into supremacy in the means of mass information of certain "groups", it is practically impossible to ensure an unprejudiced discussion of a number of controversial problems in domestic and foreign policy, and among these, undoubtedly, the INF Treaty. It is obvious to me that there are people in the country and in the Armed Forces, including competent specialists, who have a critical attitude toward the INF Treaty in its present form. However, not one of them, either before or after the signing of the treaty, was given the opportunity to

publicly present his views. Again, as in former times, healthy, fruitful discussion and comparison of various points of view were replaced by sweet-voiced, detrimental toadyism and bureaucratic unanimity. At the same time, in the USA the discussion of the treaty, as well as of the prospects of Soviet-American negotiations on the whole, is constantly ongoing, and in the course of this discussion there are tens and hundreds of viewpoints presented, which comprise the nutrient medium for the US government's development of optimal foreign policy decisions.

In conclusion I would like to say that even if I am a thousand times wrong in my reasoning, nevertheless I must explain it. And there are more than just one or two others like me, who have our doubts. This is why we need serious discussion, and not another propagandist pacifier.

COPYRIGHT: MID SSR, Obshchestvo "Znaniye", "Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn". 1990.

Realities of 'Third Zero' Option Discussed

90WC00604 Moscow: MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN in Russian No 3, Mar 90 pp 82-87

[Article by Pavel Kimovich Bayev, senior scientific associate at the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute and candidate in historical sciences; Vitaliy Vladimirovich Zhurkin, acting academician-secretary at the USSR Academy of Sciences World Economics and International Relations Department, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute and USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member; Sergey Aleksandrovich Karaganov, deputy director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute and doctor of historical sciences, and Viktor Sergeyevich Sheyin, section head at the USSR Academy of Sciences Europe Institute and candidate in historical sciences: "Will We Achieve the 'Third Zero'?"]

[Text] The breathtaking dynamics of political processes in Europe have edged out the military-political questions which have traditionally been at the center of discussions about European security. This is a heartening indication of demilitarization, if not yet of the European system of security itself, then in any case of the thinking about it. At the same time, we cannot overlook the fact that realities are lagging behind the ways of thinking, that the mountains of weapons created in the years of political confrontation which are fading into the past still remain. The "military skeleton" of the European confrontation remains, just like the "circulatory system" of military financing which nourishes it. The dismantling of these structures remains a difficult problem both from a conceptual and from a practical standpoint.

Specifically, the situation with reduction and elimination of the nuclear component of confrontation—tactical nuclear weapons, is still far from clear. In recent years, the discussion centering around this question has not been distinguished by its constructive nature. The USSR

insisted on the need for its total elimination already in the foreseeable future. Most of the political forces in power in Europe spoke out in favor of continuing to rely on nuclear weapons and refused even to conduct talks on their curtailment in Europe, fearing a "trap"—the proposal about the "third zero" in the development of the INF Treaty, which would be difficult to reject from a political standpoint. The situation was complicated by the fact that many in the West spoke out in favor of "modernization" of tactical nuclear weapons, which could not help but be perceived by the other side as being aimed at increasing combat capacities and achieving specific advantages. In this situation, the "third zero" was seen by a Soviet expert as the most effective instrument for blocking "modernization".

Today the situation has eased considerably. Having soberly evaluated the balance of its interests, NATO has put off "modernization" of its land-based missiles, which in the opinion of many experts has "buried" this notion. The surge toward democracy in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Rumania, the political dismantling of the "Berlin wall", and the acceleration of the process of rapprochement of the two German states evidently have not only removed "modernization" from the agenda of real policy. The elimination in the foreseeable future of all systems of tactical land-based nuclear weapons—both missiles and nuclear artillery—has begun to appear quite probable. Both the political and military arguments in favor of their retention are rapidly eroding. One other basic element of the NATO program of "modernization" of this type of weapon seems much more vulnerable than before. That is the replacement of nuclear bombs with "air to ground" missiles.

In 1989 the Soviet position changed in the direction of realism. (Naturally, in spite of this the USSR did not reject the politically and morally justified goal—the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons). First we proposed conducting negotiations not only on the elimination, but both on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Then in his Strassburg speech, M. S. Gorbachev agreed to constructively review the concept of "minimal deterrence". Finally, in his December speech at the political commission of the European parliament, E. A. Shevardnadze proposed to reduce the means of deterrence to a minimal level at the first stage of the talks, then to go on to the next step, i.e., to first hold talks not on the elimination, but on the reduction of nuclear weapons.

The road to effective negotiations is open. The political situation which is being formulated promises the possibility of rapid progress. Yet before embarking upon this road we should once more evaluate our own interests and the interests of the other side, and try to outline our ultimate and intermediate goals. This may be done only in the process of political and scientific discussion. This article, like the speech of the authors on whose conclusions it largely rests, is called upon to stimulate this discussion.

One of the obvious defects of Soviet political science is the absence of an integral conception of "national interests". Because of this, long-term goals have been presented primarily on the basis of ideological principles, while foreign political practice has been insufficiently oriented toward these goals. The problem of USSR interests in connection with nuclear weapons also remains undeveloped.

This lack of development makes any effort to define these interests vulnerable from the outset. Yet such efforts are evidently necessary, at least from the standpoint of stimulating discussion.

Thus, in what way does the course toward elimination of nuclear weapons unconditionally correspond to our interests?

The nuclear arms race initiated by the USA was one of the impulses which furthered the split of Europe, the formation of structures of military opposition, and the consolidation of the West in opposition to the USSR. The movement toward elimination of nuclear weapons must in principle aid in demilitarizing the system of security, in which the Soviet Union undoubtedly has an interest.

The proposal on total elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically tactical weapons, which testifies to our readiness to reject the status of a nuclear superpower, has attracted attention in Europe to our new foreign policy and has aided and continues to aid in improving the image of the USSR.

Without a doubt, the USSR is interested in continuing the course toward elimination of tactical nuclear systems also as a necessary response to the growing anti-nuclear sentiment in Europe, including also in the East European countries.

The elimination of tactical nuclear weapons will reduce the probability of a rapid escalation of any military conflict to a nuclear level, and then to the level of a global thermonuclear conflict. This corresponds to the interests of our country, as well as those of all humanity.

This thesis may be detailed in a military plane. The presence of a large amount of munitions and tactical nuclear weapon delivery systems in the zone of potential combat operations creates the conditions for immediate escalation of an ordinary conflict, including escalation due to fear of losing these weapons. Their mass placement in the deployment of forces increases the possibility of a non-nuclear conflict escalating to the nuclear level, also because the first artillery salvos and air strikes would damage the guidance and communications systems, the nuclear weapon delivery systems, and the stores of nuclear munitions. This may lead to consequences which would be difficult to predict from the

standpoint of escalation of the conflict (unsanctioned application), not to mention radiation pollution of the terrain.

In all such hypothetical scenarios, we are speaking of the possibility of escalating to the nuclear level a war which has already begun. Nevertheless, the probability of this is extremely small, which is admitted also by Western experts, while Soviet policy and military strategy is in an ever-increasing degree aimed specifically at averting any war. Strengthening the defensive directionality of doctrines and changing the structure of groupings of armed forces of both alliances would reduce the possibilities for deep offensive operations. In this situation, the destabilizing effect of tactical nuclear systems evidently tends to be reduced.

The other interests associated with elimination of tactical nuclear forces are not so synonymous.

In the West, there is a deeply rooted opinion that the presence of these forces deters the spread of conventional weapons. The argument of NATO's nuclear supremacy has been used quite often by West European politicians to counteract U.S. pressure in the direction of increasing conventional forces. Soviet reductions in armed forces in the second half of the 50's and early 60's were largely the result of the strengthening of nuclear capacities, including the development of a tactical nuclear arsenal (with a shift of about 5 years as compared with NATO). At the same time, the nuclear arms race at times spurred on the growth of non-nuclear forces. For example, the increase in armored vehicle might, evidently, was viewed in the USSR as a means of neutralizing the nuclear supremacy of the West.

Yet on the whole we cannot see a rigid connection between the development of the race for conventional and nuclear weapons, or at least this connection has not been conceptually developed. Proof of this may be seen in the dynamics of increase in our military might in the 70's, when the consolidation of strategic parity and elimination of NATO advantages in terms of nuclear forces in Europe were accompanied not only by the qualitative improvement, but also by serious quantitative increase in our non-nuclear potential. It is evidently impossible to find a rational substantiation for this large-scale military buildup, which was implemented parallel with the development of the process of relaxation of tensions. However, the elimination of its results (direct and indirect) requires serious foreign political efforts to this very day.

On the whole, however, the following supposition seems to be quite substantiated: While in the past tactical nuclear weapons were for the most part one of the stimuli in the race for conventional weapons, today, evidently, they serve as a factor of deterrence. The militaristic circles are forced to proceed from the fact that to "win"—to obtain dividends in a political or military sense—under conditions of preservation of nuclear weapons is practically impossible. The effect of

the nuclear factor makes it unpromising to shift the arms race to new directions where, according to the evaluations of Western experts, the technological supremacy of NATO may be effectively realized.

The connection of nuclear and conventional weapons in the context of the disarmament process is also non-synonymous. It is quite evident that the reductions in conventional forces and weapons at the first stage of the Vienna talks may create a favorable political atmosphere (NATO even presents this as a condition) for reducing nuclear forces. At the same time, truly deep reductions at the subsequent stages in Vienna would be difficult to achieve without serious reductions in tactical nuclear systems. However, this does not refer to their total elimination, which is absolutely unacceptable for the primary groupings of the Western ruling circles. The fear that the reduction of conventional weapons will pave the way for total elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe is one of the sources of resistance in the course of preparing the mandate for the Vienna talks, especially on the part of France and Great Britain. At the present time these notions are increasing the rigidity of the NATO position on tactical aviation, including a categorical rejection of defining strike aircraft, as well as the efforts by the two European nuclear powers to leave their own nuclear-capable aircraft outside the framework of the reductions.

In principle the USSR might be interested in the elimination of tactical and all types of nuclear weapons in Europe also from the currently refuted (but considered by Western experts) orthodox military-political standpoint. Due to the slightly more advantageous geographic position, the accumulated advantages in conventional forces, as well as the possibilities of relying on strategic forces, part of which may be aimed at objects on European territory, the elimination of tactical nuclear systems could place the Soviet Union in a relatively more favorable strategic position.

We believe, however, that the USSR cannot be interested in eliminating this type of nuclear weapon for this reason. The West, which has a significant economic supremacy over the Warsaw Pact Organization, would not allow any serious shift in the military balance, which would be necessarily be restored, but at a higher level. The impossibility of gaining advantages proceeds from the fact that it is an extremely improbable scenario in which the ratio of conventional forces remains more or less at the current level, while the tactical nuclear systems are reduced or even eliminated.

More probable is another variant of development of events, in which the USSR is truly interested for political and economic considerations—the elimination of the basic imbalances in conventional forces, large reductions in strategic offensive weapons paralleled with the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons. After such reductions, the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization would have only one remaining inalienable advantage—the geographical (associated with the transoceanic position

of the USA and the absence of strategic depth in the structure of NATO's unified armed forces). However, this advantage would evidently be compensated by NATO's advantages in qualitative arms parameters. Under these conditions, on the contrary, the USSR may have to—for the period of transition to fully defensive military structures (and this process will take at least a decade)—compensate for the possible advantages of the West.

There is one more hypothetically possible USSR interest—the weakening of NATO unity, and the effort to hasten the withdrawal of American troops. We are accused of such intentions in the West, based on the widespread and indisputable (although we do not know how substantiated) thesis that the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would inevitably lead to the withdrawal of the grouping of U.S. forces from FRG territory.

The counterarguments are obvious—the efforts to stimulate a crisis in NATO contradict the real interests of the USSR and may ultimately lead to results opposite to those which are desired. However, the main thing is that the USSR has absolutely no interest in such crisis occurrences due to the specifics of the current political situation. Here, thanks to the change in the ratio of forces between the USA and Western Europe and the erosion of the concept of the posed threat, the unity of the West from the standpoint of opposition to the East is in any case weakened.

The Soviet Union cannot be interested in adding factors of instability to a situation which is already increasingly unstable. The presence of the USA, in spite of all its negative traits, is one of the notable stabilizing elements of intra-Western relations, and to a certain measure the entire system of relations between East and West. However, under conditions when the military balance in Europe evidently takes on a stable tendency toward reduction, the relative weight of the negative traits of American presence is clearly reduced, while its relative importance as a stabilizing factor may increase.

Moreover, it is to the Soviet Union's benefit (and in this sense we have parallel interests with Western Europe) for the USA to remain militarily tied to Europe. Such a dependence in a broadly outlined sphere of security holds Washington back from large-scale and dangerous actions of force and takes into consideration its interest in European stability.

This does not mean that the authors believe the USSR to be interested in perpetuating American and Soviet military presence on the territories of their allies. In this case we are speaking about retaining presence reduced to a symbolic level as one of the stabilizing elements for the transitional period from the current to the future system of security in Europe, which will have to be based to a much greater degree on political guarantees and common European institutions.

There can be no doubt that a radical reduction in the level of military opposition in Europe is one of the basic interests of the USSR. Without a reduction in military expenditures and conversion of military production and science, the restructuring of the economy, evidently, is simply unattainable. If we speak of priorities in cutbacks from an economic point of view, then the first of these priorities must be the reduction in conventional arms, which take up the greatest part of military resources. Therefore, in the opinion of the authors, for the transitional period, during which the role of the military component in Soviet policy must steadily decrease, the USSR could be interested in the leading reduction of conventional arms and armed forces while continuing to rely on the nuclear factor.

The stability of this interest is defined by the fact that by the end of the current century in Europe, it will evidently still be impossible to create a highly reliable system of security based primarily on political guarantees. The complexity of the transitional period is increased by the fact that the countries of Eastern Europe have entered into a period of inevitable and necessary changes, even though these changes carry with them elements of instability. The dynamics of the political situation have already posed the question of eliminating our military presence (primarily nuclear) in certain countries. In this situation, the role of tactical nuclear weapons may increase also as a means of instilling confidence in those strata of our society which may be concerned about the consequences of all these changes from the standpoint of the country's security and prestige, as well as a means of instilling confidence in some of our allies.

In evaluating Soviet interests in connection with the problem of eliminating tactical nuclear systems in Europe, we must also consider the fact that fear of such elimination and weakening of American guarantees, coupled with the possibility of a significant or even complete withdrawal of American forces, is one of the primary motives for the increased tendency toward military-political integration in Western Europe in the past 2-3 years.

The presented brief analysis does not allow us to come to any absolutely synonymous conclusions regarding the question of the degree to which elimination of tactical nuclear weapons will already in the foreseeable future correspond to or contradict USSR interests. Based on an analysis of the balance of these interests, the authors are inclined toward the opinion that in principle the course toward their elimination ultimately corresponds to long-term USSR interests. At the same time, the authors believe that until the system of European security is significantly strengthened and restructured, economic reform in the USSR brings tangible results, and the scientific-technical development of the country accelerates sharply, the total elimination of this type of nuclear weapon may prove to be premature.

At the same time, the course toward such forced elimination is now viewed by most of the ruling circles of the

Western countries as being absolutely unacceptable. From the standpoint of Washington, giving nuclear guarantees to its partners in the alliance is one of the key prerequisites for maintaining the stability of NATO and retaining American positions within it.

The leadership of the West European states is speaking out against rejection of tactical nuclear systems, fearing the erosion of unity of the alliance, the weakening of the strategic ties of the USA to Western Europe, as well as the undermining of its political (and in many aspects deterrent) influence on America. Alarmist sentiments conditioned by the changing role of the FRG and the development of relations between the two German states have become particularly widespread. The retention of tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of West Germany and their modernization is related to the number of measures capable of slowing down the movement toward unification of the two German states and preventing the transformation of the FRG into a nuclear power.

Paris and London are speaking out against the elimination of Soviet and American tactical nuclear weapons, fearing that the implementation of this task will sooner or later place on the agenda the elimination of the tactical, and then also strategic arsenals of France and Great Britain.¹

Among the reasons why the NATO states dislike the idea of a nuclear-free Europe and elimination of tactical nuclear forces is the widespread, historically substantiated conviction that a non-nuclear balance, even with strengthening of the political principles of security, is unreliable from the standpoint of preventing war.

The calls for elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe evoke a particular caution among Western centrist-conservative leaders, who know that aside from the broad community circles in the West who are interested in eliminating nuclear weapons in Europe, there are also influential rightist-conservative forces. We are speaking, specifically, of those leaders in American military-political circles who want to ensure a free hand for the USA by means of isolating themselves from European security, as well as about many West German politicians who see in tactical nuclear weapons an obstacle in the path of unification of the two German states.

As for the nuclear strategy of NATO, it seems that there are two tendencies co-existing within it. The tendency toward integration of nuclear and non-nuclear systems in a single strategic conception continues to develop as before. The material basis for such close compatibility and "interoperability" of nuclear and conventional weapons is, on the one hand, the increasing emphasis on dual-purpose systems, and on the other—the application of a single system of reconnaissance, target indication, communications and control.

At the same time, the evolution of NATO military strategy in the described direction encounters some serious limitations. This, for example, is the increased

understanding even in military circles of the unacceptability of any, even an individual or "demonstrational" application of nuclear weapons due to the threat of uncontrolled escalation, the unacceptability of any large-scale nuclear war which not only may lead to catastrophic ecological consequences, but will almost inevitably serve the disintegration of current society in the European countries and will destroy the existing political orders.

As a result, another tendency in the development of NATO strategy has begun to come to the forefront ever more clearly.

This tendency is reduced to securing for tactical nuclear weapons the role of the vital means of deterring war while in fact excluding the possibility of conducting military operations with their application. The proponents of such NATO strategy development (among them are liberals and many centrists in the USA, a broad circle of forces ranging from the social-democrats to conservatives gravitating toward the center in the West European countries) speak out in favor of continuing to rely on nuclear deterrence. However, they isolate its one hypostasis—referring to deterrence, prevention of war by the threat of inflicting a nuclear strike in response to attack by conventional forces and escalation of the conflict to a strategic level, which automatically leads to an unacceptable loss. They refute the views of those adherents of deterrence who believe that in order to ensure its effectiveness one must have the capacity for multi-variantly conducting military operations with the application of nuclear weapons, the capacity for "escalation domination", etc.² Quite simply, we are speaking here of the differences between the proponents of the politicized "deterrence-prevention" and the militarized "deterrence-intimidation".

It is quite evident that in the conception of the proponents of "deterrence-prevention", "the non-application of nuclear weapons first" contains many negative elements. It rejects the idea of freeing Europe of nuclear weapons, while their retention predetermines also the retention of the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe and stimulates the race for nuclear arms and missile technologies. It also retains the role of nuclear weapons as one of the mainstays supporting the military-block structure of European security, which is based to a significant degree on military opposition. Moreover, there remain to a certain degree also the possibilities of using tactical nuclear weapons for purposes of "intimidation" and pressure.

However, major positive aspects are also evident in these conceptions. They open the possibilities for a radical reduction in this type of weapon, synchronized with the large-scale reduction in conventional forces, and for a serious strengthening of the military-strategic stability on the continent. As a result, certain potential destabilizing directions in the race for conventional arms associated primarily with missile technologies will be covered over or narrowed down.

Before moving on to a discussion of the possible parameters of the balance of "minimal means of deterrence" which may be achieved as a result of future agreements, let us deal with a number of conclusions drawn by the authors on the basis of an analysis of the evolution of the nuclear balance in Europe in the 50's-80's.

The development of tactical nuclear arms on both sides was determined not so much by notions about threats or developed military-strategic conceptions as by military-bureaucratic logic, military-technical inertia, and "life cycles" of weapons systems. The growth of tactical nuclear potentials took on a certain independence even in regard to the change in military-strategic principles, often preceding it and going beyond the framework of rational requirements. It is quite evident that prior to the 80's, political factors did not play a noticeable role in the dynamics of tactical nuclear forces. The most brilliant examples of such irrational buildup in a political and strategic sense was the increase in the American arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe in the 60's and the scope of expansion of the Soviet RSD-10 medium-range missiles in the 70's and 80's.

The development of two tactical nuclear arsenals took place to a significant degree independently of one another. It is difficult to say whether the concept of "balance" played a real rather than a propagandistic role. To a certain degree, the dynamics of such development turned out to be isolated from the changes in the balance of strategic offensive weapons and in the relation of conventional forces in Europe. Evidently, for the USSR such isolation led to additional expenditures in the 70's-early 80's, when efforts were undertaken simultaneously to change the balance in our favor both in the sphere of strategic offensive weapons and in the sphere of tactical nuclear systems, and in the sphere of conventional forces as well. Through this buildup, the USSR did not achieve and did not try to achieve "supremacy", but rather contributed to complicating the political situation.

The efforts made from time to time by both sides to count up the balances in terms of individual categories of weapons (for example, in terms of medium-range missiles) were in principle incorrect, although undoubtedly much depended on the specific purposes of such computations. The nuclear balance as such on the European continent was determined by the entire totality of nuclear forces of various range available here, mutually supplementing and overlapping each other, as well as the strategic forces intended for application in Europe or perceived as such.

In spite of the importance of the evaluations of balance from the military standpoint, it is from the political standpoint that they have predominant significance, particularly for the NATO countries. The problem of nuclear guarantees is much more acute for the West European members of this block than it has ever been for

the countries participating in the Warsaw Pact, primarily under the effect of the geopolitical factor.

In a military as well as in a political sense, nuclear balance in Europe is closely tied with the balance of conventional forces. Specifically, NATO's nuclear weapons have been perceived and are still perceived in the West as a means of compensating for the advantages of the Warsaw Pact Organization in the sphere of conventional forces and weapons.³ In turn, these advantages, as far as we know, were interpreted by the Soviet military leadership as being necessary for balancing out the nuclear supremacy of NATO, primarily in the aviation component of tactical nuclear forces.

For these reasons, the adjusted parity in tactical nuclear forces, understood as quantitative equality in means of delivery and weapons, or even as equality in combat capacities, is less necessary to ensure stability and security in Europe than similar parity on a strategic level.

In essence, parity in such an understanding practically never existed. At the same time, we cannot exclude the possibility that in the course of preparations for talks on tactical nuclear weapons, quantitative evaluations may take on decisive importance and give rise to deep differences of opinion, as was the case at the talks concerning the "Eurorockets" [missiles in Europe]. It is quite probable that negotiation decisions will be based on a certain variant of numerical equilibrium, although we must consider also the possibility of departure from absolutization of parity.

The main criterion to which the optimal balance of nuclear forces in Europe must evidently correspond (prior to their total elimination) may be the following. The nuclear forces of both sides must:

- be perceived as being aimed not at the flexible exchange of nuclear strikes or at conducting combat operations, but only at preventing war;
- have sufficient viability, particularly in regard to a potential strike by non-nuclear means, and have a reliable and stable system of control which excludes unsanctioned application;
- have dimensions and structure sufficient to maintain confidence in the reliability of the existing system of security, including the retention of a certain "tie" between Western Europe and the USA;
- correspond in their qualitative and quantitative make-up to the tasks of stabilizing the military balance while reducing conventional weapons, as well as tactical nuclear weapons themselves.

Let us try to give several variants of reductions, proceeding from the fact that at the first phase of the negotiations the talk will center specifically around the radical reduction, but as yet not the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.

In principle, the method of unilateral reductions may prove to be rather fruitful in the process of cutting back this type of nuclear weapon, including also on the basis of mutual example. (In essence, it has already been used by both sides). With consideration for this, we might work out parallel unilateral reductions as a variant, up to jointly determined intermediate (including also sharply reduced) levels. The object of negotiations then would be exclusively the development of an accord on the rates of reduction, on the quantitative and qualitative parameters of remaining levels, on the procedures of control and verification, and on measures for strengthening trust in the nuclear sphere.

At the same time, considering the persistent unwillingness of rather influential political powers in the USA, Great Britain, and France to agree to far-reaching reductions in the tactical nuclear arsenals, the emphasis on primarily unilateral steps may prove ineffective from the standpoint of a deep reduction in the level of nuclear balance. In all probability, the means of traditional negotiations based on mutual understanding achieved in the pre-negotiation period and secured by unilateral steps accelerating movement toward the agreement would remain preferable.

Prior to the start of negotiations, it is necessary to resolve a series of complex questions concerning their subject.

The first of these is: Should only the delivery systems for nuclear weapons be reviewed at these talks, or should nuclear weapons be discussed as well? The possibility of multiple use of all tactical nuclear weapons delivery systems in principle dictates the importance of considering the number of warheads. This, specifically, is what determines the degree of saturation of the European theatre with nuclear weapons. Yet on the other hand, the extreme complexity of the technical aspects of verification and control and the need for the fastest possible progress toward real results force us to accept such a variant of the agenda for the initial stage of negotiations in which reductions will extend only to the delivery systems. The readiness for unilateral reductions of arsenals of nuclear weapons demonstrated by both sides creates favorable prerequisites for securing these reductions by order or agreement at the next stage of the talks.

The second question is tied with the inclusion of the tactical nuclear forces of France and Great Britain into the subject of the negotiations. The specific position of these countries announced in Vienna regarding reductions in tactical aircraft, reductions which are not to affect their nuclear-capable aircraft, indicates the possibility of emergence of a traditional deadlock in building the final nuclear balance. The unacceptability of such a situation testifies to the expediency of excluding at the initial stage of the talks the tactical nuclear arsenals of these countries, with their unconditional consideration in the course of working out decisions on the final quantitative levels of tactical nuclear forces in Europe.

The third and most difficult question is associated with the degree to which the narrowing of the subject of negotiations to land-based systems such as artillery and tactical missiles is acceptable for the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization. The resolution of this question may be directly tied with the results of the first stage of the Vienna talks, since the relative share of the aviation component of tactical nuclear forces may change significantly. The elimination of imbalances in tactical aviation remains one of the most complex negotiation problems in Vienna, and the rapprochement of positions of the sides became apparent only as a result of compromise steps on the part of the Warsaw Pact Organization, secured in the proposals at the Vienna talks on 28 September 1989.

If the Warsaw Pact Organization is able to implement its approach—tactical aviation would be reduced to 4,700 aircraft for each of the alliances (excluding anti-aircraft defense planes). We may assume that NATO supremacy in nuclear-capable aircraft would be significantly reduced. Its total elimination, evidently, is possible upon achievement of the initial Warsaw Pact Organization reference point—strike aviation is limited to a ceiling of 1,500 aircraft. A more complex situation arises if the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is able to insist on its position—all tactical aviation is reduced by 15 percent of the NATO level, and in this case the ceiling officially proposed in Vienna—5,700 combat aircraft—proved to be sharply increased as compared with the preceding reference points.⁴ NATO's relative advantage in aircraft nuclear weapons delivery systems under this variant may even increase, since the USSR would be forced to agree to more significant quantitative reductions.⁵

Thus, we see at least two basic variants for the possible subject of negotiations on the radical reduction of tactical nuclear weapons—broad and narrow. In the first variant the limitations are imposed at once on all types of delivery systems and a ceiling is set on nuclear weapons. In the second variant, at first only the land-based nuclear systems are reduced (with limitation of the number of weapons deployed on aircraft delivery systems and prevention of their qualitative modernization). Evidently, in the first, undoubtedly more preferable, case, an outcome of a larger-scale agreement is possible, and in the second—more rapid progress toward specific results is possible, although it does not fully cover the tactical nuclear arms race.

The preliminary task of the negotiations on reducing tactical nuclear weapons may be to project (even with a certain forestalling) the reductions achieved at the first stage of the negotiations on armed forces and conventional weapons onto tactical nuclear forces. The talks must be aimed at achieving large-scale and stabilizing reductions, which would create a stimulus for their accelerated progress. At the same time, it is necessary to proceed from the currently visible limits of flexibility in the positions of the sides. This establishes a certain framework for possible compromise decisions.

Considering these limitations, we may believe that at the first stage of the negotiations on reducing tactical nuclear weapons, the problems of eliminating nuclear artillery and reducing the number of launchers for land-based tactical missiles (not only the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization, but also NATO) may be resolved within a short time, and without any "modernization".

The possibility of eliminating nuclear artillery is created by its ever more obvious military ineffectiveness, as well as by the West's overestimation of its importance as a means of deterrence. The attainment by the USSR and the Warsaw Pact Organization of approximate equality in terms of combat capacities of nuclear artillery by the early 80's strengthened, as we have noted, the conclusion of most Western specialists to the effect that this weapons system shows little promise as a means of nuclear weapons delivery.⁶ At the first stage of the Vienna talks, apparently, rather low quantitative ceilings will be established for artillery systems not only in the entire European theatre (16,500 units with caliber over 100 mm), but also individually for Central Europe (4,500 units). In connection with this, further quantitative reductions in the frameworks of the negotiations on tactical nuclear forces would hardly be possible. At the same time, a realistically attainable variant may be the total elimination of nuclear shells. Moreover, it would be preferable to extend such a "zero" to the entire territory of the USSR and to the United States. The verifiability of such an agreement would be associated not only with inspections at weapons storehouses and constant supervision at the appropriate enterprises, but also with the control of combat training within the framework of measures of trust.

The reference point for further reductions in tactical nuclear weapons may be outlined only in general terms due to the continuing indefinacy of the rate and scope of development of the disarmament process in the sphere of conventional forces and strategic offensive weapons.

Evidently, in the case of conducting the initial state of the talks only on land-based nuclear systems, the content of the second stage, which perhaps will be more or less closely synchronized with the progress of talks on the further reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, will become the expansion of the subject and the inclusion of the key question of aviation systems. The general reference point for its resolution may be the level of 1,500 tactical aviation aircraft which has already been proposed by the Warsaw Pact Organization (in other words, delivery aircraft).

Based on this reference point, the second main problem of this stage of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons will be solved. That is, the establishment of a general ceiling on tactical nuclear weapons. The third will be the development of an effective system of measures for control and verification. We may assume that the retention of a rather strong grouping of tactical aircraft will create the need for a certain nuclear "safety reserve", which may include forward basing systems as well as

flexible and viable means deployed in secondary strategic echelons. The optimal variant of the structure of tactical nuclear forces which corresponds to these requirements may be the combination of land-based missiles and aircraft systems. However, considering the development of the situation in the countries of Central Europe, a politically more preferable variant may be the total elimination of all land-based tactical nuclear weapons systems. Based on the possible levels of unilateral reductions examined above, the arsenal of nuclear weapons for each of the sides may be limited to 1,000 units.

Such a potential cannot be considered "minimal" or "symbolic", since in principle it does not exclude the possibility of flexible exchange of nuclear strikes in the course of conducting military operations. The qualitative reduction of such a possibility may be achieved in the course of the next stage of the talks on the radical reduction of tactical nuclear systems which would reduce the nuclear balance to a minimal level and ensure the slowing of the race for military technologies. The changeover to a "symbolic" nuclear potential will evidently be associated with a 2-3-fold reduction in weapons as compared with the preceding stage (i.e., to 300-400 units, placed on aircraft delivery systems specially allocated for these purposes, in order to facilitate control and verification).

An important characteristic of such "minimal" "symbolic" potential of tactical nuclear forces must be, as we believe, the global character of limitations, i.e., the inclusion of the entire territory of the USSR and the territory of the USA, which would exclude the possibility of a rapid growth of the nuclear arsenal in a crisis situation. Moreover, at this stage it will be necessary to resolve the question of sea-based nuclear weapons intended for use in Europe. The parameters of this decision may include the liquidation of nuclear capacities of aircraft carrier aviation and the establishment of a low "ceiling" on long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.

The reduction of tactical nuclear weapons to symbolic levels with the parallel reduction of arsenals of conventional weapons will facilitate a qualitative change in the political and military-strategic situation on the continent. The reorganization and at the same time stabilization of the European system of security on the basis of its politicization and accumulation of trust will sooner or later lead to the situation where nuclear weapons will prove to be unnecessary even for those circles who today consider them a necessity. The way will be opened for total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, which in turn will be the most important boundary in the transition to a nuclear-free world.

FOOTNOTES

1. Cf.: F. Heisbourg. The British and French Nuclear Forces. Current Roles and New Challenges. SURVIVAL, July/August 1989.

2. Cf.: L. Freedman. I Exist: Therefore I Deter. INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, Summer 1988.

3. Cf.: H. Binnendijk. NATO's Nuclear Modernization Dilemma. SURVIVAL, March/April 1989.

4. This figure appeared in the NATO proposals presented in Vienna in June, which defined the "Brussels initiative" of President G. Bush. We will emphasize that the figure of 4,000 combat aircraft appeared in the data published in January of 1989 and mention was made of 530 preserved and 530 instructional-training aircraft ("Conventional Forces in Europe: The Facts", 1989, p 27).

5. According to Soviet official data, the Warsaw Pact Organization has 7,184 tactical combat aircraft and anti-aircraft defense forces, while NATO has 5,500 such aircraft (PRAVDA, 30 January 1989).

6. Cf., for example: Ph. Karber. The Soviet Threat: Comparative Assessments. 1988, p 22.

COPYRIGHT: MID SSR, Obshchestvo "Znaniye", "Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn". 1990.

Austrian Choice Of Bofors Missile Noted

90UM0356C Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "New Missile Complex"]

[Text] The magazine SOLDAT UND TECHNIK reports the Austrian Ministry of Defense, after a six-month competitive test of the "Milan" transportable antitank missile system, of French-West German manufacture, and the RBS-56 "Bill" transportable antitank missile system, made by the Swedish firm Bofors, has chosen the "Bill" antitank missile system (see photo) [not reproduced]. According to the views of Austrian specialists, the "Bill's" chief advantage is that the missile flies one meter above the line of sight, reducing the chance that the missile will encounter (collide with) undergrowth and uneven terrain. In addition, the shaped charge is mounted in the warhead with a downward tilt (toward the ground) of 30 degrees from the missile's longitudinal axis, allowing better piercing of a tank's frontal armor plates.

The "Bill's" basic tactical and technical specifications are as follows: launcher and sight weight, 11 kilograms; weight of the transport-launcher container with missile, 16 kilograms; missile length, .9 m; shell diameter, .15 m; maximum firing range, 2,000 m; minimum firing range, 150 m (at stationary targets) and 300 m (at moving targets); maximum missile flight speed, 200 m per second; armor piercing capability, 800 mm.

The Austrian Defense Ministry has accepted the PAL 2000 make of the "Bill" antitank missile complex and given the Bofors firm a 500-million-krona (\$78 million) contract to supply its ground forces with 1,000 antitank missile systems and 160 launchers and infrared sights for them.

M60A1 Armor Upgrade Noted

90UM0356A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 90 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed article: "In the Arsenal and On the Test Ranges: with Reactive Armor"]

[Text] As the American magazine ARMED FORCES reports, the U.S. Department of Defense has decided to upgrade the defenses of the Marines' M60A1 tank by mounting sets of reactive armor on them (see photo). The set consists of 49 metal M1 boxes [korobki] and 42 M2 boxes (the latter are somewhat longer) that are filled with an explosive substance that detonates when the plates are hit by an armor-piercing shell. The shock wave from the detonation substantially weakens the destructive impact of the shaped [charge's molecular] flow on the tank's main armor. Moreover, detonation does not occur when the explosive container is hit by shrapnel, bullets, or 20-23 mm shells.

The set of boxes is bolted to protruding stubs [bonki] welded onto to the chassis and turret. In peacetime the tank is fitted with boxes containing an inert filler.

According to the press, plans call for mounting the reactive armor on 170 of the American Marines' 716 M60A1 tanks; the rest will be replaced gradually by M1A1 Abrams tanks. It is also reported that U.S. specialists are developing reactive armor sets for the Bradley M2 infantry fighting vehicle and for the M3 reconnaissance fighting vehicle.

According to the views of foreign specialist the main shortcoming of this means of enhancing armor protection is its rather high cost (the total cost of equipping one combat vehicle with reactive armor is nearly \$100,000) and the vehicles' reduced mobility owing to their increased combat mass. For example, the mass of a M60A1 tank is increased by 1.8 tons.

Major General Kuklev Comments on 'Open Skies' Talks

90WC0059A Moscow TRUD in Russian 27 Mar 90 p 3

[Report on interview with Major General V. Kuklev, first deputy chief of the General Staff, by unidentified correspondent; date and place not specified: "The Spy Place 'Within the Law'"]

[Text] The first stage of the "Open Skies" conference attended by the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO member countries took place last month in Ottawa. Its aim is to reach agreement on creating a regime that would allow

states to carry out flights by unarmed aircraft over each other's territory and observe military activity from the air.

Our correspondent met with the leader of the delegation of Soviet military experts at the conference, Major General V. Kuklev, first deputy chief of the General Staff.

[TRUD] Vladimir Aleksandrovich, the idea of an "open skies" regime was put forward by U.S. President Eisenhower way back in 1955....

[Kuklev] That is quite true. But at that time the cold war was at its height and the concept could not be implemented. It was rejected by the Soviet side virtually without discussion. But the years have passed and our approaches to many problems—including security and secrecy—have altered. Therefore, when President Bush proposed in May of last year that the subject be discussed again, the seed, as they say, fell on fertile ground.

[TRUD] A conference is not the same as negotiations. At the conference the parties merely stated their views and approaches to finding a solution to the problem. Notwithstanding, do the positions of the delegations coincide on the basic issues?

[Kuklev] At the conference all of those attending showed complete understanding of the importance of the "open skies" regime and a desire to try to achieve agreement on this issue. As far as its specific aspects are concerned, quite serious differences were revealed there.

First, this applies to the aircraft that will operate in the "open skies." The NATO position is this: Each country or group of countries should use its own aircraft for flights over the territory of other countries. We proposed that the side being observed should itself choose the aircraft used to make the overflight of its territory, either its own aircraft, an aircraft of the observing side, or of some third country.

Here we were guided primarily by economic considerations. Let me give you an example to clarify this. Early in January of this year, an aircraft of the Canadian Air Force made an experimental flight. It took off from Lahr Air Base in the FRG, and with the agreement of the appropriate authorities it flew over the territory of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. This flight cost the Canadians 82,100 of their dollars, and the cost for Hungary was \$5,000. And when this was done there was no sensing equipment aboard the aircraft and the duration of the flight was minimal. If we consider that the Americans have their own bases around the USSR but we, as is known, do not have any of our bases near the United States, then it becomes clear that in the event that the NATO variant is adopted the sides will be placed in unequal economic positions. Moreover, technical servicing for "foreign" aircraft will become a serious problem that will be difficult to resolve (including from the economic aspects).

Second, we favor having aboard the aircraft equipment that has been agreed on with respect to types and specifications. Only if this is done will it be possible to obtain information that can be compared.

[TRUD] But of course, as far as I know no country raised objections to having only permitted equipment aboard the aircraft. Moreover, the representatives of the West are proposing that incoming aircraft be inspected for that purpose.

[Kuklev] Let us start with the latter. The experts claim that even in 20 hours (and this is the exact figure in the NATO draft) it is impossible to ascertain that no extra instruments have been placed aboard a modern aircraft. Moreover, this kind of inspection is by no means harmless from the standpoint of flight safety.

Now as to the equipment. The NATO countries are introducing the concept of "forbidden equipment" and making lists of it. In this way, all other instruments (and even those that may be designed in the future) are not included on this list. We also have differences with respect to types of equipment. We proceed from the premise that in order to observe military activity visual instruments—optical and optoelectronic—are inadequate. NATO is proposing in addition the use of infrared equipment and synthetic-aperture radar (the so-called side-looking radars), multispectrum equipment, and instruments to take air samples, magnetometers, gravimeters, and laser detectors.

The question involuntarily arises: What is the need for all of this? To build confidence? Hardly. For intelligence purposes? Then we are talking about something quite different.

Proposals as to the way in which the information obtained is used lead to the same thought. The Americans want each country to gather information itself, using its own aircraft, only for itself. Here, without reporting the results even to the side being monitored. Whereas we think that a unified data bank should be set up. For by no means all of the 23 states will be able to carry out frequent monitoring flights. Sometimes it will be more advantageous to buy the necessary information. So a data bank is not only fair but also advantageous.

When discussing the relationship of confidence-building measures and intelligence I would not like to appear overly suspicious. Moreover, we have consistently advocated less secrecy. But in this case how do we assess the following situation: The United States announces that there should be no "closed" zones on USSR territory and at the same time removes from our observation the bases located close to the Soviet Union?

[TRUD] And are there many such "closed" zones on our territory?

[Kuklev] There are such zones in virtually all countries. And here neither military nor civilian aircraft can fly—for example, over major cities or chemical or other

ecologically dangerous enterprises, or nuclear power stations or water installations except in emergency situations. Why then should we make an exception to this rule for foreigners, thus subjecting the lives of our fellow citizens to extreme danger? Moreover, we still have regions that are closed in the interests of preserving state secrets. But first, they are very few, and second, we acknowledge their presence to the countries in the West. As they say, everything should be equal.

[TRUD] The Soviet delegation at the conference insisted that preliminary "notice" of an observation flight should be given twice as early as that proposed by the NATO representatives. Why was this?

[Kuklev] Yes, we wanted to increase the period of notification of a flight up to 48 hours. But not in order to "hide" sometimes—the route flown by the aircraft is by common agreement when the observer group arrives—but in order to deal with certain technical matters. For example, some states need time to lease an aircraft (if the flight is using equipment from a third party), and the time needed for the crew briefing, inspection and checks of equipment, and so forth.

[TRUD] Will there be restrictions on the number of flights in the "open skies" regime.

[Kuklev] Undoubtedly. We have not yet reached an agreed figure, but all 23 countries are agreed that restrictions are necessary. Here we again proceed from considerations relating to material costs.

[TRUD] You often make reference to economic motives. Earlier when talking with military chiefs I did not hear them counting the money. But if we do proceed from economic positions, then perhaps "open skies" are not even necessary. Because there are such things as space satellites....

[Kuklev] The country is short of money. Defense spending is being strictly controlled. Additional money cannot be "extracted" even for confidence-building measures. So that we literally have to count every ruble.

With respect to observation from space, let me offer you just two items for consideration. Again there is the economics of it: Given all the expense, observation from the air is much less expensive than space monitoring. Moreover, the ingrained opinion on the limitless possibilities of satellites is greatly exaggerated. I am not about to go into detail, but in this instance aircraft are more effective. So "open skies" do make sense.

[TRUD] In our conversation you have frequently used the words "Soviet side" and "American side." The impression is created that the basic dispute was between two of the delegations....

[Kuklev] Well of course this was not the case. Before going to Ottawa, the representatives of the Warsaw Pact states naturally discussed the fundamental issues. In NATO they did the same. But there was not total agreement between all the colleagues of either side. For

example, the Czechoslovak delegation suggested a compromise version envisaging the possibility of basing inspection aircraft at foreign air bases. But France actively supported our proposal that data acquisition should not go beyond confidence-building measures.

[TRUD] You have listed so many disagreements among those attending the conference that involuntarily the following question arises: Is agreement possible at all?

[Kuklev] I believe, I am even convinced, that it is possible. For we all have the main thing, namely, an understanding of the necessity and the feasibility of this concept. And disagreements are the inevitable "participant" of any negotiations. But we should not be afraid of this. I think that at the next stage of the conference there will be considerably fewer. We are working on this now.

Total Ban on Nuclear Testing Examined

French Official Comments

90WC0063A Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 3

[Article by Jean Michel Bouchron, French political figure and chairman of the Commission on Issues of Defense and the Armed Forces of the French National Assembly: "Nuclear Testing: Can It Be Stopped?"]

[Text] "Is it possible to completely stop nuclear weapons tests?" The editorial board of TRUD asked this question, which concerns all the world public, of representatives of France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union who are involved in developing military policy of their countries.

Jean Michel Bouchron, prominent French political figure and chairman of the Commission on Questions of Defense and the Armed Forces of the French National Assembly:

"France at one time decided to develop national nuclear forces in order to have the capability to protect its independence and freedom of actions. France considered it its duty to possess the necessary means to disrupt the American-Soviet confrontation and for its voice to be heard, appealing for a search for world strategic balance. Our country possessed the appropriate technological potential and, as a result of this, was able to ensure its own independence. Thus, France began the corresponding testing, and it was conducted in order to modernize its weapons within the framework of the principle of nuclear sufficiency.

In order to stop nuclear weapons tests, it would be necessary to reduce considerably the USSR's antiballistic-missile defense weapons. So, it is up to your government to ensure the appropriate conditions for eliminating these considerable weapons.

It follows from this that France will continue to maintain its nuclear forces at the proper level and also modernize them.

I would like to remind you that the French forces of deterrence are aimed "at all azimuths;" we do not orient

them only against Soviet weapons: the proliferation of nuclear and missile potentials does not encourage us in the least to reexamine our forces.

As you can see, today France has no reason to stop testing of nuclear weapons, testing that enables us to maintain our technological potential at a sufficient level, and this enables us to oppose the dangers that the world tomorrow may hold.

In following this path, France is not harming the environment and is not threatening it. Annually our country publishes a research report which analyzes the consequences of French nuclear tests. Since explosions have been conducted underground, their effect on the environment has been zero. France is not subjecting anyone to any risk by conducting these tests. Those who try to claim the opposite do so for malicious reasons or are simply pursuing their own goals, which convinces us of the correctness of our choice.

Thus, you can be sure that my answer to your question is no: In today's conditions, France cannot completely halt nuclear weapons tests, for they are needed to maintain our forces of deterrence at a level of reasonable sufficiency. As you can see, the French doctrine has always been defensive in nature, both in the area of conventional and nuclear arms. Our weapons do not under any circumstances threaten the security of any state that is not a potential source of aggression against us.

British View Given

90WC0063B Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 3

[Untitled article by Winston Churchill, member of the British Parliament from the Conservative Party, member of the Defense Committee of the House of Commons, and grandson of the famous British prime minister during World War II]

[Text] **Winston Churchill, member of the British Parliament from the Conservative Party, member of the Defense Committee of the House of Commons, and grandson of the famous British prime minister during World War II:**

Those of us in Great Britain as well as in the Soviet Union who are not yet 50 years old have spent our entire life under the threat of a world war, and the last 40 years even under the threat of a nuclear war.

After President Gorbachev came into office and took the course of perestroika, the situation not only in the Soviet Union but also in Eastern Europe and in the entire sphere of international relations in general changed radically. If this process continues, the entire world can enter an era of continually developing cooperation and even friendship, both among the superpowers and among the European family of peoples, including Russia.

If democracy grows stronger in the states of Eastern Europe and continues to develop in the Soviet Union, there will be real prospects for preserving peace at much lower levels of arms on both sides. In fact, nuclear

missiles on both sides of what my grandfather Sir Winston Churchill once called the "iron curtain" are already being melted down into plowshares, as in the well-known proverb.

I unconditionally welcome these events and hope for further strengthening of the friendship between our countries.

However, although a treaty on a universal and total ban on nuclear testing in the conditions at hand may be attainable, I cannot imagine the day when nuclear weapons will cease to exist. They cannot be "turned off," as if such an invention never existed. We must also give due to the fact that the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides was a key factor in preserving peace during the "cold war," which otherwise could have led us to World War III.

What is more, today some Third World countries, such as Libya, are doing their utmost to get hold of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. It would be incredibly stupid to make our peoples dependent upon such unpredictable dictatorships.

What we can do is to sharply reduce the level of arms—conventional, chemical, and nuclear—on both sides and build a new world in which the use of any weapons will become unthinkable and the resources today being absorbed by the arms industry would go toward improving the standard of living of our peoples. It is namely here that I see a beneficial basis for cooperation both between the East and West and among all European countries, including Russia. It is namely on this basis that the path toward a better future lies!

Soviet's Kiselev Counters

90WC0063C Moscow TRUD in Russian 3 Apr 90 p 3

[Untitled article by Sergey Kiselev, USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs expert on arms limitation issues]

[Text] The above opinions of representatives of the two European nuclear powers, the main essence of which is the supposed need to continue nuclear weapons tests, in my view, do not square very well with the present-day realities of international affairs. Integration processes are actively taking place in Europe, influenced by the USSR's new political thinking, a radical restructuring of inter-state relations has begun, influenced by the new political thinking proclaimed by the USSR, and the understanding of the "image of the enemy" has begun to be obliterated. Taking into account the prospects of creating in the center of Europe a unified German state, the task of replacing the bloc system with collective security and cooperation bodies has become even more urgent.

In these conditions, the thesis being advanced by supporters of nuclear testing about strengthening "defense on all azimuths" looks quite archaic. At the same time, there is something new in the sense of openness in this

argument. Before, supporters of nuclear testing, in defending the impossibility of stopping testing, referred to the complexity of monitoring the non-conduct of testing and the need to ensure reliability of nuclear munitions. Now they say openly that they need testing to improve nuclear weapons. Anyway this is closer to the truth.

How do they justify the need for nuclear modernization? The main argument in its favor remains the thesis on the need "to ensure deterrence." Deter whom in today's world?

Armed forces are being given a defensive structure, and they are increasingly corresponding to the principle of defensive sufficiency. After conclusion of an agreement in Vienna on conventional arms, which, I am convinced, is not far off, the possibility of "aggression from the East" will become generally a fantasy, as will, by the way, the possibility of aggression from the West. Therefore, Mr J.M. Bouchron's thesis that France needs nuclear testing to maintain its forces of deterrence is unconvincing.

References to the USSR's antiballistic missile defense weapons are also not convincing. The Soviet ABM weapons, created strictly in accordance with the 1972 Soviet-American Treaty on the Limitation of Antiballistic Missile Systems, are quite limited in number and located in only one area authorized by the treaty.

Great Britain, as we see, is also against stopping nuclear testing. From British legislator W. Churchill's statement it follows that the thesis about the "stabilizing" role of nuclear weapons there is being supported today by the need to deter certain unstable representatives of the "Third World" who can acquire nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. However, it is impossible to deter the nuclear ambitions of these countries by building up the nuclear arsenals of great powers. A directly opposite result is obtained here. It would be much more effective

not to allow deliveries of the corresponding nuclear technology to these countries and to strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. In addition, and I want to particularly emphasize this, one of the pledges made by the participants in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the commitment recorded in Article 6 to pursue in good faith the cessation of the nuclear arms race and, in particular, the cessation of nuclear testing.

Is it possible to stop nuclear testing? Soviet as well as very many foreign experts believe that it is possible from the scientific and technological standpoint, just as it is possible to monitor the non-conduct of nuclear testing.

Now the task of stopping nuclear testing has gone from the category of general political priorities to among the most urgent practical requirements of mankind. It is customary to consider the signing in December 1987 of the Treaty Between the USSR and the USA on the Elimination of Medium- and Lesser-Range Missiles as the starting point of the process of real nuclear disarmament.

In these conditions, the task of closing up any loopholes for undermining this process, both as a result of the development of new types and systems of nuclear weapons and their creeping over the planet, is coming to the fore. One of the most effective ways of carrying out such a task is to stop nuclear weapons tests. The support of many countries, above all the nuclear countries, is required to achieve this goal.

That is precisely why the position of W. Churchill and J.M. Bouchron on the question of nuclear testing cannot be called constructive. Especially since it is completely obvious that they are expressing not only their personal viewpoint. I would hope that the new political thinking, opening up for mankind a path toward a nuclear-free world, will prevail over the remaining stereotyped approaches of the past.

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

NATO's Woerner on Need for Nuclear Arms

AU2703105990 Hamburg BILD AM SONNTAG
in German 25 Mar 90 pp 4-5

[Interview with NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner by F. Weckbach-Mara and Andreas Wrede; place and date not given]

[Text] [BILD AM SONNTAG] What proposals are you taking on your trip to Moscow as NATO secretary general?

[Woerner] A lot of goodwill, the readiness for a more intensive exchange of views, and the intention to explain the changed role of the Atlantic Alliance as an instrument of change and element of cooperation. The extraordinarily interesting interview, which Gorbachev's adviser Daschichev gave to BILD AM SONNTAG, shows that important forces in the Soviet Union realize how advantageous it would also be for the Soviet Union itself if a united Germany were to remain a member of NATO. I will discuss a new security system with my Soviet interlocutors: We want to further develop the CSCE and the disarmament process to a common European security structure. Under this security roof for Europe, the states of Western and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, as well as the United States and Canada can find a place, participate in talks, and be secure.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] Will NATO and the Warsaw Pact dissolve then?

[Woerner] The fate of the Warsaw Pact must be freely determined by its member states. Its future is uncertain. The Atlantic Alliance however, remains as a supporting pillar in such a security structure. Only it can guarantee real stability and security. It is not aimed at anyone. It is not a military bloc but a partnership of democratic states and thus a community of values of the free world, which is turning more and more toward its political tasks of cooperation, arms control, and the solving of problems. Even the Warsaw Pact states see NATO as an indispensable element of stability—I have known this since the visits of the Soviet, CSSR, and the Polish foreign ministers.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] When will new disarmament steps take place?

[Woerner] In autumn I expect the conclusion of the first round of negotiations in Vienna. Thousands of armored vehicles in the East and the West will then disappear, more than 100,000 weapons systems will be destroyed. After this historic disarmament step I am confident that the second round of the Vienna negotiations will bring about even more far-reaching disarmament successes; because the potential for disarmament has not yet been fully exploited.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] And what about nuclear weapons?

[Woerner] They, too, can and must be drastically reduced. However, because NATO wants to prevent war a complete renunciation of nuclear weapons in Europe is out of the question. To achieve this, however, we need a minimum number of nuclear weapons; because nuclear weapons make war meaningless.

[BILD AM SONNTAG] What will happen to the Soviet Armed Forces in today's GDR if Germany is reunited?

[Woerner] For a transitional period the Soviet Union may be permitted to keep their troops in a united Germany. Their legitimate security interest will be taken into account. We believe in the following principles: NATO will not threaten anyone. It is purely an alliance for self-protection whose aim is to prevent war. We do not take advantage of the weaknesses of other states. This also applies to our actions toward President Gorbachev and the Soviet Union. After reunification, we do not want to station any NATO troops on GDR territory.

Belgium Urges 'Massive Reduction' in SNF

AU0604164290 Paris AFP in English
1523 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] Brussels, April 6 (AFP)—Belgian Defence Minister Guy Coeme, in a move likely to fuel a difficult debate within NATO, on Friday called on the alliance to negotiate a massive reduction in its short-range nuclear forces (SNF).

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation's nuclear planning group (NPG), gathering defence ministers in Alberta, Canada on May 9 and 10, must "review the doctrines relating to nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy," he said in a letter to NATO secretary-general Manfred Woerner.

Mr Coeme "confirms the Belgian government's wish for the rapid opening of negotiations on short-range nuclear weapons," according to a defence ministry statement that disclosed the letter.

SNF are a weapons category that comprises artillery shells, gravity bombs and missiles with a range of less than 500 kilometers (310 miles). NATO has roughly 4,000 such arms, most of them deployed in West Germany as a means of dissuading the Soviet Union from launching an all-out armoured offensive that could be unstoppable by conventional forces.

The negotiations "can result in the elimination of certain categories of Soviet and U.S. nuclear arms," Mr Coeme said. "These arms, artillery and land-based missiles, in fact can only reach countries where democracy has just been established," he observed, pointing to last year's upheavals in eastern Europe that ousted hardline communist regimes.

The debate over SNF caused a serious rift in NATO in 1988 and early 1989 that was only resolved, and in dramatic fashion, by the alliance's 40th-anniversary summit last May. The United States and Britain had argued that the alliance's ageing stock of 88 Lance missile launchers needed to be modernised. West Germany, supported by a majority of NATO members, said that the decision could wait and that SNF reductions should be opened immediately. Under the summit compromise, NATO leaders agreed that nuclear arms would remain an indispensable part of their arsenal. But they agreed to postpone any decision on the Lance update until 1992, and tied two conditions to opening SNF negotiations. These were that a future treaty for reducing conventional arms, currently being negotiated in Vienna, be concluded and start to be applied; and that SNF not be completely eliminated.

Senior alliance officials, in a meeting here last month, agreed a negotiations scenario under which NATO would slash its SNF arsenal by at least half, diplomats said. West Germany was the driving force behind the move, arguing that the big cut would reassure the Soviet Union about the impact of German unification on Soviet security, they said.

AUSTRIA

Investigation Continues on Illegal Arms Exports

AU2903144190 Vienna PROFIL in German
26 Mar 90 pp 20-22

[Untitled report by Hubertus Czernin]

[Text] Alois Mock was more enraged than he had been in a long time, employees of the Foreign Ministry report. He reprimanded the top officials of his ministry on Vienna's Ballhausplatz as if they were schoolboys.

On 9 March the minister learned via the Noricum Investigation Committee that one of the most sensitive documents on Austria's Irangate had not been sent by his ministry to either the Linz Provincial Court nor to Parliament: A telex by then ambassador to Washington, Thomas Klestil, of 15 February 1986, according to which the United States was reportedly able to prove the export of arms to the Gulf war states by the VOEST armament factory Noricum. (footnote one) (Greens Deputy Peter Pilz had discovered the telex in the arms export file of the chancellor's secretary, Eva Nowotny.)

The secret telegram (FS 25021) was indeed listed in the summary of Foreign Ministry files that were sent to the court and the committee, but it was missing in the enclosures as was a telegram from the embassy in Kuala Lumpur on Noricum exports to Malaysia.

"How this could have happened is the subject of an internal investigation," Mock stated last week in a letter to Investigating Judge Rainer Schopper and Committee Chairman Ludwig Steiner, asking for understanding.

"Either it was negligence or there was intent behind this action," a high-ranking diplomat thinks.

The emergence of Klestil's missing telegram led to a far more explosive finding, both in political and legal terms, as a result of a late initiative by the secretary general; excerpts of this finding were published by KURIER last week.

In addition to files linked with the Iran affair, in the safe of the embassy in Washington there were also copies of four documents, which had been sent to then Foreign Minister Leopold Gratz via courier on 10 April 1986:

- a personal letter by Klestil to Gratz on CIA evidence for the existence of Noricum cannons in Iran;
- precise written information from the U.S. authorities on the illegal export of GHN-45 cannons to Iran ("top secret, sensitive, Austrian 155-mm guns to Iran") [passage in parentheses given in English];
- an explanatory report by Walter Schmit, military attache accredited to Washington;
- and a sketch drawn by Schmit on the basis of photographs from U.S. spy satellites of the position of Noricum howitzers in the Iranian training camp of Isfahan.

Also under investigation is how these files could have remained unnoticed, gathering dust in the embassy in Washington for years, Mock wrote to Schopper and Steiner 14 days ago.

Thomas Klestil, who has been secretary general in the Foreign Ministry since 1987, knew of the documents. Adolf Kuen, then and now Klestil's right hand, knew of them. Walter Greinert, press chief of the ministry, who followed the career diplomat from the Potomac to the Vienna Ballhausplatz three years ago, also knew about them.

Nevertheless, after the Noricum Committee session of 9 March, Klestil claimed that the United States had never produced any evidence. He had "not been able" to find out what this evidence was, Klestil told DER STANDARD.

Not even his closest associates are able to explain why Klestil made this incorrect statement: "He obviously thought that the U.S. evidence was not very strong compared with the telegrams by Army [then ambassador to Athens]." (Greinert)

Ambassadors Herbert Grubmayer and Georg Potyka reacted differently: Last summer, immediately after the beginning of the search for files, they briefed Mock about delicate circumstantial evidence of cover-up maneuvers by the Sinowatz government.

That summer the Foreign Ministry sent a circular note to all those embassies in whose depots further evidence concerning the arms affairs was suspected: All material that was relevant to court procedures had to be delivered to Vienna immediately.

The note, signed by Johann Plattner, head of the Western Department, was sent to 12 embassies. (foot-note 2) (Athens, Sofia, Bangkok, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Baghdad, Damascus, Tehran, Amman, Riyadh, Tripoli, Cairo) Washington, "like Rome, London, or Bonn" (Plattner) was excluded.

Walter Greinert, however, reports that last year Plattner was asked by Kuen whether Washington "is included" in the circular note. According to Greinert, Plattner answered: "Yes, yes, it is included."

Thus, Klestil's successor in the U.S. capital, Friedrich Hoess, had been unknowingly sitting on domestic policy dynamite for almost three years.

The file, which was kept in the safe of First Secretary Leopold Radauer, is the last part of a chain of evidence, which has become quite strong, of how members of the Sinowatz government—particularly Karl Blecha and Leopold Gratz—tried to sweep under the rug the deliveries to the Gulf war states.

After all, it was the then foreign minister who—on 17 February 1987, after the first Iranian evidence received by Klestil from Ambassador William Woessner, deputy director for European affairs at the State Department—had his Secretary General Gerald Hinteregger cable to Washington:

"The Foreign Ministry would be very interested in the evidence concerning the VOEST howitzers, which the American side has, according to Ambassador Woessner."

Two days later, Klestil's associate, Adolf Kuen, was reassured by State Department official Harry Gilmore "that the question of handing over evidence in connection with Ambassador's Woessner's promise of use is being further dealt with, but the matter will probably take some time."

On 25 February 1986, Interior Minister Karl Blecha also contacted the embassy in Washington. So far, there has been "no indication" of deals with Iran, Blecha pretended, "however, he does not rule out that such indications could emerge in the course of further investigations." There is "particular interest in the relevant information mentioned by the U.S. side," Blecha said, according to Kuen.

The day came on 7 April. Since Klestil was needed in New York "because of the Waldheim case," as he wrote to Gratz, Adolf Kuen and Walter Schmit were called to the State Department.

They were received there by Woessner, Gilmore, and CIA "security experts" (Klestil). The Austrian diplomats were presented with "two enlarged photographs (light/dark) and the cover photo of the JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY magazine, which shows the GHN-45 with Steyr vehicles; however, for reasons of protecting the secrecy of the reconnaissance system, they were not handed over," Schmit noted in a report to Klestil.

Special techniques, such as the evaluation of satellite photos on the basis of microscopic measuring of images, were explained and the particularities of the Noricum howitzers, which had been discovered in the artillery training camp of Isfahan, were described.

Schmit had no doubts. After first indications on a satellite photo that was taken at the beginning of January 1986, "a confirmation of the presence of GHN-45 was made by evaluating the reconnaissance mission of 29 March 1986."

In addition: "The U.S. analysts rule out any doubts about the identity of the GHN-45. (...) So far, no GHN-45's have been found in Libya."

However, the CIA officials did not just present photos as evidence. They reported on "four suspicious cargo ships" (Schmit), which had transported the GHN-45 howitzers between July 1985 and January 1986 on unusually "circuitous routes" from the Yugoslav port of Kardelyewo to Iran.

Furthermore, Kuen and Schmit were assured that a Libyan end-user certificate does not necessarily mean that exported goods really end up in the desert state.

Thus, U.S. cross-country vehicles, purchased by Libya for use in agriculture, turned up as armored transporters in Sudan and in Chad. Weapons exported by the Soviet Union were "declared as medical equipment" (Schmit) and transferred to Nicaragua via Brazil. Soviet Scud missiles were sent on to Iran by Libya.

On 10 April 1986, Klestil sent Schmit's report, the written CIA information, and the sketch of the Noricum howitzers in Isfahan, which was drawn up by the military attache, to Foreign Minister Leopold Gratz.

Klestil personally summarized the U.S. findings for the minister:

"We have been asked to deal with the information in question in a strictly confidential way. If Austria has further questions or wants to study the presented material more closely, there is readiness to check on such possibilities, e.g. the study of the material by an expert sent by Austria."

"In view of the particular sensitivity of the matter, in agreement with the military attache, I have decided to present the information, including Brigadier General Schmit's explanations, in this way. The military attache assumes that you, esteemed Mr. Minister, will brief the defense minister. I would be grateful for a clarification of terms [sprachregelung] at your convenience."

The clarification of terms was the usual one. The courier mail disappeared after arriving at Gratz's office.

Three weeks later, the first investigations of the Linz public prosecutor were closed—for lack of evidence.

Former Envoy to U.S. Testifies on Arms Exports

AU2803131790 Vienna *WIENER ZEITUNG*
in German 27 Mar 90 p 2

[Excerpt] "In 1986 I reported to Vienna 10 times, I had several telephone conversations, and I asked for a clarification of terms [Sprachregelung]." This was stated on 26 March, at what was probably the last public session of the Noricum Investigation Committee, by Thomas Klestil, secretary general in the Foreign Ministry and Austrian ambassador to the United States from 1982 to 1987, who was heard as a witness.

The answer had been the same every time, Klestil said: Everything has been checked and no indications of illegal arms exports have been found.

At that time the arms deliveries to Iran were not the biggest worry for the Americans. Enemy number one for the United States was Libya. The fact that Austria delivered weapons to this country was as annoying as the technology transfer to the East Bloc states, which, they claimed, took place via VOEST, among others. In addition, there was the wartime past of President Kurt Waldheim. The witness stated that as of March 1986, "I was in the cross fire of grenades from the U.S. media practically every day."

Upon his repeated requests for a clarification of terms, he was told to consider and pass on a report by the Austrian Press Agency APA on the statements by then Chancellor Fred Sinowatz and former Minister Karl Blecha after a cabinet session as an order and a clarification of terms.

Only two copies of the often quoted secret telex which he sent to then Foreign Minister Leopold Gratz in the spring of 1986 exist. One was sent to the minister, the other one to the secretary general.

Klestil said that Blecha and Gratz always called for proof of the American allegations that Austrian artillery was being used in Iran. On the other hand, he, Klestil, was told by a close friend of the U.S. President that the accusations against Austria concerning arms deliveries to Iran were not correct. This friend of the U.S. President had just come back from Baghdad at that time.

This was also confirmed in writing by the Iraqi ambassador. "Therefore, I believed my own government more than a foreign one."

Furthermore, Klestil said, the "secret telex" had never disappeared. The documents are in the secretary general's office. "Thus, it was just a bureaucratic oversight," deputy Graff commented. [passage omitted]

BELGIUM**Defense Minister Coeme on European Strategy**

LD0604170790 Brussels *Domestic Service in French*
1600 GMT 6 Apr 90

[Text] The role of nuclear weapons in NATO strategy should be re-examined. This is what Guy Coeme said in a letter addressed to the NATO secretary general. According to the defense minister, the changes in the East do not allow any more simple solutions of bloc against bloc. Let us listen to Guy Coeme, who spoke to Martine Van Brosagen:

[Begin recording] Coeme, I think it perfectly possible to suppress the nuclear artillery and ground-launched missiles. Consequently, it is out of the question to modernize something whose suppression I called for. I do it, I think, in a very realistic way. Of course, one has to negotiate, because this type of weapon exists on the other side; but since last autumn so many events and so many upheavals have taken place, and we should take them into consideration. The Iron Curtain no longer exists, neither does the Berlin Wall; the Warsaw Pact is no longer what it used to be; there are unilateral withdrawals of parts of the Soviet Army from certain territories, I think of Czechoslovakia and Hungary. I do not imagine that these weapons, which have been known as weapons of political deterrence, could still exist and that one could fire them against friendly populations and territories. [end recording]

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY**Post-CFE Forces Planning Guidelines Emerging**

90EN0334A Bonn *WEHRTECHNIK* in German
Feb 90 pp 11-13

[Article by Colonel Henning Bruemmer, section chief, Armed Forces Command Staff: "The Bundeswehr at a Crossroads"—first paragraph is 'WEHRTECHNIK' introduction]

[Text] On 7 December 1989, West German Defense Minister Dr Gerhard Stoltenberg explained to the Bundestag the goals of the federal government regarding "further development of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s." The government declaration signaled the conclusion of an extremely intensive planning process, during which the Bundeswehr planning had to re-orient itself because of the significant changes of 1989 and their effect on the future makeup of the armed forces. Colonel Henning Bruemmer, section chief of the Armed Forces Command Staff, explains below the main points of the new planning goals.

One of the fundamental indicators was the trend in personnel and finances, which no longer permitted maintaining past plans. Another was the Vienna negotiation session on conventional forces in Europe with far-reaching consequences for the structure of our armed

forces. These negotiations are growing ever more dynamic with good chances for success. With this background, the minister of defense ordered the Bundeswehr general inspector to push the Bundeswehr planning so far ahead that political decisions could be reached on the general trends and basic numbers of an assumed Bundeswehr structure through the mid-1990s. The concepts developed by the inspector general and the inspectors are presented here. These were approvingly accepted by the federal security council and the cabinet and finally expressed in the government declaration by the defense minister. Deep cuts in the Bundeswehr of today's makeup will be associated with these decisions.

For the sake of explanation of these decisions, observations on the changed background conditions are made.

New Background Conditions

Personnel

The demographic developments of the 1990s cannot be changed. In 1996, there will only be about 180,000 conscript troops available instead of the current 220,000. This number will further sink to about 160,000 if the proposed extension of the draft length of service to 18 months is lifted and the 15-month draft length of service is maintained by the lawmakers, with a successful conclusion of arms control negotiations. Cutbacks in the numbers of enlisted and career soldiers are also unavoidable, given declining numbers in those age groups and the increasingly tough competition for labor. With significantly higher expenses for limited personnel, Bundeswehr planning is set toward a goal of 240,000 enlisted and career soldiers, about 25,000 less than at the end of the 1990s.

The total number of active soldiers in the Bundeswehr will still be 420,000 by the mid-1990s. If the draft length of service is not extended, it will still be 400,000. Simultaneously holding the number of training slots at 10,000 and the number of available soldiers on standby readiness at 40,000, the total peacetime number comes to 470,000 or 450,000.

Even from these few numbers, it is apparent that the imperative personnel reductions in active soldiers will result in a reduction in the number of active troop units, which will then, however, be better staffed with personnel than today.

Finances

The position of the coalition representatives in the most recent German Bundestag budgetary debates was that the defense budget is not a "quarry" for favorite use in other budgets. Nevertheless, the constantly tighter limits of the 14 budget planning areas in the detailed plan are unmistakable, and their inner layers are changing. For example, since 1984 the percentage of expenditures for military procurements has dropped from 26 percent to

20 percent. In the same time, the percentage which went to personnel expenditures rose from 42 percent to 44 percent.

This development logically confirmed the intent of giving absolute priority to insuring adequacy of personnel, but also equally logically can only lead to a burden on investments in equipment.

If a moderate budget increase is to be expected for the future—which given price developments actually means stagnation, if not actual reductions—then the limits on hardware investment must be drawn even more tightly. Under these indications, a comprehensive supply renewal for today's equipment will not be possible, so a corresponding matching of structural elements of all the armed services branches is unavoidable.

Also misleading is the oft-cited reasoning that a reduction in personnel must lead to reductions in the financial burden. The envisioned number of enlisted and career soldiers will only be available for the Bundeswehr with the already-mentioned significantly higher expenditures for the attractiveness and quality of service in the armed forces.

Defense Policy/Strategic Military Aspects

In his government statement on 7 December 1989, the defense minister began by laying out the flat changes on the political stage of East-West relations:

"When, in these days, we speak of the condition and mission of the Bundeswehr in the 1990s, we do so under the omen of the most powerful eruption in world politics since 1945." He indicated at the same time the new demands confronting the Bundeswehr planning, along with the traditional specified amounts of personnel and finances.

It would just be speculation at this point to deduce the fundamental effects of the internal defense policy developments in the Warsaw Pact. A look toward the Austrian capital offers much more.

Progress at the Vienna negotiations lead to expectation of some results in 1990 for the area covered by the treaty between the Atlantic and the Urals. Drastic reductions in decisive heavy combat equipment and the establishment of something approaching parity at a lower level of armed forces are foreseen.

After the implementation of such a treaty—for which several years will certainly be needed—the military strategic capabilities which are still given in the Warsaw Pact would enable a large-scale invasion after only a brief preparation period.

The conditions attained (by a treaty) would significantly limit the possibilities of an offensive war, although it would not completely eliminate it. There is currently no reference point to indicate which lane the development of the Warsaw Pact military doctrine and its armed forces dispositive will run. If Bundeswehr planning takes

into consideration a successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations, it also requires consideration that a relationship of parity does not guarantee security, per se. A potential always remains that—even with lessening probability—a geographically limited offensive operation would be enabled.

From these considerations, three fundamental requirements arise for the fulfillment of future missions by the Bundeswehr:

- One segment of the armed forces must have quick response, must be flexible, and must be almost completely ready for initial operations without a mobilization;
- Another segment can be reduced to cadres in various levels, in order to be deployed in follow-up operations after a mobilization and filling out;
- The armed forces must possess overall a measured degree of endurance whereby the size must still be oriented to conditions which will exist after implementation of an arms control treaty.

The determination that only a common, joint allied defense near the borders can signify the best guarantee of protection for our country is, at the same time, connected with the needs listed above.

Technological Aspects

In order to be able to limit the uncertainties over developments of future military doctrines and armed forces dispositions already sketched out above, that is, to contain all possible forms of conflict, the Bundeswehr planning has apportioned a broadly disciplined research and technology program of increased significance.

Defense-related advances in key fields are expected in:

- Information and communications technology;
- Materials science; and
- Energy technology.

The significance of reconnaissance and command and control will increase considerably. With new information and communications technology, capabilities in these fields can be increased. As a result, they will take precedence over all other technological activities.

The developments in materials science, energy, and information technologies especially lead to expectations of further improvements in air defense and anti-tank defense.

Technological testing is pursued as another emphasized mission, to improve troop protection, with new types of materials and their order as well as in the use of new camouflage and concealment measures.

Finally, the use of "intelligent" security technologies should contribute to the sustained support of defensive principles.

Principles and Guidelines for Hardware Planning for the Armed Forces

- Persistent adjustment of the growth potential in new technologies in the system complex of "reconnaissance, command, and effect," also with across-the-board application of modular construction;
- Planning unity in the "target analysis, weapons and munitions optimization, and carrier selection" elements;
- Avoidance of specific military performance specifications in favor of technologies that are available on the market (80 percent in time is better than 100 percent too late);
- Alternative solutions through the use of new technologies for improving utility and combat performance of existing weapon systems;
- Increased deployment of computer-supported simulators for training and workplace configurations;
- International arms cooperation, especially where cost reductions, economizing, and standardization can be achieved with high probability;
- Increased utilization of the abilities of the consolidating European market which is developing from competition.

Impacts on Bundeswehr Planning

Conceptual Main Points

The increasing pressure on resources, as well as defense policy developments, demand that the Bundeswehr recognize the consequences in two aspects: It must establish priority points even more clearly than before, and they must be arranged in conceivable defense policy tracks.

The crux of the armed forces mission also lies in the future: to protect or restore the integrity of the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, and to geographically and chronologically constrain any conflict. For future fulfillment of this mission, this means:

- Command, intelligence collection, and reconnaissance will be given first priority, whereby emphasis will be on all possibilities and measures which extend the warning time. Equally high priority will be given to initial operations. They require highly mobile forces from the Army for timely defense near the border in sections where a breakthrough is threatening. They also require simultaneous deployment of the Air Force for air defense, and of the Navy for defense of Baltic access and sea connections in the North Sea. For all missions, high-profile forces must be available.
- Arms control results limit the armed forces dispositive of an attacker, and impose longer preparation times upon him. It follows that a lesser weight of our own forces can be allotted to lead follow-up operations and to engage enemy forces in the rear areas. This is shown on the one hand on relying to a higher degree on reserve strength of the forces assigned to follow-up operations, for which filling out with reservists must be insured within anticipated preparation times, and on the other hand in the possibility of reducing the expense of engaging enemy forces in the rear areas.

—Changed strategic peripheral conditions make it easier to foresee limited staffing and a high degree of relying on reserve strength of forces intended to protect rearward combat zones and site defenses.

Remaining above all missions is the fielding of a qualitatively and quantitatively healthy personnel roster with primary characteristics of adequate leadership strength, a duty assignment structure which is both appropriate for careers and attractive, and highly qualified training and reserves.

Organization Structure Considerations

Background conditions and conceptual main points find their downfall in the configuration of future structures. Even though the details are not yet determined, the contours in their general trends are set:

The Bundeswehr will continue to consist of the armed forces and the Bundeswehr administration (territorial Bundeswehr command and armaments industry). The basic division of the armed forces into the Army, Air Force, Navy, and the two organizational groups "Central Bundeswehr Military Posts" and "Central Bundeswehr Medical Corps," will be maintained.

The Army will further develop the Army Structure 2000 in an evolutionary fashion. The field army and the territorial army will be more closely tied to one another according to mission reassignment with logistical support, medical corps, and combat support. The field army remains divided into three corps and 12 divisions, whereby the prominent change is that the number of mechanized divisions will be reduced to nine, and three air-mobile divisions will arise.

The cuts caused by limited resources will be most clearly seen in the field army brigades. Only a portion of the 35 brigades can still be maintained in a high state of readiness: This is also required to insure a minimum level of reaction ability. Other brigades, in contrast, will be transferred to partial reliance on reserve strength, and even complete removal from active duty status. Emphasis in equipment modernization lies in the fields of command, reconnaissance, indirectly guided fire, and denial ability.

Along with the command and support troops, the territorial army should consist of the German/French Brigade, nine home defense regiments, and six home defense brigades. Because of their equipment and presence, deployment options for these combat troops are limited, however.

In the Air Force, the die is already cast in the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty to eliminate the Pershing units in 1991. Beyond that, for conventional tasks the weight will shift further in favor of air defense. This does not preclude that the levels of readiness which are still high today could be reduced under arms control aspects. Such decisions will lie in agreements to be reached with the alliance. Cuts in the

number of flying squadrons are foreseen in areas of air attack and air reconnaissance, where the less usable systems' performance cannot be increased or replaced.

The proposed changes in the context of the new Air Force Structure 4 are rounded out by making the command, training, and support organizations compatible.

For equipment requisition, the Air Force is placing emphasis on modernization of the command and reconnaissance equipment, as well as continued strengthening of the air defense, ground support, air weapon systems.

Although the naval forces are not part of the arms control agreements, the Navy will have to reduce the amount of sea-warfare capacity over the next two decades with large cuts, whereby the remaining fleet will experience a considerable qualitative improvement. The numerical cuts will impact most strongly in the Baltic component, whereas the North Sea component is to be maintained substantially as it is now.

Finally, the following applies in general for all three branches of the Armed Forces:

- The Bundeswehr will definitely have fewer troop units in the future, but they will have better personnel assigned to them;
- It will maintain an—even if limited—ability of the Armed Forces to react quickly;
- It will be more dependent than before on mobilization; and
- It must more closely incorporate the reservists in training and defense concepts.

The consequence of these trends is that the Bundeswehr will bear the characteristics of a mobilization and training army by the mid-1990s much more than it does today. And so the significance of our reservists will be persistently increased.

Time Frames

As set forth, structural considerations are not yet so clearly defined that this can be calculated down to the man, machine, and military unit. Still, with the decisions of 1989, the most important turns have been made. The planning that is to follow will be pursued so that:

- In 1990, the detailed structures—after completion of a series of pending studies—will be presented;
- By 1993, a necessary provisional reorganization will be completed; and then
- By 1996 the actual reorganization can take place.

Major changes in the personnel and duty situation of many soldiers and civilian employees will be tied with the changes. Strict adherence to the time schedule will make it all the more compelling to be able to inform those affected as soon as possible.

Concluding Observations

The Bundeswehr is being confronted with the most fundamental changes since its creation. The grounds and intentions of the reorganization have been named. The Bundeswehr Inspector General, Admiral D. Wellershof, summarizes the current state of planning as follows in a letter to the troops:

"You can all be sure that the new structure of the Bundeswehr will continue to be able to fulfill its mission under future political and strategic conditions. It will also make its considerable contribution to the common defense within the alliance."

It is to be added that the structure will be flexibly arrayed so that when surrounding conditions change again, they will not necessitate fundamentally new structural planning.

The German Armed Forces have provided important prerequisites for the successful security policy of the post-war period which is now coming to a close. This is providing the base for lessening of the size of the Armed Forces, which is now possible. With these planned measures, the solid and realistic foundation for the transition into the 1990s has been provided.

Defense Minister on Possible Cuts in Bundeswehr

LD2903082290 Hamburg DPA in German
0729 GMT 29 Mar 90

[Excerpt] Bonn (DPA)—Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg (Christian Democratic Union) considers it conceivable, in the process of further Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament, that military service could be cut from 15 to 12 months. At a "Federal Army Forum" organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation in Bonn today, Stoltenberg said that military service will in the future remain the legitimate expression of a fortified democracy. Federal Army planning is flexible enough to be able to respond to the results of the Vienna follow-up negotiations with a further reduction in the strength of the Federal Army below 400,000 men.

Stoltenberg referred to the fact that a reduction in the number of active soldiers from 495,000 to 400,000 is now being sought. Thus the Bundeswehr as a whole will be smaller, but at the same time more professional and more modern. The defense capacity of the Bundeswehr, with 1.34 million soldiers, will also be considerably reduced. The structure of the armed forces must also be modified. A reduction in the active capacity will, in all sections of the armed forces, be accompanied by a reduction in the number of units.

According to Stoltenberg, it remains the basic political principle of the federal government that the Federal Army, in the nineties too, should be in a position to fulfill its duties and its alliance commitments with modern armed forces. Changes in the international environment will, in the long term, also lead to further developments in the strategy and military structure of

the NATO alliance. Nuclear and conventional armed forces will then serve the purpose of direct deterrence less than that of safeguarding and stabilizing a contractually agreed system of reciprocal security in Europe. [passage omitted]

Hesse Government Wants U.S. Troop Reduction

AU0404182090 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Apr 90 p 4

["P.T.N." report: "Hesse Hopes For Troop Withdrawal"]

[Text] Wiesbaden—The Hesse Government, as well as the opposition Social Democratic Party of Germany [SPD], have urged that Hesse should be considered in the U.S. Armed Forces troop reductions. In a letter to Chancellor Kohl published in Wiesbaden on Tuesday [3 April], Minister President Wallmann expressed the expectation that a successful conclusion of the Vienna negotiations will also affect Hesse.

Referring to "considerable burdens" for the civilian population in the "densely populated Rhine-Main region," the minister president appealed to Kohl to use his influence to bring about the withdrawal of the U.S. Army V Corps from Frankfurt.

Hesse SPD Chairman and Kassel Mayor Eichel welcomed Wallmann's letter and, for his part, presented a "disarmament catalogue" in which the creation of an "office for disarmament" is proposed. That authority would help the cities and municipalities to cope with the structural problems that might be caused by the troop withdrawal "in a socially acceptable way."

To substantiate his wish to relieve the burden of the Rhine-Main area in his letter to the chancellor, the Hesse minister-president points out that above all the withdrawal of the U.S. forces from the city of Frankfurt, the Air Force Base at Frankfurt Airport, and the U.S. military air base in Wiesbaden-Erbenheim would open up "opportunities for civilian use" on which this region and Hesse depend, to be able to cope with the political challenges in Europe and to hold their ground in the competition in the European single market. Frankfurt could only consolidate its "function as a metropolis" in the European competition by developing its infrastructure. For that purpose, areas for housing construction, services enterprises, authorities, and public institutions have to be provided. In Frankfurt it is especially difficult to find the required areas because of the extremely high congestion. On the other hand, V Corps headquarters, the housing developments for American soldiers and their families, and barracks take up much of the urgently needed space.

In the letter to the chancellor, Wallmann affirmed that the point for the land government are "not populist demands," but "the withdrawal of armed forces from those regions where they result in a major disadvantage

for civilian development and where the withdrawal need not cause any concerns about economic, labor market, and social policy disadvantages."

In addition to his letter to Kohl, Wallmann reported that, together with his deputy, Science Minister Gerhard, he will go to the United States in May to hold talks with government agencies and to take further steps "to safeguard Hesse's interests."

Hesse SPD Chairman Eichel regards the creation of the "office for disarmament" he proposed as an opportunity to advance speedily Hesse's disarmament ideas and to establish a "uniform level of coordination and contact." The office is to be directly subject to the state chancellery and "scientifically supported" by the Hesse Institute for Peace and Conflict Research. Regional interests are to be represented by an advisory council. According to Eichel, the withdrawal of the U.S. Armed Forces and the "thinning out" of the Bundeswehr in Hesse will have far-reaching consequences for civilian jobs. It affects approximately 11,000 civilian jobs alone with the Americans in Hesse. Therefore, the land government must use every opportunity to "minimize and socially secure the risk of unemployment for German civilian employees."

Dregger Urges Eliminating Short-Range Weapons

AU0404141990 - furt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 4 Apr 90 p 2

[F. Y. report: "Dregger: Eliminate Short-Range Weapons"]

[Text] Bonn, 3 April—Talks with the USSR on the elimination of all short-range nuclear missiles ought to be initiated yet this year. This demand was raised by Alfred Dregger, chairman of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union [CDU/CSU] Bundestag group in Bonn on Tuesday. Thus, Dregger reacted to reports according to which the U.S. Administration intends to revise a NATO resolution made last year. According to this resolution, the question on whether the "Lance" missile ought to be replaced by a more far-reaching nuclear weapon should be decided in 1992 under the considerations of the political situation at that time. According to reports from Washington, the U.S. Administration wants to counteract the disapproval of this modernization with a "bold and far-reaching" proposal, a Pentagon spokesman stated last weekend. He said that this plan would be worked out in close coordination with the allies. It is to be presented on 8 and 9 May, the date on which NATO's nuclear planning group plans to meet again in Banff (Canada). In this connection, Dregger said that, once the first phase of the Vienna disarmament talks on conventional arms was concluded, one could practically exclude the stationing of new short-range missiles. Dregger stated that the \$112 million in funds for next year, for which the American Congress has applied, could be used for a better purpose. Dregger reiterated his view that all nuclear battlefield

weapons ought to be eliminated, because the only legitimate purpose of nuclear weapons is not their use on the battlefield, but their deterrence of potential attackers. He said that the condition for this is that the attacker can be reached on his own territory. Nuclear weapons whose range is too short lack the only legitimate purpose of nuclear weapons. They are unacceptable to the people in Central Europe. This also applies to nuclear tube artillery, Dregger concluded.

Defense Spokesman Confirms Missile Withdrawal

AU0404132090 Cologne Deutschlandfunk Network
in German 1100 GMT 4 Apr 90

[Text] The Bundeswehr is starting to eliminate its Pershing 1-A intermediate-range missiles. An FRG Defense Ministry spokesman said today in Bonn that preparatory work began on Sunday. He thus confirmed information acquired by Deutschlandfunk, according to which the about 70 [figure as heard] Pershing systems, which would carry U.S. nuclear warheads if they were used, will be finally put out of service by May 1991. The complete elimination of all intermediate-range weapons, which are deployed in central Europe, by this date was agreed on between the United States and the USSR in 1987. It is not yet certain whether the Bundeswehr missiles are to be taken back to the United States, the spokesman said. The Pershing 1-A missiles will probably be destroyed in the FRG.

The spokesman did not want to confirm information acquired by Deutschlandfunk that the withdrawal of the U.S. Cruise missiles, which are also affected by the INF treaty, will start next Wednesday [11 April]. He stressed that this is the business of the Americans.

No Evidence of RSA Submarines Found

AU0704181290 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER
ALLGEMEINE in German 7 Apr 90 p 5

["vL" report: "No Submarines Are Being Built in South Africa"]

[Text] Johannesburg, 6 April—Three Bundestag deputies of the Christian Democratic Union [CDU] are convinced that submarines have not and are not being built in South Africa. They think that accusations that submarines are being built with German help, which were recently repeated by the television magazine MONITOR, are wrong. The United Nations had mentioned and criticized the FRG in a resolution on the topic—but not other countries. For two days, accompanied by German experts, the deputies investigated the port of Durban from the ocean and on land. With an openness that they did not expect, they were given access to all halls and technical facilities. Previously, the deputies, headed by Chairman of the Mediation Committee Huesch, had acquainted themselves with pertinent information in Kiel and Bonn for several days in order to be able to recognize any sign of submarine construction. The other two deputies, Boernsen and Carstensen, belong to

the 110-member Bundestag submarine investigation committee and know the details of the shipbuilding industry.

After his visit to Durban, Boernsen said that there have been no submarines built there, there are no submarines built there, and, probably, there will not be any submarines built there. The MONITOR report had intended to give the impression that the construction had already started and would be completed within 18 months. The construction of a submarine takes about four years. It is so costly and highly visible that it could not be hidden, according to Huesch. As to technical preconditions, such construction in South Africa is only possible in Durban, if at all, experts assured the deputies. There, too, the standard does not live up to Western requirements. In the Simonstown shipyard, which the deputies will visit this Saturday [7 April], it is only possible to refit a submarine.

Reports had repeatedly claimed that in the shipyard in Durban, which belonged to the Sandock-Austral company—it has meanwhile been sold to the Dorbyl Shipbuilding company—submarines are being built on the basis of the blueprints delivered illegally by Howaldswerke/Deutsche Werft AG and Ingenieurkontor Luebeck in 1984. According to Boernsen, this shipyard, which the deputies visited, lacked any indication of submarine construction; in addition, it does not have the facilities for it. Dorbyl will be working to capacity for quite some time with the construction of three 9,300-tonne container ships for a Cypriot shipowner, which are to be completed in November 1992, and of a platform for Moss gas, a project off Mossel Bay, where there is offshore drilling for natural gas. Obviously, the enterprise's policy has changed since the sale by Sandock-Austral, a subsidiary of the Armscor armament company, to Dorbyl.

Boernsen cites as another argument the fact that in a society as polarized as South Africa the construction of a submarine, which requires many hundreds of workers, could not be kept secret. Interlocutors from the extraparlimentary opposition denied the MONITOR magazine allegation about the alleged construction of submarine models. The rumor about the construction could be based on a misunderstanding, a staff member of the CDU/Christian Social Union Bundestag group says. After a talk with a Portuguese worker, who used the term "submarino," a journalist of the South African news agency SAPA had reported on the alleged construction of submarines. As she now told the deputies, the term, which was translated incorrectly at the time, also refers to all "submarine" buildings. And thus applies to the natural gas platform, which is being built there.

Presumably, South Africa planned to build submarines in the past. The intermediate report of the investigation committee of last December considers that certain. The microfilm blueprints of the submarine type 209 from Schleswig-Holstein, which were obviously transported via diplomatic pouch, would have helped in that. Former

President Botha, who had been defense minister before, had said that he hoped to live to see the construction of South African submarines. In 1987 Mrs. Eid, a Greens deputy and also a member of the submarine investigation committee, was refused a visa when she wanted to visit the Sandock shipyard. Until the visit of the CDU deputies, access to the shipyard had been prohibited. The sudden openness of the South Africans is probably not only linked with the changed attitude of the government—which includes the reduction of military influence—but probably is intended to eliminate possible irritations shortly before President De Klerk's visit to Bonn on 21 May (immediately before Defense Minister Stoltenberg is scheduled to be questioned by the investigation committee).

South Africans prided themselves on being able to build submarines despite the binding arms embargo imposed by the UN Security Council in November 1977. In July 1988, however, Admiral Syndercombe, commander-in-chief of the South African Navy, and his successor, Vice Admiral Putter, repeated last September that South Africa does not build submarines and does not intend to do so for the time being.

The submarine construction, which had been planned by Botha and would have required the majority of the defense budget, probably failed at least because of financial problems. At the beginning of the year De Klerk drastically reduced the defense budget. The Navy was affected most strongly. Five Navy bases and the Marines guard unit were disbanded. The Navy bases in the Whale Bay enclave in Namibia and in Simonstown—including the shipyard—were reduced in size. Thus, the construction of submarines is little likely in the future, either.

FINLAND

Interceptor Acquisition Choices Seen Narrowed

90EN0354D Helsinki HELSINGIN SANOMAT
in Finnish 11 Feb 90 p 12

[Article by Matti Klemola and Jyri Raivio: "Wanted To Buy: Good Fighter Cheap. Finland Will Soon Request Proposals From Three Western Aircraft Factories. Swedes Are Believed To Have Already Dropped out of the Competition, However"]

[Text] There will be roaring in the skies over Lapland in the next few days, when the French Dassault-Breguet aircraft factory tests its Mirage 2000 fighter in Rovaniemi under Arctic conditions.

The arrival of the Mirage in Rovaniemi just now certainly was not simply by chance. The French know quite well that the Finnish Defense Ministry is going to send requests for proposals to three Western manufacturers of combat aircraft this month. The candidates, along with the Mirage 2000, are the American F-16 and the Swedish JAS-39.

The Finns will later request a proposal concerning the Soviet MiG-29 aircraft—or its successor—too.

The French flights in Lapland do not cause concern to the Defense Ministry or the Air Force. The Finns will just stay as far away as possible from the Dassault-Breguet people and the aircraft itself, so that the impression is not created that Finland is already tilting toward the Mirage. Of course, the Air Force will give the French the assistance the latter need for the test flights.

Actually, the Mirage flights in Finland are a very good thing, according to the defense forces, because the Mirage is the only one of the Western candidates that has not been tested thoroughly in a cold climate.

Does Finland Need 60 Interceptors?

The sending of requests for proposals and the arrival of the Mirage in Finland mean that the combat aircraft purchase that has been called the arms purchase of the century has really started now. The Air Force needs 60 new interceptors, with which the aging Drakens made in Sweden and MiG-21's that were purchased from the Soviet Union are to start being replaced in 1995.

During the whole time that there have been public discussions about the fighter purchase, the leftists have asked whether Finland really needs 60 interceptors, three squadrons. Finland is not allowed to have more combat aircraft than that at all. This is a requirement of the Paris Peace Treaty.

Would not fewer be sufficient now that the military tension in Europe is lessening? Should Finland purchase new weapons when even the superpowers are giving up their own purchases? Where will the 10 billion markkas for purchasing the three fighter squadrons come from?

The defense forces state piously that they welcome a public discussion. In fact, both the Defense Ministry and the Air Force are extremely annoyed by the fact that the reasonableness of the fighter purchase is being questioned. The military is especially incensed over the fact that Finland is alleged to be building up its armaments. They say that Finland is just replacing old aircraft with new ones.

Army personnel, and also civilians in the Defense Ministry, say that raising questions about the fighter purchase is completely naive. Although the East European communist governments have fallen, this does not necessarily mean that the military tension in Europe will decrease tomorrow.

The probable final result of the arms limitation negotiations going on in Vienna (the so-called TAE talks) will be that a country with a large area like Finland will need interceptors more than previously. The Vienna agreement is expected to increase the significance of cruise missiles. There is no point in even trying to intercept these without modern fighters.

The most startling thing about the fighter purchase is the price. The general estimate is 10 billion markkas, but the actual cost will be known only when a response is made to the request for proposals in October.

The Air Force and the Defense Ministry have already begun the campaign. Attempts are being made to assure influential groups that the fighter purchase probably is cheaper than has been described and that it will not necessarily lead to an expansion of the defense budget.

The Air Force commander, Major General Pertti Jokinen, recently wrote that "the money required for renewing the interceptors will fit into the planning framework of our minimal defense budget if reasonably directed." This means, in fact, that the blanket is being extended by cutting a piece off the other end: Purchases by other combat arms will certainly suffer.

Those who have been following the arms purchase of the century closely wager that, when the new Parliament that is to be elected in a year has to vote on money for the fighters sometime in 1992, the Social Democrats will be softened into pushing the yes buttons in the name of the interests of the fatherland.

Was a Proposal Requested From Sweden out of Courtesy?

Sweden has already practically dropped out of the game, sources say. The problems of the JAS-39 Gripen or Griffin are so great that it is no longer seriously considered for the Finnish Air Force's interceptor. Some foreign experts regard the JAS as a project that Sweden should not have undertaken from the outset.

Far out in front of the JAS, the French Mirage and the American F-16 Fighting Falcon are competing.

The Mirage has been marketed more skillfully and energetically than the American aircraft. The French are also expected to be very flexible in the so-called counter-purchase negotiations. Finland wants the country selling the fighters in order to purchase Finnish technological products out of the purchase price.

Now the Americans, too, have understood the Finns' trade-policy needs. They are sprinting to overcome the French head start and know, in addition, that the Finnish aviators would especially like the F-16 fighter.

The aviators' reasons are persuasive. The F-16 is cheaper than the Mirage. Thousands of them have been manufactured, while only a few hundred of the Mirages have been built. Among other things, the F-16 is the general fighter of the Western military alliance, NATO. It has participated in battles with good success. The F-16 is also easy to maintain. The United States is the world's largest aircraft manufacturer and, at the same time, the world leader in technical know-how.

Because of the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the F-16 should be considered as politically explosive in any way, "unless the Finns reject it out of excessive caution," one expert remarked.

Finnish Order Interests Sellers

The purchase of 40 Western fighters by the Finnish Air Force is a giant transaction for the Finns, but it is a small one on the world fighter market. Of the two candidates that are considered strongest at the moment, General Dynamics has sold over 3,000 F-16 aircraft, and Dassault-Breguet has sold 442 Mirage 2000's.

Still, there is fierce competition for the Finnish order. Representatives of all three Western suppliers said at the Paris Air Show last summer that they regarded the Finnish order to be exceptionally important.

Finland is a neutral country, the Air Force of which, despite its smallness, is on a high technical level. Finland's choice is an important recommendation when selling the aircraft elsewhere—especially in countries where large procurement decisions are made by virtue of something other than bribes.

Both General Dynamics and Dassault-Breguet have also sold aircraft to countries where business transactions are anything but pure.

In Greece, a parliamentary study commission was appointed last summer to determine for what reason both the F-16 and the Mirage 2000 were purchased for the Greek Air Force.

Greece purchased 40 of each aircraft. The F-16's unit price was \$23.2 million, and the Mirage's price was 192 million francs. At the present exchange rate, the F-16 cost 92 million markkas and the Mirage 134 million markkas.

The commission also wants to know why the Mirage's price doubled, and that of the F-16 rose by half during the purchase negotiations. It is also intended to clarify what role the controversial Saudi Arabian businessman Adnan Khashoggi had in the Greek fighter purchases. Khashoggi is still often used as a consultant by American sellers of military goods.

In Finland, the commercial activity is not at all so dramatic. The selection will be resolved by an equation in which the most important factors will obviously be the Air Force's need and opinion. Also involved in the game, however, will be foreign policy, military policy, trade policy and—a very important component—the counter-trade package.

Counterpurchases are desired above all by Valmet. It is striving for 30 percent of them. Jukka Holkeri, whose father is chairman of the board of Valmet's supervisory board and the prime minister of the Republic, has participated in the negotiations up to this point on behalf of Valmet's aircraft industry unit.

"These machines are not sold the same way as detergents," Air Force Colonel Heikki Nikunen, who is coordinating the procurement in the General Staff, said.

It is well known that there are no colorful advertising campaigns on television, but rather marathon negotiations by experts. The commercial negotiations will take place in 1991, when the Air Force will also fly a basic test-flight program with the candidates. The Finns have already made short familiarization flights in both the F-16 and the Mirage. The selection decision will be made in 1992.

The negotiations will be conducted and the purchases made directly between the Defense Ministry and the manufacturers when Parliament has approved the appropriation. The ministries of defense of the manufacturing countries, whose advance approval was required before the whole process could start, will also be closely involved.

Two of the suppliers, SAAB-Scania and Dassault-Breguet, have representatives in Finland—Scan-Auto for the former and Gronblom Oy for the latter. The Americans are represented in Brussels, where General Dynamics has its European headquarters.

Both Gronblom and Scan-Auto have retired Air Force colonels promoting the transaction. Nikunen emphasized, however, that the Finnish companies are not importers of military aircraft, or afterwards of their parts, but simply help maintain contacts between the manufacturers and the Defense Ministry.

[Box, p 12]

What Does a Combat Aircraft Cost?

- Navigation, communication, and control systems: 40 million markkas
- Weapon systems and the related electronics: 50 million markkas
- Airframe and its mechanical systems: 30 million markkas
- Power plant: 30 million markkas

A modern combat aircraft with its weapon systems costs about 100-200 million markkas.

The weapon systems are especially expensive. If the aircraft price is 150 million markkas, for example, at least a third will have to be paid for the weapon systems.

In the aircraft itself, the equipment needed to fly it costs the most. The navigation, communications, and control systems' share of the costs is about 40 percent. It is impossible to know to what extent the buyer will have to cover the aircraft's design and development costs. The governments of countries manufacturing combat aircraft support research and development directly or indirectly. If these costs were calculated into the aircraft's costs as is, making a deal would be hopeless.

The combat aircraft in the drawing is the French Mirage 2000, but the prices reflect in general terms what combat aircraft usually cost.

USSR Questioned About Possible Nuclear Tests

LD2903175290 Helsinki Domestic Service
in Finnish 1930 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Finland has expressed to the Soviet Union its concern over the report that Soviet nuclear tests would take place on the Arctic islands in the Novaya Zemlya area. Foreign Minister Pertti Paasio announced this today at a seminar of the disarmament committee. According to Paasio, the matter has been discussed between Finland and the Soviet Union at a level of officials. The reason for concern is the reports that the Soviet Union is transferring the tests from the Semipalatinsk area to the north. Soviet Deputy Premier Igor Belousov said in the Soviet parliament today that the nuclear tests in the Semipalatinsk test area in Kazakhstan will be ended for the time being because of protests by local residents.

FRANCE

Controversy on Hades Missile Deployment Viewed

90ES0537D Paris LIBERATION in French
6 Feb 90 pp 6, 7

[Interview with Francois Fillon, former chairman of the Defense Committee in the National Assembly, by Jean Guisnel, place and date not given: "Fillon Urges 'Volunteer Army', Opposes Hades"; first four paragraphs are LIBERATION introduction]

[Excerpts] Chevenement is pulling out all the stops to defend this short-range nuclear missile scheduled to go into service in 1992. But the ranks of his adversaries are swelling, even within the PS [Socialist Party], as prospects for conventional disarmament become brighter.

Opponents are once again drawing a bead on the Hades missile. [passage omitted]

Now a new voice has been raised against it: Francois Fillon, defense affairs expert for the RPR [Rally for the Republic] and former chairman of the [National Assembly] Defense Committee. Fillon says any idea of putting the Hades into service "must be abandoned." [passage omitted]

He believes there is no way to avoid a debate on defense policy, and proposes a dialogue between the majority and opposition.

[LIBERATION] The Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament in Europe [CFE] are expected to conclude with an agreement before the end of the year. In your opinion, what consequences will this have for the French Armed Forces?

[Fillon] Doubtless it will affect France less than the two superpowers, but the effects will in any case be far from insignificant. In the first place it will affect the Army, which we understand will have to take a 10 to 15 percent manpower cut. This insures a debate on the size of the Army as well as the need for conscription, which will be viewed as so unjust that the public will no longer tolerate it. In addition, it is absolutely necessary to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent. It is really quite impossible for France to join in a European security arrangement: It would be denuclearized, since our partners do not want France's nuclear umbrella covering all of Europe. So it makes more sense to continue modernizing the strategic nuclear forces and engage in serious negotiation with the British on future nuclear programs, for the two of us are in similar predicaments. Also, we have to abandon the idea of deploying the Hades missile in 1992, since its range of less than 500 km restricts its application to countries which are in the process of moving toward Western Europe.

[LIBERATION] But the president and the defense minister say there is still a useful role for Hades...

[Fillon] I simply do not understand their position—especially since both of them were quite hostile to tactical nuclear weapons, even at the height of the cold war. If Soviet forces withdraw to their borders tomorrow, the military utility of short-range nuclear weapons will be greatly reduced, while the political obstacles to their deployment will become substantial.

[LIBERATION] So the idea of a pre-strategic "final warning" is now completely obsolete?

[Fillon] Certainly the president should have the means to take some action short of unleashing a strategic holocaust. But the Air Force and Navy will still have their medium-range air-to-ground missile, even if (as I hope) the Hades does not go into service. I also advocate the idea of another land or airborne defense component, one with enough range and precision to reach military forces inside the Soviet Union, the only nuclear power with an arsenal that poses a threat to France.

[LIBERATION] In 1985 you proposed to reduce the size of the Army by one-third and eventually cut it back to 200,000 men. Do you still think that is a good idea?

[Fillon] Absolutely. The field forces (1,100 tanks and 500 helicopters in service) in eastern France and Germany have been deployed to serve as reserve forces for the Atlantic Alliance, thus giving France the time it would need to employ the deterrent force. If the military threat from the Warsaw Pact is diminishing, we must take that fully into account. Our own decisions, however, will necessarily depend on the actual results of Vienna: If the USSR fails to fulfill its commitments, the situation would be different, but it really seems determined to withdraw its troops from Europe. The need to downsize the French Army is not new. It is something that has been needed for years, and the need today is even more pressing.

[LIBERATION] You think that conscription could become "intolerable" and that there are too many professional soldiers. So you favor a career Army.

[Fillon] On the one hand, we know there will be fewer positions and less equipment to manage. On the other, the government declares it intends to make conscription more equitable and more universal. You can't have both at the same time. For my part, I advocate a volunteer Army, with one sole exception: It is essential for the nation's elites to serve stints in the Armed Forces, so we do not end up with a completely proletarian military. Elementary principles of equity should be observed here, and those on whose education the state lavishes the most expense should in return give a little of their time for the defense of the country.

[LIBERATION] What will you do with the career servicemen who would be thrown out of work if your proposals are implemented?

[Fillon] I am convinced government service should be unified, and servicemen thrown back into civilian life should have priority in terms of jobs with the national government or local public institutions. Many of them could be vocationally rehabilitated in this manner. But there is still time: The Army is not like the steel industry.

[LIBERATION] French politicians do not seem very excited about the debate over the consequences of a Vienna accord. Why?

[Fillon] There isn't a real debate in France, either within the RPR or anywhere else. The opposition would be wise to devote a little more time to these matters than it does to its Machiavellian in-fighting. I am going to hold a meeting open to all political leaders—majority and opposition—who support both progress and the defense of France. This is vitally important, since if the parties don't take the lead, the terms of the debate could very well be set by the masses themselves, with all the dangers of demagoguery and myopic thinking that entails.

Disarmament Plans Trouble Army Leadership

90ES0537B Paris LIBERATION in French
6 Feb 90 p 6

[Article by Jean Guisnel: "Army Feels Increasingly Disarmed"]

[Text] The conventional disarmament agreement now being negotiated in Vienna covers Europe all the way from the Atlantic to the Urals, and the French Army is worried that it may entail new reductions, in personnel as well as weaponry. It also fears disarmament may eventually spell the end of conscription.

The Navy is still sailing under blue skies, since sea-going forces are not on the agenda in the conventional disarmament talks, at least for the moment; and the Air Force is preparing itself stoically for the sacrifice it is called on to make: destruction of about 15 percent of its combat

aircraft. But the Army, which fears it will end up taking the lion's share of France's reductions, is on red alert, and the strain is showing. Though senior officers feign unconcern, the ranks are becoming increasingly worried, and it takes very little to bring anxieties out in the open.

An agreement on conventional disarmament, if concluded in Vienna in the near future, will require the Western countries to reduce by 15 percent their arsenals of artillery equipment, combat tanks, armored vehicles, and helicopters between the Atlantic and the Urals. Theoretically, this 15 percent cut in materiel would mean the loss of 1,340 AMX-30 and AMX-30B2 battle tanks, 3,380 AMX-10 and VAB armored vehicles, and 340 attack helicopters. But negotiators at Vienna do not intend to apply these reductions on a per-country basis, but rather by "zones": France is in zone 3, a ring of countries that includes Great Britain, Denmark, and Italy¹. This ring completely surrounds Zone 4, which includes the FRG (therefore French forces in Germany) and the Benelux countries². In reality, the 15 percent figure is an average: It will apply only to the combined strength of the Western forces. The French military establishment is convinced it will be able to persuade its allies to accept a larger share of the arms reductions, but this remains to be seen.

In the halls of the Elysee, Matignon, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where the future of France's defense establishment will be decided, there is virtually unanimous agreement that the Army will have the most difficulty maintaining its current force level, and dramatic personnel reductions are to be expected. How dramatic? Precise estimates are still impossible. But the experts say a second arms reduction conference, a Vienna II, is almost inevitable. As one highly respected government expert says: "The Vienna I accords are already obsolete, and as things stand now it is clear that withdrawal of the American forces from Germany will not be enough. An additional 140,000 troops—mostly French and British—will also have to go." Though not yet cast in concrete, there is a real possibility that all or part of the 50,000 French soldiers in Germany will leave in the next few years. And this only reinforces the Army's anxieties. What to do with these men if they have to return to France?

One thing is sure: At such a reduced force level, conscription in its present form could no longer be justified. Even now it is only able to make use of 75 percent of the potential conscript pool. A further drop in this percentage is inconceivable without a complete change of structure: Some are already going so far as to advocate an all-volunteer Army, essentially a "career" Army. The prospect is not a happy one for professional soldiers, who know that compulsory service, and the numerous military installations it requires, serves to strengthen civilian loyalty to the military as an institution. An end to conscription, according to one infantry officer, "would plunge us into a profound identity crisis; Army morale could be undermined, but under the circumstances where would we go?"

Within the Army, reactions to this darkly sensed problem are diverse. A very few officers, like this expert on the current negotiations, think of disarmament as an opportunity: "Massive armies have long been an anachronism," he says. "The value of a military force depends on the opposing force it is up against. If the others reduce their force levels, there is no reason to maintain or augment our own." Few in the Army currently subscribe to this point of view. And the sentiments expressed by one general serving with the mechanized armor corps clearly reflect a much more widespread attitude: "One has the impression that French politicians have already disarmed and are ready to kiss the Russians on the lips. Central Europe has been stagnant for 40 years. How will it evolve now? Our military capacity, our power to project, should remain qualitatively at maximum readiness."

One of his colleagues serving with the Rapid Action Force goes even further: "We cannot reduce our armaments and troop levels all at once merely on the basis of strong feelings. When you go too fast, you lose control. Right now all the signs indicate we're going to be consigned to oblivion before the others have disarmed: We're beating a retreat even before the engagement has begun." It is clear that for a substantial percentage of the military establishment the status quo would be the best possible solution. Most of these leaders believe it would be a negotiating defeat for France to reduce the number of its attack helicopters below 350 or cut armored equipment by 15 percent. The only thing that wouldn't bother them is a decrease in the number of artillery guns: The French Army scarcely boasts 500 artillery pieces, a number already considered insufficient.

There remains the thorny problem of the Hades missile: The range (450 km) and throw-weight (90 kilotons) of this pre-strategic weapon (uniquely suited to attacking troop concentrations) make it difficult to utilize in Eastern Europe. Does anyone still imagine that one day this weapon might be used against Germany, much less Poland, Czechoslovakia, or Hungary? French military strategists say yes, pointing out logically (but of course only in private) that Hades could be very useful in deterring a reunited Germany from attacking France. In a 29 January speech in Paris, Francois Heisbourg, director of London's International Institute of Strategic Studies, noted: "I strongly fear that those who nourish a secret hope that Hades could serve as a guarantee against a united and anti-French Germany run the risk of creating the very situation they hope to avoid....If current strategic trends in Europe continue, we will have to be ready to abandon the program in a way that preserves the total independence of our decision (it should be a unilateral decision) and thus maximizes the political significance of the gesture." Jean-Pierre Chevenement will have something to say on this interesting question in the speech he is scheduled to make this afternoon at the war college.

Footnotes

1. Along with Hungary, the Baltic states, Byelorussia, and the Carpathians.
2. Along with Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the GDR.

Defense Official Questions Equipment Production

90ES0619A Paris LE QUOTIDIEN DE PARIS
in French 6 Mar 90 p 11

[Text] Vice Admiral Herve Le Pichon, in charge of an "innovation" mission at the Ministry of Defense, has just questioned the production of future combat aircraft and the real effectiveness of tanks.

"Why spend a lot of money manufacturing combat aircraft" when soldiers, even small numbers of them, can be supplied with Stinger surface-to-air missiles or blinding lasers—a "simple and inexpensive weapon from which it is practically impossible at the moment to protect oneself"? What is "the real effectiveness of tanks that can be blinded by a simple beam of light"? Those were the questions asked last week by Vice Adm. Le Pichon during a seminar on disarmament. "The fighter plane was designed to intercept bombers," but there "will be no more bombers—neither strategic because rockets do the job better, nor tactical because lasers and other Stinger missiles will make their use prohibitive," he explained, although he acknowledged the "intentionally excessive and provocative" nature of his remarks.

Defense Minister on German Unity, Europe

AU1203193390 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German
12 Mar 90 pp 190-195

[Untitled interview with Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement by unidentified reporter; date and place not given]

[Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr Minister, as a boy, you witnessed the German invasion of France, and as a student, the building of the Berlin Wall. Is Defense Minister Chevenement concerned about German reunification?

[Chevenement] I am not concerned about reunification. I have advocated the Germans' right to self-determination for a long time and I have always been sure that Germany would be reunified.

[DER SPIEGEL] Many of your compatriots are irritated at the idea of a unified Germany. The Communists see France in "great danger," the magazine LE POINT speaks about a "blitz war" of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and others fear German predominance in Europe.

[Chevenement] You are not describing the mood correctly. France is the country where public opinion begrudges the Germans their unity least of all. President Mitterrand said on 27 July 1989, long before the opening of the Wall: "It seems to me that the Germans' striving

for reunification is legitimate; however, it must take place in a peaceful and democratic way."

[DER SPIEGEL] That sounds very general.

[Chevenement] But very clear. German-French friendship is very important. On the one hand, it requires openness, and on the other, both sides must avoid every appearance of complacency and arrogance. In his book on the war of 1870/71, the French socialist Jean Jaures wrote something valid: There must be room for two, and in my view, perhaps even for more great nations in Europe.

[DER SPIEGEL] Many Frenchmen, including former Gaullist Prime Minister Michel Debre, have reproached Mitterrand for saying nothing on the German question.

[Chevenement] Michel Debre or the Communists only express old French concerns. We must beware of any malevolent imputation toward Germany. However, our responsible politicians must not bury their heads in the sand either. As a matter of fact, Germany is a powerful reality in the center of Europe; its reunification creates genuine problems which should be frankly discussed in both sides' interest.

[DER SPIEGEL] What are the most urgent problems?

[Chevenement] To begin with, there is the problem of European security and peace. The blocs are being disbanded. What security system will replace them? Also, there is the problem of European unification. We have been told that the path to European monetary union is difficult. Quite a few people in France are surprised now to see that it is apparently much less difficult to bring about monetary union between the FRG and the GDR.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is not the old tendency of French intellectuals of conjuring up the German trauma reemerging here?

[Chevenement] Fear of a Germany which again only pursues its own goals is not unusual for a country which was attacked three times. However, the overwhelming majority of the French are aware that German-French reconciliation must be renewed every day and is the basis for a united Europe.

[DER SPIEGEL] What role is Germany supposed to play in Europe in the future?

[Chevenement] It must take part in building a peaceful and democratic Europe; this is the area where Germany historically has great responsibility. However, to do so, it would first have to give up its—what shall I call it?—its inclination to indulge in self-contemplation. I hope very much for Germany, because I know that German culture contains all the prerequisites that are necessary for Europe. People's Front President Leon Blum said: "Great qualities impose great duties." I know the great qualities of the German people.

[DER SPIEGEL] Paris has called upon Bonn to recognize the Oder-Neisse border. Do you think that the four victor powers could guarantee this border?

[Chevenement] This border could only be changed by a war; however, Europe has a right to peace. Therefore, this border must be recognized by an international act. That is in Europe's interest as well as in Germany's interest. Federal Chancellor Kohl has made that clear.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are the events in Germany since 9 November generally strengthening the relations between Bonn and Paris, or is Chancellor Kohl's policy straining the relationship between the two countries?

[Chevenement] It is no secret that we were informed about some important political decisions by the press—about the 10-point plan on reunification, for instance, or about decisions on the German monetary union. On the other hand, the French Government has always been careful not to hurt German feelings. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why some politicians accuse us of excessive restraint.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is that the reason why Paris did not comment on Chancellor Kohl's demand to link a border agreement between the FRG and Poland with the issue of reparations?

[Chevenement] Foreign Minister Roland Dumas commented on it. The German-Polish border must not become a bargaining chip. To strengthen the relations between Bonn and Paris, it is necessary for our two countries to first think about what they could jointly do for the benefit of Europe.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Warsaw Pact has virtually fallen apart. In the absence of an enemy image, has European defense policy not become unnecessary?

[Chevenement] The Warsaw Pact has, of course, largely lost its ideological cohesion; however, it continues to exist as a political and even military alliance, particularly the alliance between Poland and the Soviet Union. To my knowledge, neither Romania nor Bulgaria plan to leave it, and not even Hungary or the CSSR which called for the withdrawal of the Soviet troops intend to do so.

[DER SPIEGEL] How about the West?

[Chevenement] NATO's military doctrine is in a crisis. The Alliance must be reconsidered. Instead of keeping to the notion of two blocs confronting each other, we should create a collective security system.

[DER SPIEGEL] Would that necessarily include U.S. troops in Europe?

[Chevenement] We will have to think about that. When the Americans withdrew from Europe and went into isolation following World War I, history taught us a bitter lesson. We need to have a stable balance in Europe, even in the case of considerably reduced armed forces and under conditions of minimum deterrence. We

should continue to think along these lines and should try to create a common European security system. The Soviet Union remains a big military power—in nuclear and conventional terms.

[DER SPIEGEL] Will it remain a threat?

[Chevenement] Regarding defense, we must think 20 or 30 years in advance. In 1932, we signed a comprehensive disarmament agreement. Who would have thought at that time that Hitler would take power seven weeks later? And who would have thought in 1933 that in 1938 the Munich Agreement would be signed? We have to live with imponderabilities. Who would ever have considered possible a war between Argentina and Great Britain for the Falkland Islands? A large strategic vacuum in the center of Europe would be an eternal source of instability.

[DER SPIEGEL] Is the demand of the West that a unified Germany be a NATO member not totally unacceptable for Moscow?

[Chevenement] The Soviet Union has legitimate security interests, but Germany has such interests, too. We must not give up an existing security system, which is, of course, not entirely new, and replace it with a new one that does not even exist. Foreign Minister Genscher has suggested a certain demilitarization of the GDR where Soviet troops could continue to be temporarily deployed, while West Germany would remain a NATO member. Honestly, I do not consider this a lasting solution.

[DER SPIEGEL] Assuming that Germany would not be a member of any military alliance, would France consider that a security risk or a factor of insecurity?

[Chevenement] I do not think that such a large country as Germany could be neutral.

[DER SPIEGEL] Should French soldiers continue to be deployed in a united Germany?

[Chevenement] That must be decided by the Germans. The presence of our troops is only justified as a French contribution to German security. Perhaps these soldiers will form part of a European security system before long. However, we will withdraw them, if you so wish.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could Germany not assume the same role that De Gaulle created for France in 1966: continuing as a member of NATO without being a member of its military organization?

[Chevenement] We respect Germany's sovereign decisions under any circumstances. However, France and Germany are not in the same situation. Despite its strategic independence, France has concluded defense agreements with its allies, particularly with Germany, but also with NATO. For geographical reasons, Germany ranks first. That will not even change as a result of the fact that the Warsaw Pact has ceased to represent a threat. Unlike France, Germany's security must in the long run be guaranteed by the Western nuclear powers:

the United States, Great Britain, and France. For a new pan-European security system, we must yet come up with a lot of new ideas.

[DER SPIEGEL] Could that include a French nuclear umbrella for Europe?

[Chevenement] The Germans would have to ask for such an umbrella. Also, France is not the only nuclear power; the United States and Great Britain also have nuclear weapons. Nuclear guarantees would have to be dealt with in an agreement. As matters stand now, negotiations on such a collective security system would be conceivable—including negotiations with the Soviet Union.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does that mean that there will not exclusively be a French nuclear guarantee?

[Chevenement] I did not say that. Our president has shown that he is open to everything. Our vital interests do not start at the Rhine. Imagine going from Belfort where I am the mayor, to Freiburg in Breisgau, it is less than an hour's drive. We can never be indifferent to what is happening in Germany.

[DER SPIEGEL] How reassuring.

[Chevenement] The Germans should come up with something new themselves regarding their future security policy. If at least the German political parties agreed, we would get on more easily.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr Minister, your new Hades short-range missile, which has a maximum range of less than 500 km, can only threaten Central Europe, but not the Soviet Union. Is Hades of any use once Eastern Europe has freed itself of the Soviet yoke?

[Chevenement] This question is paradoxical. It shows that you do not understand our doctrine of deterrence. Our nuclear weapons will not be used; they are deterrence weapons. They make deterrence, which is the only concept appropriate for us and Europe, credible. We certainly do not want to win a war; we want to prevent a war, as Mitterrand has said.

[DER SPIEGEL] But they are targeted on us.

[Chevenement] Our weapons are targeted on no one. I am always amazed that the Germans are concerned about a few dozen French warheads, whereas 1,800 similar Soviet warheads are targeted on them, as the Soviets themselves have admitted. We could gain the impression that our own few missiles were threatening them more than Moscow's tanks and shells. Our weapons ensure geostrategic stability. They also serve German security.

[DER SPIEGEL] When will France take part in nuclear disarmament?

[Chevenement] When the Soviets and the Americans reduce their nuclear arsenal to a level comparable to ours—equal rights for everyone—we can, of course,

speak about nuclear disarmament. At present, each of the superpowers still has 12,000 strategic nuclear weapons and more than 10,000 tactical warheads, whereas we have just a few hundred strategic warheads which we think are enough.

[DER SPIEGEL] Why then the Hades?

[Chevenement] It could be useful for all of Europe. Hades is not a weapon to wage war, but a means of giving a final warning, to make strategic deterrence credible. I really believe in Gorbachev's sincerity, but who knows what will happen tomorrow? Who tells me that we will not be attacked in the next 30 years? France has seen 60 invasions since Attila: We do not need any more.

[DER SPIEGEL] Your comrades, too, want to achieve more disarmament. Several days prior to the congress of the Socialists, Gerard Fuchs, your party's security expert, called for arms reductions in France, including the Hades.

[Chevenement] All Socialists are for negotiated disarmament. Gerard Fuchs is an old friend of mine, and whenever I meet him, I sing for fun (laughs and sings in German): "Fuchs, du hast die Gans gestohlen, gib sie wieder her, sonst wird dich der Jaeger holen mit dem Schiessgewehr." [Fox, you stole the goose, give it back; otherwise, the hunter will get you with his gun].

[DER SPIEGEL] You should record that.

[Chevenement] My mentioning the gun is supposed to illustrate the problem of the range of the Hades. If we abolished all weapons with which we can shoot over the Rhine, the only weapons left would be sporting guns.

[DER SPIEGEL] NATO as a hunters' association—that would be real disarmament.

[Chevenement] Are you a hunter?

[DER SPIEGEL] No.

[Chevenement] I used to go hunting, if I may admit that to your ecologically minded readers. I still have a small carbine. But that is no reason for my neighbors to run away from me. They know that I am a peaceful person and do not intend to shoot at them. You see, France, too, is peaceful—without any claims, and only filled with the wish of making Europe a continent of peace.

NETHERLANDS

First CFE Monitor Recruits Begin Training

90WC0051A Rotterdam NRC *HANDELSBLAD*
in Dutch 24 Feb 90 p 2

[Article by Willebrord Nieuwenhuis: "Detente Requires More Monitoring"]

[Text] The Hague, 24 Feb—There is one part of the Netherlands armed forces that is growing because of

East-West detente and there is considerable interest in it. On 19 March, the first class of "inspectors for verification" begins training in Ede. That is even before the countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO conclude a conventional arms control treaty in Vienna.

Each of the 23 countries is responsible for carrying out inspections to determine whether the treaty is being obeyed. The Ministry of Defense's new Verification Section was established on 1 January. Last week the Netherlands announced a proposal to conduct mutual military inspections with Poland to gain experience and expand the "confidence-building measures" between the countries of Europe.

Confidence-building was one of the goals of the Helsinki Final Accords. Poland is still considering whether it wishes to accept the Netherlands proposal. If the costs are too high for Warsaw, the Netherlands is prepared to help out.

NATO will determine this spring in Brussels how many inspections each country is to carry out. France, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada are demanding the lion's share. The Netherlands will probably be assigned to visit 60 military camps, training areas, airfields, and storage depots in Eastern Europe. The six-man teams will take four to five days to carry out their mission there. In the first months after a treaty is signed in Vienna, the task will be to verify the strength figures provided by the Warsaw Pact countries. Then, for three years the inspectors will verify that the reductions are actually being carried out. Finally, there are routine inspections and unannounced inspections.

The Defense Ministry expects 80 men to be sufficient for the next four years. The operation will cost 40 million guilders to begin with. The inspectors come from the various branches of the armed forces, most of them from the Army. Some are assigned permanently as inspectors while others are assigned temporarily. The training, which will last four weeks, will include knowledge of the treaty, inspection techniques, rules of conduct, knowledge of the Warsaw Pact armed forces organization and equipment and order of battle, map-reading, and the use of sound and video equipment. This summer the Netherlands and Belgium want to hold test inspections. At first interpreters will be brought in from outside but soon military personnel will be trained to do that as well.

Brigadier General M. van Breeman of the defense staff wants to make it a flexible organization, not a cumbersome one. Now that the fear of the enemy is fading, he considers it very important for professional officers to be able to perform in other fields as well. Cooperation with other Western European countries will improve knowledge and skills. In this new field there is much to be learned from one another's experience, he says. Little experience was gained in implementing the treaty to eliminate intermediate-range missiles (INF). Teams

must also be trained in the Netherlands to accompany inspectors from Eastern Europe.

During a conference held yesterday at Clingendael, the Netherlands Institute for International Relations, it was pointed out that once the Vienna treaty is concluded, the Soviets alone will probably be withdrawing 380,000 men and 131,000 weapon systems. Today only the United States and the Soviet Union possess satellite systems capable of monitoring troop deployments and depots. Most other NATO and Warsaw Pact countries see that as a problem.

The head of the Free University's Verification Technology Center, H. van der Graaf, suggested that the European countries together should put up a satellite system of their own. He would like to see separate satellite systems for Western and Eastern Europe. Such a system would cost 500 million guilders a year and it would take six to seven years before the satellites could be launched. The Western European Union (WEU), the political and military club formed by nine Western European countries, is studying the desirability and costs of Western European surveillance satellites. Today the 21 countries must rely on ground teams and monitoring from aircraft.

Van der Graaf envisages the Netherlands playing a special role by equipping some of the Navy's 13 Orion patrol aircraft, stationed at Valkenburg, with infrared sensors and making them available to other NATO countries for inspection flights. Interested countries could contribute to the cost of the aircraft and provide personnel.

Modern technology will facilitate verification of the new arms treaties. Garrisons and arms depots can be monitored by means of advanced electronic equipment. Special electronic signs can be attached to weapon systems to make it possible to verify from a distance, or even from space satellites and aircraft, in addition to ground inspection, whether they are being removed from the depots or casernes and deployed elsewhere.

At the Clingendael conference there was some criticism of the latest proposals presented by NATO this week in Vienna. The 16 NATO countries want to retain the right to refuse certain surprise inspections after all. NATO is also divided as to the desirability of allowing inspections of factories where military materiel is manufactured. If inspection is not allowed, it would be possible to cheat. Naturally, guarantees must be provided against the possibility of industrial espionage, but that can be done by conducting inspections outside the factories, experts say.

The facts gathered by the individual Western European countries on Warsaw Pact territory should be processed by a central agency. It would cost about 900 million guilders a year to set up such an agency and operate a Western European surveillance satellite. That would require the NATO countries to be self-denying in the acquisition of electronic equipment, because otherwise it would cost far more. The cost of monitoring arms treaty

compliance seems high but it is just one one-thousandth of the 900 billion guilders the West now spends on defense every year.

NORWAY

Debate on Local U.S. Force Strength Viewed

90EN0419A Oslo AFTENPOSTEN in Norwegian
6 Mar 90 p 2

[Guest commentary by Arne Olav Brundtland, researcher with the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs: "Not Like Albania"]

[Text] One argument for accepting increased advance stockpiling of American military supplies in Norway at this time, according to Prime Minister Jan P. Syse's statement in the Saturday edition of AFTENPOSTEN, is that other NATO countries also think this is the right course in a situation where the United States is pulling its military forces out of Europe. Another argument implied in the debate is that we have the chance now, but we cannot know how interested the United States will be later on. A third is that there has been no naval disarmament in the northern region and, therefore, more counterbalance is needed. A fourth is that Europe is in turmoil and some people even think internal unrest in the Soviet Union could tempt the Soviets to embark on foreign policy adventures against Norway to divert the discontent.

New Strategy?

The first of these arguments is the most interesting, but it involves a new strategic vision that I would like to see developed in more detail. The point seems to be that when the Americans weaken their ground forces in Germany, they should strengthen their flank positions. In my opinion such reasoning would seem more correct if the anticipated American withdrawal was occurring as a result of a spirit of antagonism toward Germany and the Soviet Union. But in reality it is taking place in a totally different situation that is characterized by arms reduction, detente, and cooperation.

I find it impossible to believe that the American Navy will ever lose interest in the Soviet North Fleet. This means that Norwegian territory will always be of strategic interest to the United States. Consequently, we will not lose out on any future advance stockpiling if we decline the offer now.

NATO Profile

New advance stockpiles will represent a modest step in the direction of enhancing our NATO profile. This can be regarded as a kind of tone-deafness with regard to security policy in a situation characterized by a sharp reduction in the Soviet threat. Communism is on its sickbed in Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union too,

for that matter. Democratic elections are being introduced. People want consumer goods, not defense production. A Soviet military withdrawal is in progress and the Soviet Union has even endorsed Germany unity. We do not need to enhance our NATO profile in this kind of foreign policy situation.

It is quite absurd to think that the Soviet North Fleet represents any self-contained aggressive danger independent of general Soviet policy. We can also discount any unrealistic Soviet policy aimed at diverting internal discontent. Even if the Soviet military staged a counterrevolution it would be a long time before the Soviet Union could launch an attack aimed at conquering a united West.

Debate

The debate we are now having on possible new advance stockpiling has been given a pronounced domestic political emphasis by some participants. There are questions about what this person or that said in the past. Such internal political position assessments and the accompanying accusations of betraying one's standpoints must be viewed as a "sport" of limited significance.

Security policy must be pursued with an eye to the real threats the country is facing or might face in the future. Since the time when the discussion of possible new advance stockpiling began, we have experienced an international security policy revolution that will probably continue along the same encouraging lines. Norway should also contribute to such a development on the international level, preferably more vigorously than it does today. At that point we must show that we have a carefully considered grasp of the situation. It cannot be that different from the dictates of common sense and the sentiments of our leading allies.

Neither increased NATO integration nor a steadily rising defense budget can be goals in themselves or a test of fidelity to a responsible security policy. We should not conduct a security policy debate in this country that makes us look like some kind of "security policy Albania," opposed to any change.

During a Storting debate John Lyng once retorted to Finn Gustavsen that it was absurd to accuse him of wanting to go to the North Pole just because he wanted to walk out of Storting through the north door.

There should be some sense of proportion in the discussion.

TURKEY

Ministry Sees No Hostile Iraqi Missile Intent

TA0504101290 Ankara ANATOLIA
in English 0855 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Text] Ankara, (A.A)—The intention of how to use missiles is an important factor in a potential threat situation, the Foreign Ministry said on Wednesday following recent reports that Iraq has long-range missiles

capable of carrying chemical warheads. Iraq has said it has chemical missiles capable of hitting Israel, which could be used in the event of an Israeli threat. A Turkish newspaper said on Wednesday that the missiles were a threat against Turkey as well.

Foreign Ministry spokesman Ferhat Ataman told A.A. that Turkey had friendly relations with Iraq. "On the missile issue, there are two elements in a missile threat. One is the actual existence of the weapon, the other is the intent of using it. In this respect, our relations with Iraq are good and friendly," he said.

UNITED KINGDOM

Nuclear Triggers Intercepted en Route to Iraq

LD2803181290 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1645 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Report by Peter Archer, PRESS ASSOCIATION home affairs correspondent]

[Excerpts] Forty nuclear trigger devices—enough to detonate one or two nuclear bombs—were seized at London's Heathrow airport today as they were about to be loaded on a flight to Iraq.

British and American customs investigators arrested five people.

They were caught trying to smuggle 40 krytron triggers, a sophisticated electrical switch which forms part of the nuclear detonation chain.

One of the five, an Iraqi, is being deported after his country's ambassador was summoned to the Foreign Office.

The four others are three Britons, including a woman and a naturalised Iraqi-born man, and a Lebanese.

The gang was tonight being questioned at a secret location by customs investigators.

The swoop came after a protracted inquiry by investigator [words indistinct] the United States to Britain, and on to Iraq.

It is understood American customs officers working undercover early last year discovered a plot to smuggle the nuclear triggers to Baghdad.

The Americans kept surveillance on the plotters and when it became [words indistinct] to Iraq was through the UK, British customs chiefs were alerted.

The trap was set but arrests could not be made until documentation was completed, freeing the nuclear triggers from a Heathrow warehouse to be loaded on to an Iraqi flight.

Police from Scotland Yard's deportation squad arrested two men at Heathrow.

The three other gang members were arrested at addresses in London and Surrey. [passage omitted]

The triggers were stored in TWA's transit shed at Heathrow and were probably disguised as machine parts.

Trade in the triggers is prohibited with certain countries under the 1989 export of goods (control) order.

The regulations, drawn up by the 17 member states of the Co-ordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), including European countries and the United States, deny regimes like Iraq access to materials with possible uses in the development of nuclear and chemical weapons and missile technology.

Defense Secretary Foresees Military Cuts

LD2803193990 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1901 GMT 28 Mar 90

[Text] Britain's future armed forces will be smaller but better equipped if developments in Eastern Europe continue as hoped, Defence Secretary Tom King said today. In his first public discussion on the future shape of the services, Mr King outlined the military map of Europe in the years ahead. He acknowledged there would be some cuts in forces but insisted a nuclear deterrent would remain.

"We have seen the resolution of conflict without invasion because nuclear deterrents made the sort of wars we saw in World War I and II absolutely unacceptable," he told the Commons Defence Committee. We are not about to dismantle that now that it has been proved a million times over."

Citing the current situation in Lithuania, Mr King said: "We live in uncertain and potentially dangerous times. We do not put at risk [words indistinct]"

He agreed there would be problems with the defence budget but cut [words indistinct] in five years, tensions continued to relax. In what appeared to be a 'sweetener' to the forces, Mr King pledged his full support to new procurement programmes such as the European fighter aircraft and a replacement for the Chieftain tank. Mr King spoke of a "comprehensive" examination of the roles of Britain's forces so that changes would be made in a careful and considered way and not driven by having to save set sums of cash. He predicted there would be a "thinning-out" of British forces on the Central Front in West Germany but was unclear about the future role of the three army divisions currently based on German soil.

It was "unlikely" they would be moved elsewhere in Europe but there could be increased participation in multi-national forces.

Mr King also said Britain wanted a unified Germany to remain part of NATO, although there would be major

problems over the precise terms. He accepts Soviet concerns about the time required to withdraw troops from East Germany and acknowledged the immense problem of demobilising thousands of troops.

He did not envisage NATO troops replacing Warsaw Pact forces in what is now East Germany—but possibly West German troops not dedicated to NATO.

Kohl Wants 'Full NATO Protection' for Germany

LD3003135790 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1238 GMT 30 Mar 90

[Report by Tom McMullan, PRESS ASSOCIATION
diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] A united Germany should come under the full protection of NATO, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said in London today. Dr Kohl, who held talks with Mrs Thatcher at Downing Street, said they had agreed that nuclear weapons would have to remain on German soil after unification. Speaking at a joint press conference, Mrs Thatcher said: "We agreed that the presence of nuclear weapons on European soil—German soil is the preferred soil—is vital. We have not got down to details. That has to be negotiated within NATO." Dr Kohl added that the presence of nuclear weapons on German soil had to be negotiated as part of wider security arrangements. Germany was not seeking special treatment because they might lead to isolation, he said. "We want the full protection of NATO for the territory of Germany," he said.

Mrs Thatcher and Dr Kohl aired their difference over the direction of Europe, whether more power should be given to the European Parliament and the need to modernise short-range nuclear weapons based on German soil. But at the end of the talks there was no sign of acrimony between the two leaders whose relations are not normally close. Mrs Thatcher did not respond to the chancellor's call for the European Community to move ahead to greater unity. She said: "It is best as it is at the moment."

Dr Kohl said the creation of a barrier-free market in 1992 was "only a step towards the goal of political unification of Europe".

The prime minister pointed out that Britain willingly cooperated on a wide range of issues with its European partners at a variety of levels. She said: "Each of us willingly cooperates and keeps our national pride, our own characteristics which we bring to Europe as a whole. "I believe in Europe growing together in that way with willing cooperation. I believe it is growing day by day. That is the way I want to keep it." She was also asked if she believed that more power should now be given to the European Parliament. "It is not long since we increased the powers under the single European act. I see no need

for any further increase," she said. Mrs Thatcher indicated that a decision has yet to be taken not to modernise the Lance short-range nuclear weapon now based in Germany.

Dr Kohl suggested that short-range missiles had a reduced role to play in the light of the changes sweeping Eastern Europe. "I think the world has changed and within NATO we will have to draw the consequences in reasonable discussions," he said. He indicated he would not readily agree to the modernisation of short-range weapons based in Germany.

Company Denies Illegal Dealings with Iraq

*LD3003142490 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1337 GMT 30 Mar 90*

[Text] One of the companies searched by customs officers investigating an alleged Iraqi smuggling operation today denied supplying equipment or services without first clearing them with the British authorities. The officers seized large quantities of documents from the raids on Global Technical and Management Services International, based in Deeside, North Wales, and a company in Edinburgh. Inquiries are understood to centre on the alleged smuggling to Iraq of acoustic detonators for sea mines which can distinguish between friendly and enemy ships.

Global said in a statement it had recently completed a contract for clearing Iraq's offshore waterways of mines and debris and intended increasing its links with the country. It continued: "Global is currently negotiating several contracts in Iraq and regards it as an important market place in which it enjoys an enviable reputation. It intends to increase its activities in Iraq and intends continuing to transfer technology and knowledge to Iraq. However, Global is equally committed to a policy of openness and would not provide any services to Iraq or any other foreign country that was not accepted or sanctioned by the British authorities."

Customs officers searched its offices, as well as those of its accountants and solicitors and the homes of two directors, on Wednesday morning and a large quantity of documents relating to the company's activities in Iraq were taken.

The statement said: "The precise nature of their investigation is at this time not clear to us. However, we believe that customs suspect Global of having been involved in exporting prohibited materials to Iraq."

Global was specifically incorporated to carry out a contract to survey Iraqi offshore waterways of ordinance and other debris in order to make them safe for navigation and movement of shipping.

The statement went on: "The project involved the supply to Iraq of equipment and personnel (many of which were ex-special British forces) to carry out the contract of works and also to train Iraqi navy personnel. Prior to the

award of the contract, it was discussed in depth with British embassy officials in Baghdad. Copies of the contract document were distributed to the British embassy, all major UK suppliers and third parties involved within the project." The company said the contract had begun on January 5, 1989, and was recently completed, with all works witnessed and certified by Lloyds Register. "We emphasise no equipment or materials were supplied outside those listed in the contract."

Hurd Stresses 'Essential Role' of NATO

*LD3103100790 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 0931 GMT 31 Mar 90*

[Text] NATO still has an essential role to play in maintaining stability in Europe, Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said today. Although the changes in the European balance of power raised the possibility of "orderly" arms cuts and changes in strategy, the basic framework must remain, he said.

Mr Hurd, due to visit the Soviet Union in 10 days, told representatives of the Conservative Central Council in Cheltenham that no one knew how long the reformist policies of President Gorbachev would last. He said the West, shielded by NATO, had "shone as a beacon" to the nations of Eastern Europe for 40 years. "Of course Mr Gorbachev is different from his predecessors. Of course we hope that he will succeed in bringing both political and economic reform to Russia. But we have no guarantee that Mr Gorbachev will succeed. We have to acknowledge the possibility that we could one day be faced again with a grimmer, more traditional Soviet leader." Even with arms cuts, the Soviet Union would still have the largest armed forces in Europe.

"So arms reductions, yes, by all means, provided that they are orderly and well thought out. Changes to NATO strategy—not ruled out. But the Atlantic alliance is still and for the foreseeable future will remain the cornerstone of European peace and our own national security," he said. The proper place to reinforce democracy and human rights was within the framework of the 35-nation Helsinki agreement at September's conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Eventually he hoped the emerging democracies of the East would turn into thriving free market economies and join the EC. But he added: "Apart from the special case of East Germany none of the new democracies will be ready in the short term for full community membership—although that should not be excluded for the future. Our immediate task is to establish association agreements allowing each of these countries to develop ever stronger and closer links with the Community. That work is under way—it is in the interests of us all."

In his first public pronouncement on the problems in Lithuania, Mr Hurd followed the prime minister's line of urging restraint on President Gorbachev. "We hope he will use his new powers wisely to tackle his country's

many problems. In particular, we hope that restraint on both sides and a readiness to negotiate will lead to a just settlement in Lithuania.

Defense White Paper Outlines Future of Forces

LD0204148190 London PRESS ASSOCIATION
in English 1041 GMT 2 Apr 90

[Report by Charles Miller, PRESS ASSOCIATION
defence correspondent]

[Text] Future armed forces will be modern and well-equipped, although slightly smaller in numbers, with an increased role outside Europe, according to the defence White Paper published today.

Speculation of sweeping changes and cuts in the wake of easing East/West tension and disarmament hopes is firmly quashed.

It talks of the continued presence of British forces in Germany and U.S. forces in Europe and the need for nuclear weapons.

And the emphasis is on a cautious, disciplined and good sense approach to any changes in military structure.

But, in an unprecedented move, the White Paper talks for the first time of the possibility of including Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent in disarmament talks.

It stresses government policy remains unchanged with continuing plans to replace Polaris with the more potent Trident system in the mid-1990s.

Even the successful conclusion of the superpowers START (Strategic Arms Reduction Talks) Treaty, would not remove the need to introduce Trident, it says.

But it adds: "If U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals were further reduced very substantially and there had been no significant improvements in defensive capabilities, we would consider how best we might contribute to the arms control process in the light of the changed circumstances.

"Reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic arsenals would have to go much further before we could even consider including the British deterrent in any future negotiations on strategic nuclear weapons."

Although the White Paper insists that NATO's policy of flexible response—a gradual escalation from conventional through to a range of nuclear forces—remains the best defensive strategy, it emphasises the size of these forces can be changed.

In a forward to the White Paper, Defence Secretary Tom King continues the government line of welcoming events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, but warning of the uncertainty inherent in such changes.

Despite conventional arms cuts expected from the CFE (Conventional Forces in Europe) talks in Vienna later

this year, he says the Soviet Union will remain a super-power for the foreseeable future.

This scheme is continued later in the White Paper, with a warning that changes in Russia over the centuries have not been marked with peaceful gradualism.

"The very suddenness of recent upheavals, welcome as their initial impulse has been, carries its own warning," it says.

"The range of possible outcomes remains wide, and not all the possibilities are comfortable.

"It makes no sense accordingly to throw away safeguards simply because we would like not to need them any more."

But the White Paper talks of the new, "immense" opportunities opening up for managing international security.

Mr King says the government is doing a great deal of work to prepare for future decisions on the "adjustments" that might be made in the future.

However, in a reference to out of area commitments and the possible threat to world peace from the Third World, Mr. King says the services will continue their role of safeguarding the country's interests and freedoms.

"We cannot be certain where or how these may next be threatened and we must remain able to meet challenges with a skilful and effective response," he says.

"While there may be opportunities for reductions in some areas, we are resolved to sustain modern and well-equipped forces."

The first indications of a change in emphasis away from the central front in Germany to the Royal Navy and out of area commitments are contained in an analysis of the budget figures.

For the first time, the amount of money to be spent on forces on the central front is set to fall from 4.349 billion pounds sterling to 4.135 billion pounds sterling, having risen substantially every year from 2.6 billion pounds sterling in 1984-85.

And, for the first time in four years, spending on the Navy is set to rise from 2.59 billion pounds sterling to 2.67 billion pounds sterling, having fallen every year from 1986-87.

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

27 APRIL 90